Category: Housing

Hotak and Others v London Borough of Southwark and Another: SC 13 May 2015

The court was asked as to the duty of local housing authorities towards homeless people who claim to be ‘vulnerable’, and therefore to have ‘a priority need’ for the provision of housing accommodation under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996. Those issues turn on the interpretation of the 1996 Act, but some of them also involve consideration of the Equality Act 2010.
Held: (Baroness Hale dissenting in part) Kanu’s appeal was allowed, but thoset of Johnson and of Hotak were dismissed.
The right comparator would be an ordinary person if that person were to become homless, not an actual homeless person. Allowance had to be given for the possible support ofthird parties including family. Attempting to use as a comparator an actually homeless person would lead to arbitrary results.
Lord Neuberger, President, Lady Hale, Deputy President, Lord Clarke, Lord Wilson, Lord Hughes
[2015] UKSC 30, [2015] HLR 23, [2015] WLR(D) 224, [2015] 2 WLR 1341, [2015] 3 All ER 1053, [2015] PTSR 1189, [2015] BLGR 530, UKSC 2013/0234
Bailii, WLRD, Bailii Summary, SC, SC Summary
Housing Act 1996 175 176 177, Equality Act 2010
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – Hotak v London Borough of Southwark CA 15-May-2013
The court was asked whether, when assessing an applicant’s ‘priority need for accommodation’ under section 189(1)(c) Housing Act 1996 (that is, whether the applicant is ‘vulnerable’ by reason of old age, mental illness or handicap or physical . .
Cited – Regina v London Borough of Camden ex parte Pereira CA 20-May-1998
When considering whether a person was vulnerable so as to be treated more favourably in applying for rehousing: ‘The Council should consider such application afresh applying the statutory criterion: The Ortiz test should not be used; the dictum of . .
Appeal from – Kanu v The London Borough of Southwark CA 29-Jul-2014
Mr Kanu, aged 48, had physical problems, including back pain, hepatitis B, hypertension and haemorrhoids, as well as psychotic symptoms and suicidal ideation. His wife assisted him in taking the necessary drugs, but stress would raise his . .
Cited – Begum (Nipa) v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council CA 1-Nov-1999
The fact that the accommodation found to be available to the applicant for housing was in Bangladesh did not make it unavailable in law. The subsections must be read separately. Accommodation could be available to the applicant even though she could . .
Cited – Osmani v London Borough of Camden CA 16-Dec-2004
Auld LJ set out the test to be applied by an authority when deciding whether the applicant was vulnerable for the purposes of deciding whether to give priority housing assistance. The courts had recognised the difficult, involved nature of the . .
Appeal From – Johnson v Solihull CA 6-Jun-2013
. .
Cited – Kanu v The London Borough of Southwark CA 29-Jul-2014
Mr Kanu, aged 48, had physical problems, including back pain, hepatitis B, hypertension and haemorrhoids, as well as psychotic symptoms and suicidal ideation. His wife assisted him in taking the necessary drugs, but stress would raise his . .
Cited – Regina v Waveney City Council, ex parte Bowers CA 25-May-1982
The applicant was an alcoholic and had in 1980 been hit by a motor vehicle and suffered a severe head injury. He sought judicial review of the respondent’s failure to house him.
Held: The appeal was allowed: ‘The question we have to consider . .
Cited – Regina v Oldham Metropolitan Borough Council ex parte Garlick and similar HL 19-Mar-1993
No homelessness priority could be established by means of having a child applying for housing, rather than his or her parent. An application by a person suffering mental disability who would also be dependent upon others was also rejected. In each . .
Cited – Runa Begum v London Borough of Tower Hamlets (First Secretary of State intervening) HL 13-Feb-2003
The appellant challenged the procedure for reviewing a decision made as to the suitability of accomodation offered to her after the respondent had accepted her as being homeless. The procedure involved a review by an officer of the council, with an . .
Cited – London Borough of Lewisham v Malcolm HL 25-Jun-2008
The tenant had left his flat and sublet it so as to allow the landlord authority an apparently unanswerable claim for possession. The authority appealed a finding that they had to take into account the fact that the tenant was disabled and make . .
Cited – M, Regina (on the Application of) v Slough Borough Council HL 30-Jul-2008
The House was asked ‘whether a local social services authority is obliged, under section 21(1)(a) of the 1948 Act, to arrange (and pay for) residential accommodation for a person subject to immigration control who is HIV positive but whose only . .
Cited – Holmes-Moorhouse v Richmond Upon Thames HL 4-Feb-2009
The father had been awarded shared residence for three children. He asked the local authority to provide appropriate housing.
Held: The authority’s appeal succeeded.
‘When any family court decides with whom the children of separated . .
Cited – Ajilore v London Borough of Hackney CA 8-Oct-2014
Appeal against an order dismissing the appellant’s appeal against the review decision of the respondent local housing authority.
Underhill LJ discussed statistical evidence on a section 202 review in relation to an applicant who was said to be . .
Cited – Regina v London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham ex parte Anthony Fleck Admn 18-Aug-1997
Sedley J said that , there would be a real risk that ‘a sick and vulnerable individual (and I do not use the word ‘vulnerable’ in its statutory sense) is going to be put out on the streets’, which he described as a ‘reproach to a society that . .
Cited – Morgan v Stirling Council SCS 10-Oct-2006
(Outer House) Lord Glennie pointed out that anyone who is homeless is also vulnerable, and accordingly it follows that section 189(1)(c) must contemplate homeless people who would be more vulnerable than many others in the same position (especially . .
Cited – O’Rourke v Mayor etc of the London Borough of Camden HL 12-Jun-1997
The claimant had been released from prison and sought to be housed as a homeless person. He said that his imprisonment brought him within the category of having special need. He also claimed damages for the breach.
Held: The Act was intended . .
Cited – Tower Hamlets v Begum (Rikha) CA 23-Mar-2005
Neuberger LJ said: ‘ I turn to the text of the letter of 25 January 2002. It referred to the Council ‘making a reasonable and suitable offer of permanent accommodation’, but it made no reference to the opinion that it was or would be reasonable for . .
Cited – Baker and Others, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and Others CA 28-Feb-2008
Dyson LJ considered the interaction between race relations law and planning permission in the context of gypsy encampments. He looked at section 71 of the 1976 Act and said: ‘In my judgment, it is important to emphasise that the section 71(1) duty . .
Cited – Brown, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions Admn 18-Dec-2008
Having ‘due regard’ is not Obligation to do
The claimant sought to challenge the decision to close her local post office on the basis that being retired and disabled and without a car in a rural area, the office was essential and the decision unsupportable. In particular she challenged the . .
Cited – Pieretti v London Borough of Enfield CA 12-Oct-2010
The claimant sought a declaration that the duty set out in the 1995 Act applies to the discharge of duties, and to the exercise of powers, by local housing authorities under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996 being the part entitled ‘Homelessness’. . .
Cited – Hurley and Moore, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills Admn 17-Feb-2012
The applicants, intending university students, challenged the decision to raise to andpound;9,000 per annum, the fees which might be charged by qualifying universities.
Elias LJ said: ‘Contrary to a submission advanced by Ms Mountfield, I do . .
Cited – Bracking and Others v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions CA 6-Nov-2013
Application for permission to appeal against refusal of leave to bring judicial review of decision by the respondent to close the Independent Living Fund.
Held: McCombe LJ summarised the application of section 149 of the 2010 Act: ‘1 . . . .

