Category: Road Traffic

Director of Public Prosecutions v Tuncer Kavaz: Admn 25 Nov 1997

[1997] EWHC Admin 1042
Bailii
Road Traffic Act 1988 143(2)
Citing:
Appealed to – Director of Public Prosecutions v Kavaz CACD 17-Mar-1999
The duty to demonstrate that a car is properly insured and has an MOT certificate remains the responsibility of the actual driver. . .
Cited – Rex v Oliver 1944
When an Act of Parliament provides that a person shall not do a certain thing unless he has a licence, the onus is always on the defendant to prove that he has a licence because it is a fact peculiarly within his own knowledge . .

Cited by:
Appeal from – Director of Public Prosecutions v Kavaz CACD 17-Mar-1999
The duty to demonstrate that a car is properly insured and has an MOT certificate remains the responsibility of the actual driver. . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 25 December 2020; Ref: scu.137987

Carmichael and Sons Ltd v Cottle: 1971

References: [1971] RTR 11
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – West Yorkshire Trading Standards Service v Lex Vehicle Leasing Ltd QBD 9-Feb-1995
    It was alleged that the maximum permitted front axle weight of the vehicle in question was exceeded. The court was asked what were the circimstances defing a ‘user’ of a motor vehicle in prosecutions for use of the vehicle.
    Held: ‘The . .
    ([1996] RTR 70)
  • Cited – Jones v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 26-Mar-1998
    A van was stopped carrying a delivery of coal. The insurance was for social domestic and pleasure purposes only. The owner appealed a conviction for using it without insurance.
    Held: ‘using’ when the description of the offence in connection . .
    (Times 23-Apr-98, , [1998] EWHC Admin 363)

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 27 November 2020; Ref: scu.190481

Oxford v Austin: 1981

The court said that a road was ‘a definable way between two points over which vehicles could pass.’
References: [1981] RTR 416
Judges: Kilner Brown J
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Clarke v Kato and Others; Cutter v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd HL 25-Nov-1998
    Save exceptionally, a car park is not a road for the purposes of road traffic legislation on obligatory insurance. It is an unjustified strain on the language. A distinction made between the road ways and the parking bays was artificial and . .
    (Times 23-Oct-98, Gazette 25-Nov-98, Gazette 11-Nov-98, , , [1998] UKHL 36, [1998] 4 All ER 417, [1998] WLR 1647)

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 27 November 2020; Ref: scu.194256

Bennington v Peter; Regina v Swaffham Justices ex parte Peter: QBD 1984

The applicant held a heavy goods vehicle licence. He became diabetic. The licensing authority refused to renew his licence. He appealed.
Held: The justices had used the wrong test, saying he could not be said not to be likeley to suffer a hypoglycaemis attack. The test should be whether the disability was likely to cause the driver’s actions so as to be a danger. They had no jurisdiction to extend the effect of the licence, but since they had made a decision wrong in law, and the matter was to be remitted, the licence would stay in effect until they reached their decision.
References: Times 11-Feb-1984, [1984] RTR 383
Judges: Woolf J
Statutes: Road Traffic Act 1972 118(2), Heavy Goods Vehicle (Drivers’ Licences) Regulations 1977 (1977 No 1309) 3
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Griffin v Westminster City Council CA 28-Jan-2004
    The claimant sought emergency rehousing saying that he was a vulnerable person within section 189. The court at first instance had overturned the rejection of his claim by the authority.
    Held: The test set out in the statute was to be followed . .
    (Times 04-Feb-04, , [2004] EWCA Civ 108, Gazette 11-Mar-04, [2004] HLR 32)

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 27 November 2020; Ref: scu.192637

Brewer v Director of Public Prosecutions: QBD 11 Feb 2004

The defendant was a disqualified driver. He was seen to be driving slowly across a railway station car park. He was found to have excess alcohol in his blood.
Held: Allowing his appeal against conviction. The magistrates had found that the car park’s prime function was the parking of cars but that it was also used by pedestrians and as a through road. The only use which could properly constitute it as a road was the use by staff to drive through it to their own car park. That was insufficient to make it a highway. The appeal succeeded.
References: Times 05-Mar-2004
Judges: Rose LJ, David Clarke J
This case cites:

  • Cited – Clarke v Kato and Others; Cutter v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd HL 25-Nov-1998
    Save exceptionally, a car park is not a road for the purposes of road traffic legislation on obligatory insurance. It is an unjustified strain on the language. A distinction made between the road ways and the parking bays was artificial and . .
    (Times 23-Oct-98, Gazette 25-Nov-98, Gazette 11-Nov-98, , , [1998] UKHL 36, [1998] 4 All ER 417, [1998] WLR 1647)

