The question arose whether the defendant solicitor, sued for fraudulently concealing that his client was insolvent and thereby inducing the plaintiff to issue a promissory note on the client’s behalf, could claim privilege in respect of communications which he had received from his client. The Lord Chancellor held that the defendant could claim privilege, that it made no difference whether it was the client or the solicitor who was the defendant and that it did not matter that, at the time, there were no existing or contemplated proceedings. In relation to lawyers: ‘Here the question relates to the solicitor, who is called upon to produce the entries he had made in accounts, and letters received by him, and those written (chiefly to his town agent) by him, or by his direction, in his character or situation of confidential solicitor to the party; and I am of opinion that he cannot be compelled to disclose papers delivered, or communications made to him, or letters, or entries made by him in that capacity. To compel a party himself to answer upon oath, even as to his belief or his thoughts, is one thing; nay, to compel him to disclose what he has written or spoken to others, not being his professional advisers, is competent to the party seeking the discovery; for such communications are not necessary to the conduct of judicial business, and the defence or prosecution of men’s rights by the aid of skilful persons. To force from the party himself the production of communications made by him to professional men seems inconsistent with the possibility of an ignorant man safely resorting to professional advice, and can only be justified if the authority of decided cases warrants it. But no authority sanctions the much wider violation of professional confidence, and in circumstances wholly different, which would be involved in compelling counsel or attorneys or solicitors to disclose matters committed to them in their professional capacity, and which, but for their employment as professional men, they would not have become possessed of. As regards them, it does not appear that the protection is qualified by any reference to proceedings pending or in contemplation. If touching matters that come within the ordinary scope of professional employment, they receive a communication in their professional capacity, either from a client, or on his account, and for his benefit in the transaction of his business, or, which amounts to the same thing, if they commit to paper, in the course of their employment on his behalf, matters which they know only through their professional relation to the client, they are not only justified in withholding such matters, but bound to withhold them, and will not be compelled to disclose the information or produce the papers in any Court of law or equity, either as party or as witness. If this protection were confined to cases where proceedings had commenced, the rule would exclude the most confidential, and it may be the most important of all communications – those made with a view of being prepared either for instituting or defending a suit, up to the instant that the process of the Court issued.’
If it were confined to proceedings begun or in contemplation, then every communication would be unprotected which a party makes with a view to his general defence against attacks which he apprehends, although at the time no one may have resolved to assail him. But were it allowed to extend over such communications, the protection would be insufficient, if it only included communications more or less connected with judicial proceedings; for a person oftentimes requires the aid of professional advice upon the subject of his rights and his liabilities, with no references to any particular litigation, and without any other reference to litigation generally than all human affairs have, in so far as every transaction may, by possibility, become the subject of judicial inquiry. ‘It would be most mischievous,’ said the learned Judges in the Common Pleas, ‘if it could be doubted whether or not an attorney, consulted upon a man’s title to an estate, was at liberty to divulge a flaw’ (2 Brod. and Bingh. 6). . . The foundation of this rule is not difficult to discover. It is not (as has sometimes been said) on account of any particular importance which the law attributes to the business of legal professors, or any particular disposition to afford them protection, though certainly it may not be very easy to discover why a like privilege has been refused to others, and especially to medical advisers. . . . But it is out of regard to the interests of justice, which cannot be upholden, and to the administration of justice, which cannot go on, without the aid of men skilled in jurisprudence, in the practice of the Courts, and in those matters affecting rights and obligations which form the subject of all judicial proceedings. If the privilege did not exist at all, every one would be thrown upon his own legal resources; deprived of all professional assistance, a man would not venture to consult any skilful person, or would only dare to tell his counsellor half his case. If the privilege were confined to communications connected with suits begun, or intended, or expected, or apprehended, no one could safely adopt such precautions as might eventually render any proceedings successful, or all proceedings superfluous.’
However: ‘for a person at times requires the aid of professional advice upon the subject of his rights and liabilities, with no references to any particular litigation, and without any other reference to litigation generally than all human affairs have, in so far as every transaction may, by possibility, become the subject of judicial inquiry . . .The foundation of this rule is not difficult to discover. It is not (as has sometimes been said) on account of any particular importance which the law attaches to the business of legal professors, or any particular disposition to afford them protection, though certainly it may not be very easy to discover why a like privilege has been refused to others, and especially medical advisers. But it is out of regard to the interests of justice, which cannot go on, without the aid of men skilled in jurisprudence, in the practice of the courts, and in those matters affecting rights and obligations which form the subject of all judicial proceedings. If the privilege did not exist at all, every one would be thrown upon his own legal resources’
and ‘the interests of justice, which cannot be upholden, and the administration of justice, which cannot go on without the aid of men skilled in jurisprudence, in the practice of the courts, and in those matters affecting rights and obligations which form the subject of all judicial proceedings.’
Judges:
Lord Brougham LC
Citations:
(1833) 1 My and K 98, [1833] EngR 105, (1833) Coop T Br 96, (1833) 47 ER 35
Links:
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Three Rivers District Council and others v The Governor and Co of the Bank of England (No 5) CA 3-Apr-2003
Documents had been prepared by the respondent to support a request for legal advice in anticipation of the Bingham enquiry into the collapse of BCCI.
Held: Legal advice privilege attached to the communications between a client and the . .
Cited – Three Rivers District Council and others v The Governor and Co of the Bank of England (No 6) CA 1-Mar-2004
The Bank of England had sought assistance from its lawyers to prepare for a private non-statutory enquiry. The claimant sought disclosure of that advice. The defendant bank claimed legal professional privilege.
Held: Not all advice given by a . .
Cited – Three Rivers District Council and others v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 6) HL 11-Nov-2004
The Bank anticipated criticism in an ad hoc enquiry which was called to investigate its handling of a matter involving the claimant. The claimant sought disclosure of the documents created when the solicitors advised employees of the Bank in . .
Cited – Herring v Clobery 1842
The court considered whether legal advice privilege should be confined to litigation: ‘But further, I think that restriction of the rule is not consistent with, and not founded on, any sound principle; for it may, and in a great variety of cases . .
Cited – Carpmael v Powis 1846
The court discussed the extent and scope of legal professional privilege: ‘I am of the opinion that the privilege extends to all communications between a solicitor, as such, and his client, relating to matters within the ordinary scope of a . .
Cited – Regina v Derby Magistrates Court Ex Parte B HL 19-Oct-1995
No Breach of Solicitor Client Confidence Allowed
B was charged with the murder of a young girl. He made a confession to the police, but later changed his story, saying his stepfather had killed the girl. He was acquitted. The stepfather was then charged with the murder. At his committal for trial, . .
Cited – Kuwait Airways Corporation v Iraqi Airways Company (No 6) CA 16-Mar-2005
The defendant company appealed against an order allowing inspection of documents for which litigation privilege had been claimed. It was said that the defendants had been involved in perjury in previous proceedings between the parties.
Held: . .
Cited – Prudential Plc and Another, Regina (on the Application of) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax and Another Admn 14-Oct-2009
The company had obtained legal advice but had taken it from their accountants. The Revenue sought its disclosure, and the company said that as legal advice it was protected by legal professional privilege.
Held: The material was not protected. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Legal Professions
Updated: 27 April 2022; Ref: scu.180861