Cited by:
Cited – Jewish Rights Watch (T/A Jewish Human Rights Watch), Regina (on The Application of) v Leicester City Council Admn 28-Jun-2016
The claimant challenged the legaity of resolutions passed by three local authorities which were critical of the State of Israel. They said that the resolultions infringed the Public Sector Equality Duty under section 149 of the 2010 Act, and also . .
Cited – Rowley, Regina (on The Application of) v Minister for The Cabinet Office Admn 28-Jul-2021
Failure to Provide Signers was Discriminatory
The claimant challenged the failure of the respondent to provide sign language interpreters to accompany public service broadcasts during the Covid pandemic. The parties agreed that the steps taken for later broadcasts had satisfied the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 07 August 2021; Ref: scu.546544

Powell v Dacorum Borough Council: CA 24 Jan 2019

Appeal from refusal of appeal from housing possession order.
Lord Justice McCombe
[2019] EWCA Civ 23, [2019] HLR 21
Bailii
Equality Act 2010
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Rowley, Regina (on The Application of) v Minister for The Cabinet Office Admn 28-Jul-2021
Failure to Provide Signers was Discriminatory
The claimant challenged the failure of the respondent to provide sign language interpreters to accompany public service broadcasts during the Covid pandemic. The parties agreed that the steps taken for later broadcasts had satisfied the . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 07 August 2021; Ref: scu.633091