This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Barrett v Director of Public Prosecutions Admn 10-Feb-2009
    barrett_dppAdmn2009
    The defendant appealed against his conviction for driving whilst disqualified. He had driven on a roadway within a caravan park. A public footpath (a highway) went through the park. There were gates at the entrance but these were kept open. The . .
    (, [2009] EWHC 423 (Admin))

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 27 November 2020; Ref: scu.194253

Commission v Greece: ECJ 14 Jan 2016

ECJ Failure to fulfill obligations – Freedom to provide services – Motor vehicles – Decision rental or lease of a motor vehicle by a resident of a Member State with a supplier established in another Member State – Taxation of that vehicle during its registration in the first Member State – Perception of the full amount of the registration tax ‘
References: C-66/15, [2016] EUECJ C-66/15
Links: Bailii
Jurisdiction: European

Last Update: 16 October 2020; Ref: scu.559129

X v Minister Van Financien: ECJ 21 Nov 2013

ECJ Request for a preliminary ruling – Article 43 EC – Motor vehicles – Use in a Member State of a private motor vehicle registered in another Member State – Taxation of that vehicle in the first Member State when it was first used on the national road network and also in the second Member State when it was registered – Vehicle used by the citizen concerned for both private use and for going, from the Member State of origin, to the place of work situated in the first Member State
References: C-302/12, [2013] EUECJ C-302/12
Links: Bailii
Judges: R. Silva de Lapuerta
Jurisdiction: European

Last Update: 23 September 2020; Ref: scu.518465

Taylor v Rajan; 2 Jan 1974

References: [1974] RTR 304, [1974] 1 All ER 1087, [1974] QB 424
Coram: Lord Widgery Chief Justice
The defendant had consumed alcohol so that the alcohol level was 102 milligrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood. An appeal was heard as to whether there existed special reasons for not disqualifying him.
Held: The court considered when it should find special reasons allowing it a discretion not to disqualify a driver who was subject to an automatic disqualification for driving with excess alcohol. The test of whether the circumstances exist to find special reasons is an objective one. A higher reading would make the exercise of the discretion more difficult.
Lord Widgery CJ said: ‘This is not the first case in which the court had had to consider whether driving in an emergency can justify a conclusion that there are special reasons for not disqualifying the driver. If a man, in the well-founded belief that he will not drive again, puts his car into the garage, goes into his house, and has a certain amount of drink in the belief that he is not going to drive again, and if thereafter there is an emergency which requires him, in order to deal with it, to take his car out despite his intention to leave it in the garage, then that is a situation which can in law amount to a special reason for not disqualifying a driver.
On the other hand, justices who are primarily concerned with dealing with this legislation, should approach the exercise of the resultant discretion with great care. The mere fact that the facts disclosed a special reason does not mean that the driver is to escape disqualification as a matter of course. There is a very serious burden on the justices, even when a special reason had been disclosed, to decide whether in their discretion they should decline to disqualify in a particular case. The justices should have very much in mind that if a man deliberately drives when he knows he has consumed a considerable quantity of drink, he presents a potential source of danger to the public which no private crisis can lightly excuse.
One of the most important matters which justices have to consider in the exercise of this discretion is whether the emergency — and I call it such for want of a more convenient word — was sufficiently acute to justify the driver taking his car out. The Justices should only exercise the discretion in favour of the driver in clear and compelling circumstances. They ought to remember that the special reasons which they are considering and which are relevant are not the reasons which caused the driver to take his car on the road . . . The Justices therefore must consider the whole of the circumstances. They must consider the nature and degree of the crisis or emergency which has caused the defendant to take the car out. They must consider whether there was alternative means of transport or methods of dealing with the crisis other than and alternative to the use by the defendant of his own car. They should have regard to the manner in which the defendant drove, because if he committed traffic offences such as excessive speed or driving without due care and attention this again is a consideration which tells against his having discretion exercised in his favour, and they should generally have regard to whether the defendant acted responsibly or otherwise.’
The test for the existence of special reasons for not disqualifying is an objective one and not a subjective one, and ‘Last but by no means least, if the alcohol content of the defendant’s body is very high, that is a very powerful reason for saying that discretion should not be exercised in his favour. Indeed, if the alcohol content exceeds 100 milligrams per hundred millilitres of blood, the Justices should rarely exercise the discretion in favour of the defendant driver.’
This case cites:

  • Cited – Jacobs -v- Reid ([1974] RLT 71)
    The test for whether magistrates may find special reasons for not disqualifying a driver is not a subjective one as to what the defendant thought. . .

This case is cited by: