The claimant was the adult daughter of the deceased. She had been expressly excluded by the deceased from a share in his estate. The claimant had bought a business with the aid of a loan secured by a mortgage. At first instance, Johnson J, dismissed her application, holding that whilst the deceased had a moral obligation to the applicant, based both on a promise by the deceased to leave shares previously belonging to his wife to the daughter, and on the daughter’s care for the deceased during his lifetime, that moral obligation had been discharged by the deceased’s financial support for the daughter during his lifetime.
Held: Her appeal succeeded. the claimant was awarded andpound;60,000 from the total net estate of andpound;196,000. The Court attached weight to the claimant’s assertion that her father had promised her mother that those assets that she had left directly to her husband would pass to her.
Butler-Sloss LJ summarised the arguments presented: ‘Mr Norris QC for the appellant submitted that the judge fell into error in his approach to the claim. He concentrated on the issue of moral obligation and did not consider the criteria under s 3(1) as a whole. Mr Norris submitted that the most significant factor for the court to take into account was the applicant’s needs and resources and the judge failed, despite the evidence before him, to make any findings at all about the financial position of the appellant: s 3(1)(a). An adult child was in no special position and this appellant was, at the time of death, dependent upon the deceased. At the time of the hearing her financial position was precarious. The judge, having found that a moral obligation existed, was in error in concluding that it had been discharged.
Mr Herbert QC submitted that the judge had to make a value judgment and the appellate court should not interfere unless he was plainly wrong. A court should be reluctant to disturb a will. An adult child capable of earning a living had a big hurdle to overcome unless moral obligation or special circumstances could be established. He accepted that the judge did not make findings about the appellant’s financial position but submitted that on the facts of this case it was not necessary to do so. In any event it must be inferred that the judge considered it was a case where the appellant had needs in order for him to go on and consider the moral obligation. The appellant had never provided evidence nor sought to ask for details of the portfolio shares inherited by the deceased from his wife and there was no evidence about it. At the time of the trial the appellant had bought a business and her present financial position was adequate. He submitted that the judge was entitled to come to the conclusion that the contribution made by the deceased during his lifetime together with the conduct of the appellant discharged any obligation he might have towards her.’
Butler-Sloss quoted her own judgment in Re Hancock and said: ‘I have drawn attention to the passages above from earlier decisions of this court in order to show the way in which the words ‘moral obligation’ and ‘special circumstance’ have been applied in the judgments. Subsection (1)(d) refers to ‘any obligations and responsibilities’. Plainly those obligations and responsibilities extend beyond legal obligations and that is why, in my view, the word ‘moral’ has been used to underline and explain that the deceased’s obligations and responsibilities are not to be narrowly construed as legal obligations but to be taken into account in a broad sense of obligation and responsibility. Any other meaning of ‘moral’ (such as the distinction between right and wrong, see Concise Oxford Dictionary) would more appropriately be considered under (g). There may have been some confusion in the minds of trial judges that the appellate court was placing a gloss upon the words of the section, and putting some special emphasis upon the requirements of subs (1)(d) so as to elevate moral obligation or special circumstance to some threshold requirement. From the judgments of this court in Re Coventry to the present day, it should be clear that no gloss has been put upon subs (1)(d). An adult child is, consequently, in no different position from any other applicant who has to prove his case. The court has to have regard to s 3(1)(a)-(g) and assess the relevance and the weight to be given to each factor in the list. If the applicant is of working age, with a job or capable of obtaining a job which would be available, the factors in favour of his claim for financial provision may not be of much weight in the scales. As Oliver J pointed out in Re Coventry, necessitous circumstances cannot be in themselves the reason to alter the testator’s dispositions. The passage from the judgment of Sir John Knox in Re Hancock (above) is, in my respectful view, particularly helpful to remind us of the right way to approach this class of case under the Act.
Applying these propositions to the present appeal, in my judgment the judge did fall into error by focusing too much upon the requirement for an adult child to show a moral obligation. At the stage that he decided that the moral obligation had been discharged, he failed to put the other criteria, particularly needs and resources of the appellant, into the balancing exercise. In the light of the way in which the case was presented to him, I have some sympathy with the judge’s approach to his decision. We were also told that it was an extempore judgment on the last day of his sitting in Manchester. Nonetheless his approach to the value judgment he had to make was flawed and his decision cannot stand.’
Judges:
Butler-Sloss LJ
Citations:
[1999] 1 FLR 747
Statutes:
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 3(1)(a)
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Snapes v Aram; Wade etc, In re Hancocks (Deceased) CA 1-May-1998
The adult daughter of the deceased claimed under the 1975 Act. The deceased had acted entirely reasonably in leaving his business land to those of his children who were active in the business, but after his death part of the land acquired a . .
Cited by:
Cited – Ilott v Mitson and Others CA 31-Mar-2011
The claimant, the estranged adult daughter of the deceased, had claimed under the 1975 Act. The judge made an order for payment of andpound;50,000 by way of capitalisation of maintenance. The claimant appealed saying she should have received more, . .
Cited – Garland v Morris and Another ChD 11-Jan-2007
The claimant sought additional provision from her father’s estate. She said that the will failed to make reasonable provsion for her, bearing in mind her extreme financial needs. She was a single mother of three.
Held: The claim failed. . .
Cited – Wright v Waters and Another ChD 6-Nov-2014
The claimant sought provision from her late mother’s estate under the 1975 Act, and asserting a proprietary estoppel. The mother had transferred andpound;10,000 to the daughter several years before. The mother had said it was to be invested on her . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Wills and Probate
Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.431727