Herefordshire Council v AB: FC 1 Feb 2018

Keehan J
[2018] 2 FLR 784, [2018] EWFC 10
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Williams and Another v London Borough of Hackney SC 18-Jul-2018
On arrest for shoplifting a 12 year old said he had been doing so to get food, and that he had been hit with a belt by his father. Investigation revealed the home to be dangerous, and all eight children were removed to the care of the LA. The . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 07 August 2021; Ref: scu.606353

Woolfe, Regina (on The Application of) v London Borough of Islington: Admn 15 Jul 2016

The claimant sought judicial review against Islington under three discrete heads of claim that (1) an aspect of Islington’s scheme is unlawful in that it prevents applicants to whom reasonable preference must be given, but who have fewer than 120 points, from bidding at all for available properties; (2) additionally or alternatively, that points threshold for bidding is unlawful, being in breach of section 11 of the Children Act 2004; and (3) in relation to herself, Islington in any event misapplied their own policy and failed to award her the 90 ‘New Generation’ points to which she says she is entitled under Islington’s own policy and scheme.
Holman J
[2016] EWHC 1907 (Admin)
Bailii
Children Act 2004 11
England and Wales

Updated: 24 July 2021; Ref: scu.567657

Kowalek v Hassanein Ltd (Housing – Rent Repayment Order): UTLC 18 Jun 2021

Recoverability of rent paid after relevant housing offence had ceased – whether tenants’ failure to pay rent and existence of substantial arrears to be taken into account as relevant matters of conduct – treatment of rental deposit – ss. 40-44, 52(2), Housing and Planning Act 2016 – appeal dismissed
[2021] UKUT 143 (LC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 20 July 2021; Ref: scu.665550

B, Regina (on the Application Of) v Southwark: Admn 4 Jul 2003

A young offender was to be released subject to being tagged. He wished to apply for housing.
Held: The claimant should be considered homeless. He had ‘no accomodation available for his occupation’ under the Act. Prison was not a right to occupy a cell, and was his continued detention would be the antithesis of a right to occupy.
Owen J
[2003] EWHC 1678 (Admin), Times 30-Jul-2003, [2002] HLR 40
Bailii
Housing Act 1996 175(1)
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Birmingham City Council v Ali and Others; Moran v Manchester City Council HL 1-Jul-2009
Homelessness Status Requires LA Action
The House considered appeals challenging whether local authorities who gave unacceptable housing to the homeless had satisfied their obligations to them as homeless people. What was meant by the phrase ‘accommodation which it would be reasonable for . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 18 July 2021; Ref: scu.185626

Birmingham City Council v Walker: HL 16 May 2007

The tenant was the son of the former tenant. The tenancy had originally been in the ownership of his father and his mother. The father died in 1969, when the tenancy not yet a secure tenancy. On the mother’s death, the council argued that the first death amounted to a succession, so that on the mother’s death, no further succession could take place.
Held: Before 1980, the tenants of local authorities had no security. The provisions for succession applied only while the tenancy was secure. The current succession was therefore the first under the 1985 Act.
Lord Hoffman said: ‘The method adopted by the 1980 Act to deal with transmissions is different. It reflects the fact that a secure tenancy is different in nature from a statutory tenancy. Whereas the statutory tenancy is unassignable, not an estate in land but a mere ‘personal right of occupation’ (see Lord Greene MR in Carter v SU Carburetter Co [1942] 2 KB 288, 291), a secure tenancy is an orthodox estate in land which, subject to specific restrictions in the 1980 Act, can be assigned, held in joint names, pass by survivorship and be disposed of by will on death. Thus, while a statutory tenancy can pass from one person to another only in very limited circumstances (such as the statutory transmission on death or by a court order on divorce) a secure tenancy can in principle pass in any way permissible at common law.’
Lord Hoffmann, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Scott of Foscote, Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, Lord Mance
[2007] UKHL 22, Times 18-May-2007, [2008] 1 P and CR 16, [2007] 2 P and CR DG10, [2007] L and TR 24, [2007] 3 All ER 445, [2007] HLR 38, [2007] 2 AC 262, [2007] NPC 61, [2007] 2 WLR 1057, [2007] 2 EGLR 58, [2007] 21 EG 131
Bailii
Housing Act 1985
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – Walker v Birmingham City Council CA 22-Jun-2006
. .
Cited – Carter v SU Carburetter Co CA 1942
A statutory tenancy is not an estate in land but a mere ‘personal right of occupation’ and is unassignable. . .
Cited – Whitmore v Lambert 1955
Provisions for transmission of secure tenancies operated only once. . .

Cited by:
Cited – Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd and Others HL 1-Jul-2009
Mutual Knowledge admissible to construe contract
The parties had entered into a development contract in respect of a site in Wandsworth, under which balancing compensation was to be paid. They disagreed as to its calculation. Persimmon sought rectification to reflect the negotiations.
Held: . .
Cited – Solihull Metropolitan Borough Council v Hickin CA 27-Jul-2010
The claimant sought to succeed to a secure tenancy. She had lived with her mother, a joint tenant, but who had died before her father who had not lived at the house for many years and who had now died. The council said that the tenancy had become . .
Cited – Solihull Metropolitan Borough Council v Hickin SC 25-Jul-2012
The claimant’s parents were secure joint tenants. After her father left, the mother later died. The respondent served a notice on the father terminating the tenancy since as the survivor and not resident, he was not entitled to continue the tenancy. . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 15 July 2021; Ref: scu.252415

Carega Properties SA (formerly Joram Developments Ltd) v Sharratt: HL 1979

A widow aged 75 had developed a platonic relationship with a young man aged 24. He lived in her flat for nearly 20 years until she died. They treated themselves as aunt and nephew. The trial judge held that through their relationship this elderly lady and young man achieved a familial nexus, meaning thereby a nexus such as one would only find within a family. The Court of Appeal reversed the judge’s decision, and held that on the facts the relationship was not within the permissible limits of the meaning of the phrase ‘a member of the . . . tenant’s family’.
Held: The term ‘family’ where it is used in the Rent Acts is not a term of art. Its interpretation is a question of law, and and ‘family’ is not the same as ‘household’. ‘The facts of the instant case, if they are not unique, are certainly most unusual, and for that reason they do not, in my opinion, provide a suitable occasion for this House to undertake a general consideration of what persons may be included in the expression ‘a member of the original tenant’s family’ where at the time of the tenant’s death there did exist between him and the claimant to a statutory tenancy by succession a relationship of one or other of the various kinds to which I have referred above. In particular, the difficult question posed by Dyson Holdings Ltd. v. Fox [1976] Q.B. 503 as to the extent, if any, to which changed social attitudes towards cohabitation between unmarried couples and the offspring of such liaisons may have enlarged the meaning of the expression ‘family’ in the Rent Act 1968 does not arise in the instant case and is best left for consideration in the light of the actual facts of a case in which it does arise.’
Lord Diplock, Viscount Dilhorne
[1979] 1 WLR 928, [1979] 2 All ER 1084
England and Wales
Citing:
Approved – Ross v Collins CA 1964
The defendant had acted as the original tenant’s housekeeper in return for which he remitted her rent. They had never addressed each other by their Christian names and there was no question of an intimate personal relationship. After his death she . .
Cited – Dyson Holdings Ltd v Fox CA 17-Oct-1975
The defendant had lived with the tenant for 21 years until his death. They were unmarried and had no children. Reversing the County Court judge, the Court of Appeal ruled that she was a member of his family. It was absurd to distinguish between two . .
Appeal from – Carega Properties SA v Sharratt CA 1979
The Court referred to the ‘Cohen’ Question: ‘. . it is for this court to decide, where such an issue arises, whether, assuming all the facts found by the judge to be correct, the question may, as a matter of law, within the permissible limits of the . .

Cited by:
Cited – Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Ltd HL 28-Oct-1999
Same Sex Paartner to Inherit as Family Member
The claimant had lived with the original tenant in a stable and long standing homosexual relationship at the deceased’s flat. After the tenant’s death he sought a statutory tenancy as a spouse of the deceased. The Act had been extended to include as . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 08 July 2021; Ref: scu.215876

Carega Properties SA v Sharratt: CA 1979

The Court referred to the ‘Cohen’ Question: ‘. . it is for this court to decide, where such an issue arises, whether, assuming all the facts found by the judge to be correct, the question may, as a matter of law, within the permissible limits of the meaning of the phrase ‘a member of the tenant’s family,’ be answered ‘Yes.”
Megaw LJ
[1979] 1 WLR 3
England and Wales
Citing:
Approved – Brock v Wollams CA 1949
A child had been adopted in fact and lived with the tenant for many years, but had not been formally adopted under the Act claimed to inherit the tenancy on his death.
Held: He was to be considered to be a member of the former tenant’s family . .

