CS v ACS and Another: FD 16 Apr 2015

Rule Against Appeal was Ultra Vires

W had applied to have set aside the consent order made on her ancillary relief application accusing the husband of material non-disclosure. She complained that her application to have the order varied had been refused on the ground that her only remedy was in an appeal.
Held: The appeal succeeded. The rule allowing only an appeal was ultra vires and was to be treated as a nullity insfar as it purported to remove the right of a litigant in certain circumstances to apply to the court without first obtaining permission.

Sir James Munby P FD
[2015] EWHC 1005 (Fam), [2015] WLR(D) 171, [2015] 1 WLR 4592, [2015] Fam Law 647
Bailii, WLRD
Family Proceedings Rules 30, Practice Direction 30A 14.1, Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 31F(6)(a)
England and Wales
CitedJonesco v Beard HL 1930
The plaintiff was a race horse trainer. He had made two claims against the defendant owner alleging first that the defendant had agreed to give him a share in some horses and second that the plaintiff had sold two horses to him but not been paid for . .
Citedde Lasala v de Lasala PC 4-Apr-1979
No Revisiting of Capital Claim after Compromise
(Hong Kong) Where capital claims are compromised in a once-for-all court order they cannot be revisited or reissued in the absence of a substantial mistake. Capital orders are ‘once-for-all orders’. The legal effect of the order derives not from the . .
CitedHarris v Manahan CA 1997
Application to vary ancillary relief order made by consent. Promptitude is required. Ward LJ considered substantial restraint on a judge hearing appeals against his own decisions. . .
CitedL v L FD 2-May-2006
The husband had accepted an obligation to make periodical payments to the wife but the obligation had been expressed as an undertaking on his part rather than as an order by consent for periodical payments pursuant to section 23(1)(a) of the Act. . .
CitedL v L FD 15-Aug-2011
Appeal by the Appellant husband from a financial remedy order made following the breakdown of his marriage to the wife. . .
CitedGohil v Gohil (No 2) CA 13-Mar-2014
The parties had agreed financial provision on their divorce, but W subsequently discovered what she said was material non-disclosure by H. The court was now asked whether a court of first instance had jurisdiction to set aside a final financial . .
CitedHunt v Luck CA 1902
Dr Hunt owned properties for which the rents were collected by his agent. The land were conveyed to a Mr Gilbert, who then mortgaged them. After the doctor’s death, his personal representatives challenged the validity of the conveyance. When the . .
CitedCommissioners of Customs and Excise v Anchor Foods Ltd (No 3) ChD 8-Jul-1999
The Civil Procedure Rules have not changed the common law rules which say that an interlocutory order for costs could not be varied by another judge sitting at first instance, except only in exceptional circumstances where it appeared for example . .
CitedS v S 2002
Bracewell J considered the first of the conditions suggested by Lord Brandon in Barder for allowing an appeal against an order made by consent – that the circumstances giving rise to the appeal should be such as to undermine the order. He said that . .
CitedPeakviewing (Interactive) Ltd and others v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport CA 28-Nov-2002
The Secretary of State had refused to grant a certifate as to a file under the 1985 Act thus disallowing certain capital allowances. The Rules said that a decision of the High Court would be final. . .
CitedMasterman-Lister v Brutton and Co, Jewell and Home Counties Dairies (No 1) CA 19-Dec-2002
Capacity for Litigation
The claimant appealed against dismissal of his claims. He had earlier settled a claim for damages, but now sought to re-open it, and to claim in negligence against his former solicitors, saying that he had not had sufficient mental capacity at the . .
CitedLloyds Investment (Scandinavia) Ltd v Ager-Hanssen ChD 15-Jul-2003
The defendant sought a variation under Part 3.1(7) of an order setting aside an earlier judgment in default of defence, on terms requiring a substantial payment into court with which the defendant, who was a litigant in person, had not complied.
CitedRoult v North West Strategic Health Authority CA 20-May-2009
The parties had settled a personal injury claim, on the basis as expected that the claimant would be provided with accommodation by the local authority. It later turned out that accommodation would not be provided, and he returned to court to . .

Cited by:
CitedSharland v Sharland SC 14-Oct-2015
The Court considered the impact of fraud upon a financial settlement agreed between divorcing parties where that agreement is later embodied in a court order? Does ‘fraud unravel all’, as is normally the case when agreements are embodied in court . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Family, Litigation Practice

Leading Case

Updated: 02 November 2021; Ref: scu.545892