Grappelli v Derek Block (Holdings) Ltd: CA 20 Jan 1981

Stephane Grappelli, an renowned musician, employed the defendants to promote him. They purported to arrange various concerts, but did so without his authority. When they were cancelled, they told the venue owners that they were cancelled because the plaintiff was ‘very seriously ill in Paris’ and that it would be surprising ‘if he ever toured again’. About five months later the defendants by advertisement and a press release announced a number of concerts to be given by the plaintiff at different places on dates which included some of the dates on which the first concerts were to have taken place. The plaintiff claimed damages for injurious falsehood, and for libel alleging that the facts gave rise to an innuendo that the plaintiff had given a false reason for cancelling the concert which he knew to be false. The defendant sought to strike out the allegation of libel and slander because the pleadings did not identify any members of the public who were alleged to acknowledge of the intrinsic facts supporting the innuendo. The defendant appealed against rejection of this argument.
Held: The appeal succeeded. A claimant cannot rely on events subsequent to publication to establish that the words referred, or would have been understood to refer to him.
Lord Denning MR said: ‘Upon this point we heard interesting discussion on both sides. I would go by the principle, which is well-established, that in defamation – be it libel or slander – the cause of action is the publication of defamatory words of and concerning the plaintiff. The cause of action arises when those words are published to the person by whom they are read or heard. The cause of action arises then: and not later.’
C-D Dunn LJ said: ‘Like Lord Denning MR, I would prefer to deal with this on principle. I agree that a publication is an essential part of the cause of action; that once there is publication the cause of action is complete, and there is no room for the doctrine that the cause of action can, so to speak, be allowed to be inchoate or lie dormant until such time as some fact emerges which would transform an otherwise innocent statement into a defamatory one . . .’

Judges:

Denning MR, Templeman and Dunn LJJ

Citations:

[1981] 2 All ER 272, [1981] 1 WLR 822

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

ApprovedSimons Proprietary Ltd v Riddle 1941
(New Zealand) Blair J said: ‘On the authorities – see Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspapers 1929] 2KB 331 and Tolley v. JS Fry and Sons Ltd. [1930] 1 KB 467 – innocent matter may be given a defamatory meaning by readers with knowledge of facts not . .

Cited by:

CitedWright v Caan QBD 27-Jul-2011
The claimant sought damages in defamation and malicious falsehood and in respect of a conversation with a journalist and the defendant’s website. The defendant had made offers of support to her business venture in a television program. After she . .
CitedEconomou v De Freitas QBD 27-Jul-2016
Failed action for defamation on rape allegations
The claimant had been accused by the defendant’s daughter of rape. He was never charged but sought to prosecute her alleging intent to pervert the course of justice. She later killed herself. The defendant sought to have the inquest extended to . .
CitedLachaux v Independent Print Ltd (1) CA 12-Sep-2017
Defamation – presumption of damage after 2013 Act
The claimant said that the defendant had published defamatory statements which were part of a campaign of defamation brought by his former wife. The court now considered the requirement for substantiality in the 2013 Act.
Held: The defendant’s . .
CitedSimon and Others v Lyder and Another PC 29-Jul-2019
(Trinidad and Tobago) The Board was asked as to the well-known conundrum in the common law of defamation, namely the extent to which (if at all) two or more different statements made upon different occasions by the same defendant may be aggregated . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Defamation

Updated: 24 April 2022; Ref: scu.442250