Although instructors in special schools, carried out work of a broadly similar nature to qualified teachers, and the majority were women, they were not entitled to an equality of pay clause, since there was no evidence of sex discrimination, and the employers were not required under the section to establish a good reason for the disparity in pay. A rebuttable presumption of sex discrimination arises once the gender-based comparison shows that a woman, doing like work or work rated as equivalent or work of equal value to that of a man, is being paid or treated less favourably than the man. The variation between her contract and the man’s contract is presumed to be due to the difference of sex. The burden passes to the employer to show that the explanation for the variation is not tainted with sex.
Lord Nicholls said: ‘I do not believe the Act of 1970 was intended to have this effect. Nor does the statutory language compel this result. The scheme of the Act is that a rebuttable presumption of sex discrimination arises once the gender-based comparison shows that a woman, doing like work or work rated as equivalent or work of equal value to that of a man, is being paid or treated less favourably than the man. The variation between her contract and the man’s contract is presumed to be due to the difference of sex. The burden passes to the employer to show that the explanation for the variation is not tainted with sex. In order to discharge this burden the employer must satisfy the tribunal on several matters. First, that the proffered explanation, or reason, is genuine, and not a sham or pretence. Second, that the less favourable treatment is due to this reason. The factor relied upon must be the cause of the disparity. In this regard, and in this sense, the factor must be a ‘material’ factor, that is, a significant and relevant factor. Third, that the reason is not ‘the difference of sex.’ This phrase is apt to embrace any form of sex discrimination, whether direct or indirect. Fourth, that the factor relied upon is or, in a case within section 1(2)(c), may be a ‘material’ difference, that is, a significant and relevant difference, between the woman’s case and the man’s case.
When section 1 is thus analysed, it is apparent that an employer who satisfies the third of these requirements is under no obligation to prove a ‘good’ reason for the pay disparity. In order to fulfil the third requirement he must prove the absence of sex discrimination, direct or indirect. If there is any evidence of sex discrimination, such as evidence that the difference in pay has a disparately adverse impact on women, the employer will be called upon to satisfy the tribunal that the difference in pay is objectively justifiable. But if the employer proves the absence of sex discrimination he is not obliged to justify the pay disparity.’
Lord Nicholls
Times 08-Feb-2000, Gazette 17-Feb-2000, [2000] UKHL 5, [2000] 1 WLR 333, [2000] ICR 196, [2002] IRLR 272
House of Lords, Bailii
Equal Pay Act 1970 1 1(3)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Strathclyde Regional Council and others v Wallace and others (Scotland) HL 22-Jan-1998
80% of the men who had been employed since 1 April 1997 had got protection under TUPE whereas only 66.66% of the women had. It was argued that this difference in percentages was sufficient to justify a claim of indirect discrimination.
Held: . .
Cited by:
Cited – Nelson v Carillion Services Ltd CA 15-Apr-2003
The appellant challenged dismissal of her claim for equal pay. It had been rejected on the ground that the employer had shown a material factor justifying the difference in pay.
Held: Enderby establishes that the burden of proving sex . .
Cited – Home Office v Bailey and others CA 22-Mar-2005
Prison officers claimed awards for sex discrimination. The employer replied that the pools of comparators each contained members of either sex. The appellants sought to establish that any less favourable treatment of them in comparison with the . .
Cited – Sharp v Caledonia Group Services Ltd EAT 1-Nov-2005
EAT Equal Pay Act – Material factor defence – In an equal pay claim involving a presumption of direct discrimination the genuine material factor defence requires justification by objective criteria.
The . .
Cited – South Tyneside Metropolitan Borough Council v Anderson and others EAT 26-Mar-2007
The council appealed a finding that there was no genuine material factor justifying a difference in pay, and in particular the availability of bonus schemes. . .
Cited – Grundy v British Airways Plc CA 23-Oct-2007
The claimant, a cabin crew member of the defendant’s staff sought damages for sex discrimination.
Held: Sedley LJ said that the pool chosen should be that which suitably tests the particular discrimination complained of. . .
Cited – Armstrong and others v Newcastle Upon Tyne NHS Hospital Trust CA 21-Dec-2005
The claimants claimed equal pay, asserting use of particular comparators. The Trust said that there was a genuine material factor justifying the difference in pay.
Held: To constitute a single source for the purpose of article 141, it is not . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Discrimination, Employment
Leading Case
Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.80854