There had been a purported marriage in 1963 between a man and a male to female trans-sexual.
Held: Because marriage is essentially a union between a man and a woman, the relationship depended on sex, and not on gender. The law should adopt the chromosomal, gonadal and genital tests. If all three are congruent, that should determine a person’s sex for the purpose of marriage. Any operative intervention should be ignored. The biological sexual constitution of an individual is fixed at birth, at the latest, and cannot be changed either by the natural development of organs of the opposite sex or by medical or surgical means. The marriage was void ab initio.
As to the difference between a declaration under RSC Ord.15, and a decree of nullity, Ormrod J observed: ‘The importance of this distinction is, of course, that on a decree of nullity, the court has the power to entertain an application for ancillary relief whereas if a declaration order is made, there is not such power.’ Since ecclesiastical courts did in fact grant declaratory sentences in cases of meretricious marriages, there was no discretion to withhold any decree of nullity. ‘[o]n the facts as I have found them to be, a matrimonial relationship between the petitioner and the respondent was a legal impossibility at all times and in all circumstances, whereas a marriage which is void on the grounds of bigamy, non-age or failure of third party consents, might, in other circumstances, have been a valid marriage.’ Sex is an essential determinant of marriage, because: ‘it is and always has been recognised as the union of man and woman.’
Ormrod J: ‘It is common ground between all the medical witnesses that the biological sexual constitution of an individual is fixed at birth (at the latest), and cannot be changed, either by the natural development of organs of the opposite sex, or by medical or surgical means. The respondent’s operation, therefore, cannot affect her true sex. The only cases where the term ‘change of sex’ is appropriate are those in which a mistake as to sex is made at birth and subsequently revealed by further medical investigation.’
Ormrod J
[1971] P 83
England and Wales
Citing:
Applied – Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee 20-Mar-1866
A marriage contracted in a country where polygamy is lawful, between a man and a woman who profess a faith which allows polygamy, is not a, marriage as understood in Christendom; and although it is a valid marriage by the lex loci, and at the time . .
Cited by:
Cited – Bellinger v Bellinger CA 17-Jul-2001
Transgender Male may not marry as Female
Despite gender re-assignment, a person born and registered a male, remained biologically a male, and so was not a woman for the purposes of the law of marriage. The birth registration in this case had been correct. The words ‘male and female’ in the . .
Cited – The Chief Constable of the West Yorkshire Police v A, Secretary of State for Education EAT 2-Oct-2001
The Force appealed findings of sex discrimination against the respondent who had undergone gender reassignment. She required the fact of the procedure to be kept secret. The force refused her application for appointment since they said she would be . .
Cited – Bellinger v Bellinger HL 10-Apr-2003
Transgender Male to Female not to marry as Female
The parties had gone through a form of marriage, but Mrs B had previously undergone gender re-assignment surgery. Section 11(c) of the 1973 Act required a marriage to be between a male and a female. It was argued that the section was incompatible . .
Applied – Regina v Tan CA 1983
Tan and others were accused of keeping a disorderly house having advertised: ‘Humiliation enthusiast, my favourite past time is humiliating and disciplining mature male submissives, in strict bondage, lovely tan coloured mistress invites humble . .
Applied reluctantly – S v S-T (Formerly J) CA 25-Nov-1996
The parties had gone through a form of marriage, but the purported husband was many years later revealed to be a female to male transsexual. The marriage had been annulled. There was now an application for ancillary relief.
Held: Ancillary . .
Cited – Rees v The United Kingdom ECHR 17-Oct-1986
The applicant had been born and registered as a female, but later came to receive treatment and to live as a male. He complained that the respondent had failed to amend his birth certificate.
Held: The court accepted that, by failing to confer . .
Cited – Cossey v The United Kingdom ECHR 27-Sep-1990
A male to female transsexual who had undergone full gender reassignment surgery wished to marry. The court held that despite the Resolution of the European Parliament on 12th September 1989 and Recommendation 1117 adopted by the Parliamentary . .
Cited – Sheffield and Horsham v The United Kingdom ECHR 30-Jul-1998
It is within a nation’s margin of appreciation to refuse to re-register birth details of people who had undergone sex-changes. Similarly it was not a human rights infringement not to allow post operative trans-sexuals to marry. However the court was . .
Cited – A v West Yorkshire Police HL 6-May-2004
The claimant was a male to female trans-sexual who had been refused employment as a police officer by the respondent, who had said that the staturory requirement for males to search males and for females to search females would be impossible to . .
Cited – J v S T (Formerly J) CA 21-Nov-1996
The parties had married, but the male partner was a transsexual, having been born female and having undergone treatment for Gender Identity Dysphoria. After IVF treatment, the couple had a child. As the marriage broke down the truth was revealed in . .
Cited – J v C and E (a Child) (Void Marriage: Status of Children) CA 15-May-2006
The parties had lived together as a married couple. They had had a child together by artificial insemination. It was then revealed that Mr J was a woman. The parties split up, and Mr J applied for an order for contact with the child.
Held: The . .
Cited – Wilkinson v Kitzinger and others FD 31-Jul-2006
The parties had gone through a ceremony of marriage in Columbia, being both women. After the relationship failed, the claimant sought a declaration that the witholding of the recognition of same-sex marriages recoginised in a foreign jurisdiction . .
Cited – Bellinger v Bellinger FD 22-Nov-2000
The test for what sex somebody was for the purposes of validating a marriage was the sex as decided and set out on the birth registration certificate. Though increasing recognition has been given to the complexities of gender identity over the . .
Cited – Hudson v Leigh FD 5-Jun-2009
The claimant sought a decree of divorce. The ceremony had been a religious one in Cape Town. They had intended it to be followed by a ceremony in a register office in England, but this did not happen. The pastor in south Africa said that he had . .
Cited – Goodwin v The United Kingdom ECHR 11-Jul-2002
The claimant was a post operative male to female trans-sexual. She claimed that her human rights were infringed when she was still treated as a man for National Insurance contributions purposes, where she continued to make payments after the age at . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Family, Administrative
Updated: 13 January 2022; Ref: scu.180939