The claimant said that the English law on assisted conception infringed her right to family life. She had began treatment with her partner, and was given a cycle of in-vitro fertilisation before her cancerous condition required removal of her ovaries. Her relationship foundered, and before she applied to have the embryo implanted, her former partner withdrew his consent to their use.
Held: The claim failed. A state was given a margin of appreciation and had a discretion within that range. The UK had operated within that margin, and had found its own balance between the public interest in regulation in vitro fertilisation and the right to private life.
The decision to become or not to become a parent, and the regulation of abortion, fall within the sphere of private life
The absence of any provision for individual scrutiny in legislation requiring the consent of both parties to the implantation of stored embryos was consistent with article 8 of the Convention. The Grand Chamber found (para 60) that ‘strong policy considerations underlay the decision of the legislature to favour a clear or ‘bright-line’ rule which would serve both to produce legal certainty and to maintain public confidence in the law in a sensitive field.’ It went on to observe: ‘While the applicant criticised the national rules on consent for the fact that they could not be disapplied in any circumstances, the court does not find that the absolute nature of the law is, in itself, necessarily inconsistent with article 8. Respect for human dignity and free will, as well as a desire to ensure a fair balance between the parties to IVF treatment, underlay the legislature’s decision to enact provisions permitting of no exception to ensure that every person donating gametes for the purpose of IVF treatment would know in advance that no use could be made of his or her genetic material without his or her continuing consent. In addition to the principle at stake, the absolute nature of the rule served to promote legal certainty and to avoid the problems of arbitrariness and inconsistency inherent in weighing, on a case by case basis, what the Court of Appeal described as ‘entirely incommensurable’ interests. In the courts view, these general interests pursued by the legislation are legitimate and consistent with article 8.’
6339/05, [2007] ECHR 264, Times 02-May-2007, [2007] 2 FCR 5, [2007] 1 FLR 1990, 46 EHRR 34, [2007] Fam Law 588, (2007) 95 BMLR 107, 22 BHRC 190, (2008) 46 EHRR 34
Bailii
Human Rights
Citing:
See Also – Evans v The United Kingdom ECHR 22-Nov-2006
. .
See Also – Evans v United Kingdom ECHR 7-Mar-2006
The claimant had entered into fertilisation treatment with her boyfriend. They both signed an agreement under which the fertilised sperm were only later to be implanted with the agreement of both. The couple separated, and the potential father . .
Cited by:
Cited – Marper v United Kingdom; S v United Kingdom ECHR 4-Dec-2008
(Grand Chamber) The applicants complained that on being arrested on suspicion of offences, samples of their DNA had been taken, but then despite being released without conviction, the samples had retained on the Police database.
Held: . .
Cited – MGN Limited v United Kingdom ECHR 18-Jan-2011
The applicant publisher said that the finding against it of breach of confidence and the system of success fees infringed it Article 10 rights to freedom of speech. It had published an article about a model’s attendance at Narcotics anonymous . .
Cited – Gallagher for Judicial Review (NI) SC 30-Jan-2019
Each appellant complained of the disclosure by the respondent of very old and minor offences to potential employers, destroying prospects of finding work. Two statutory schemes were challenged, raising two separate questions, namely whether any . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Human Rights
Updated: 09 January 2022; Ref: scu.253167
