The registration of a claim was founded on negotiations through correspondence. The Court examined the correspondence, and found that it was clear that there was no possible binding contract existing between the parties, vacated the registration. It vacated the registration.
Wilmer LJ said: ‘ It seems to me that this is a clear case and that the judge was plainly right. The correspondence relied on as constituting an estate contract was precisely specified and limited to the period between the dates given. With regard to that correspondence, the judge in his judgment said: ‘I will not go through that correspondence in detail. It will be sufficient for me to say that it is clear beyond argument that nothing in that correspondence creates a binding contract as between the plaintiffs and the defendants. The whole correspondence consists of negotiations ‘subject to contract’ for the sale of land, those negotiations being conducted on the basis that a contract would in due course be entered into and that the parties would not be bound until a contract was entered into.’ I entirely agree with what the judge said in that passage; indeed, the contrary has not really been argued; for Mr, Merriton has admitted that on the correspondence as it stands he cannot understand (contend?) that a binding contract was entered into. If that be right, then, it seems to me, the entry which is on the register ought not to be allowed to stand.
Mr. Merriton has, however, indicated that it may be possible, with the aid of documents which are not at present available, and possibly with the aid of oral evidence from a witness, to prove that there was some other contract. Assuming for the sake of argument that he is justified in that contention, it does not seem to me to affect the question whether this particular entry in these terms ought to be allowed to stand. Agreeing, as I do, with the judge that on the correspondence it is quite clear that the alleged contract registered was not a contract, I also agree with him in the conclusion he reached that the previous case of In re Engall’s Agreement was clearly distinguishable.’
Judges:
Wilmer LJ
Citations:
[1963] 1 WLR 975
Cited by:
See Also – Heywood v BDC Properties Ltd (No 2) CA 1964
The registration of an action as a lis pendens by a non-counterclaiming defendant was held to be an abuse, and although there was no jurisdiction to vacate the registration under the Land Charges Act 1925, the Court had an inherent jurisdiction to . .
Cited – Nugent v Nugent ChD 20-Dec-2013
The court was asked whether the court has, following the the 2002 Act, an inherent power to order the cancellation of a unilateral notice registered against a title registered under the 2002 Act and, if so, in what circumstances, and how, such a . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Registered Land
Updated: 04 May 2022; Ref: scu.519750
