Protesters objected that byelaws which had been made to prevent access to common land, namely Greenham Common were invalid.
Held: The byelaws did prejudice the rights of common. The House was concerned to clarify the test applicable when seeking to sever the valid from the invalid where part of subordinate legislation, the RAF Greenham Common Byelaws, was held to be ultra vires the enabling statute.
The fact that the invalid feature of the byelaw could not be excised with a blue pen did not preclude severance. What precluded it was that, if the byelaw was so construed as to allow the 62 commoners to enter the land, the legislative purpose behind it would be undermined.
The House set out a test of ‘substantial severability’ which the byelaws failed. Lord Bridge said: ‘When a legislative instrument made by a law-maker with limited powers is challenged, the only function of the court is to determine whether there has been a valid exercise of that limited legislative power in relation to the matter which is the subject of disputed enforcement. If a law-maker has validly exercised his power, the court may give effect to the law validly made. But if the court sees only an invalid law made in excess of the law-maker’s power, it has no jurisdiction to modify or adapt the law to bring it within the scope of the law-maker’s power. These, I believe, are the basic principles which have always to be borne in mind in deciding whether legislative provisions which on their face exceed the law-maker’s power may be severed so as to be upheld and enforced in part.
The application of these principles leads naturally and logically to what has traditionally been regarded as the test of severability. It is often referred to inelegantly as the ‘blue pencil’ test. Taking the simplest case of a single legislative instrument containing a number of separate clauses of which one exceeds the law-maker’s power, if the remaining clauses enact free-standing provisions which were intended to operate and are capable of operating independently of the offending clause, there is no reason why those clauses should not be upheld and enforced. The law-maker has validly exercised his power by making the valid clauses. The invalid clause may be disregarded as unrelated to, and having no effect upon, the operation of the valid clauses, which accordingly may be allowed to take effect without the necessity of any modification or adaptation by the court. What is involved is in truth a double test. I shall refer to the two aspects of the test as textual severability and substantial severability. A legislative instrument is textually severable if a clause, a sentence, a phrase or a single word may be disregarded, as exceeding the law-maker’s power, and what remains of the text is still grammatical and coherent. A legislative instrument is substantially severable if the substance of what remains after severance is essentially unchanged in legislative purpose, operation and effect. ‘ and ‘The test of textual severability has the great merit of simplicity and certainty. When it is satisfied the court can readily see whether the omission from the legislative text of so much as exceeds the law-maker’s power leaves in place a valid text which is capable of operating and was evidently intended to operate independently of the invalid text. But I have reached the conclusion, though not without hesitation, that a rigid insistence that the test of textual severability must always be satisfied if a provision is to be upheld and enforced as partially valid will in some cases . . have the unreasonable consequence of defeating subordinate legislation of which the substantial purpose and effect was clearly within the law-maker’s power when, by some oversight or misapprehension of the scope of that power, the text, as written, has a range of application which exceeds that scope. It is important, however, that in all cases an appropriate test of substantial severability should be applied. When textual severance is possible, the test of substantial severability will be satisfied when the valid text is unaffected by, and independent of, the invalid. The law which the court may then uphold and enforce is the very law which the legislator has enacted, not a different law. But when the court must modify the text in order to achieve severance, this can only be done when the court is satisfied that it is effecting no change in the substantial purpose and effect of the impugned provision.’
Lord Bridge, Lord Griffiths, Lord Oliver and Lord Goff
[1990] 2 AC 783, Times 13-Jul-1990, [1988] UKHL 11
Bailii
Military Lands Act 1892
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Rex v Company of Fishermen of Faversham 1799
Lord Kenyon CJ discussed the validity of a byelaw: ‘With regard to the form of the byelaw indeed, though a byelaw may be good in part and bad in part, yet it can be so only where the two parts are entire and distinct from each other.’ . .
Cited – Rex v Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, Ex parte Whybrow and Co 1910
The court considered the ability to sever void sections of statutes from other sections.
Held: Griffiths CJ said: ‘It is contended, on the authority of decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, which are entitled to the greatest . .
Cited – The Employers’ Liability Cases 1908
(US Supreme Court) The court heard together two appeals regarding the range of federal jurisdiction to legislate for the regulation of interstate commerce. The true construction of the federal statute whose constitutionality was in issue was . .
Cited – Illinois Central Railroad Co v McKendree 1906
(US Supreme Court) An order of the Secretary of Agriculture purporting to fix a quarantine line under the Cattle Contagious Disease Act (1903), which applied in terms to all shipments, whether interstate or intrastate, was void, notwithstanding that . .
Cited – Strickland v Hayes CA 12-Feb-1896
A by-law made by a county council under s 16 of the 1888 Act, was in the following terms: ‘No person shall in any street or public place, or on land adjacent thereto, sing or recite any profane or obscene song or ballad, or use any profane or . .
Cited – Regina v Lundie QBD 1862
A byelaw provided: ‘if any person shall stock or depasture, inter alia, a vicious horse on any part of the common pastures, then, and in every such case, the person or persons so offending, and the owner or owners of the said stock and cattle, shall . .
Cited by:
Cited – Pilar Aida Rojas v Brian Berllaque PC 10-Nov-2003
PC (Gibraltar) The system of selecting a criminal jury obliged men to be available for selection, but women could choose not to be on the role of jurors. The result was that jury lists and juries were almost . .
Cited – Commissioner of Police v Davis PC 1994
(Bahamas) Certain statutory provisions relating to drug offences infringed the Constitution of The Bahamas. A question then arose on the severability of one of the offending statutory provisions, section 22(8) of the Dangerous Drugs Act. This . .
Cited – Oakley Inc v Animal Ltd and others PatC 17-Feb-2005
A design for sunglasses was challenged for prior publication. However the law in England differed from that apparently imposed from Europe as to the existence of a 12 month period of grace before applying for registration.
Held: Instruments . .
Cited – National Association of Health Stores and Another, Regina (on the Application of) v Department of Health CA 22-Feb-2005
Applications were made to strike down regulations governing the use of the herbal product kava-kava.
Held: The omission of any transtitional provisions had not affected anyone. Nor was the failure to consult as to the possibility of dealing . .
Cited – Regina v Warwickshire County Council ex parte Powergen Plc CA 31-Jul-1997
The council as highway authority had objected to a development on the grounds of road safety. The application was subsequently approved by the Secretary of State, but the Council sought to maintain its safety objection.
Held: The highway . .
Cited – Futter and Another v Revenue and Customs; Pitt v Same SC 9-May-2013
Application of Hastings-Bass Rule
F had created two settlements. Distributions were made, but overlooking the effect of section 2(4) of the 2002 Act, creating a large tax liability. P had taken advice on the investment of the proceeds of a damages claim and created a discretionary . .
Cited – T and Another, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for The Home Department and Another SC 18-Jun-2014
T and JB, asserted that the reference in certificates issued by the state to cautions given to them violated their right to respect for their private life under article 8 of the Convention. T further claims that the obligation cast upon him to . .
Cited – Hemming (T/A Simply Pleasure) and Others, Regina (on The Application of) v Westminster City Council SC 19-Jul-2017
The claimant challenged fees which were charged to the respondents on applying to Westminster City Council for sex shop licences for the three years ended 31 January 2011, 2012 and 2013 and which included the council’s costs of enforcing the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Land, Constitutional, Armed Forces
Leading Case
Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.187749