Cited by:
Appeal from – Carega Properties SA (formerly Joram Developments Ltd) v Sharratt HL 1979
A widow aged 75 had developed a platonic relationship with a young man aged 24. He lived in her flat for nearly 20 years until she died. They treated themselves as aunt and nephew. The trial judge held that through their relationship this elderly . .
Cited – Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Ltd HL 28-Oct-1999
Same Sex Paartner to Inherit as Family Member
The claimant had lived with the original tenant in a stable and long standing homosexual relationship at the deceased’s flat. After the tenant’s death he sought a statutory tenancy as a spouse of the deceased. The Act had been extended to include as . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 08 July 2021; Ref: scu.215937

Helby v Rafferty: CA 1979

The court declined to hold that a man who had lived with a woman tenant for five years before her death were part of the same family because they had deliberately opted to retain their formal independence and they had not been recognised as being married: ‘but, be that as it may, it seems to me that this court has, by a majority, decided that a woman who has had a sufficiently permanent relationship with a man over a period of years, but has not been married to him, may, nonetheless, have acquired the status of a member of that man’s family. Accordingly, logically it can be argued – and one sees the force of the argument- that if in such circumstances that applies so as to enable a woman to become a statutory tenant by succession of a man, so in similar circumstances it should equally apply to enable a man to become a statutory tenant by succession of a woman . . that being so, it seems to me it must be a question of fact and degree in each case – whether a sufficient state of permanence has been reached so that the surviving party can fairly be said in all the circumstances to be a member of the original tenant’s family . . the case was obviously fully and carefully argued before him [the judge] and he, for the reasons which appear in his judgment, expressed the view that the necessary degree of permanence in this particular relationship had not been shown; and he accordingly held that the defendant could not be and was not a statutory tenant by succession.’
Roskill LJ
[1979] 1 WLR 13
Rent Act 1977
England and Wales
Citing:
Confined to its facts – Dyson Holdings Ltd v Fox CA 17-Oct-1975
The defendant had lived with the tenant for 21 years until his death. They were unmarried and had no children. Reversing the County Court judge, the Court of Appeal ruled that she was a member of his family. It was absurd to distinguish between two . .

Cited by:
Cited – Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Ltd HL 28-Oct-1999
Same Sex Paartner to Inherit as Family Member
The claimant had lived with the original tenant in a stable and long standing homosexual relationship at the deceased’s flat. After the tenant’s death he sought a statutory tenancy as a spouse of the deceased. The Act had been extended to include as . .
Cited – Nutting v Southern Housing Group Ltd ChD 21-Dec-2004
The deceased tenant and the appellant had lived together in a violent alcoholic homosexual relationship. The appellant had claimed to have succeeded to the tenancy on his partner’s death. The authority said the relationship had been at an end, and . .
Cited – NML Capital Ltd v Argentina SC 6-Jul-2011
The respondent had issued bonds but in 2001 had declared a moratorium on paying them. The appellant hedge fund later bought the bonds, heavily discounted. Judgment was obtained in New York, which the appellants now sought to enforce against assets . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 08 July 2021; Ref: scu.215905

Solihull Metropolitan Borough Council v Hickin: CA 27 Jul 2010

The claimant sought to succeed to a secure tenancy. She had lived with her mother, a joint tenant, but who had died before her father who had not lived at the house for many years and who had now died. The council said that the tenancy had become his by survivorship on the mother’s death.
Held: The council’s appeal succeeded: ‘on the death of Mrs Hickin, the tenancy of the house vested in Mr Hickin by virtue of the doctrine of survivorship; Mr Hickin did not reside in the property, and consequently the tenancy ceased to be a secure tenancy; it was therefore effectively determined by the notice. In those circumstances, Miss Hickin was neither entitled to succeed to the tenancy nor remain in the house once the notice had expired.’ and ‘as a matter of elementary property law, where a tenancy is granted to two persons as joint tenants, and one of those persons dies, the tenancy becomes vested in the survivor as the sole tenant. That is sometimes known as a doctrine, or right, of survivorship, and is an integral ingredient of a jointly owned interest in land.’ This rule applied unless the 1985 Act displaced it. It did not, and the argument that it did might itself produce extraordinary and unwelcome results.
Lord Neuberger MR, Laws, Sullivan LJJ
[2010] EWCA Civ 868, [2010] HLR 45, [2010] 1 WLR 2254, [2010] 2 EGLR 147, [2010] 31 EG 62, [2011] PTSR 103
Bailii
Housing Act 1985
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Carter v SU Carburetter Co CA 1942
A statutory tenancy is not an estate in land but a mere ‘personal right of occupation’ and is unassignable. . .
Cited – Lloyd v Sadler CA 1978
One of two joint tenants under a tenancy protected under the Act, had left the property to get married and did not intend to return. The remaining tenant stayed until the end of the tenancy. The landlord claimed possession, arguing that the . .
Cited – Birmingham City Council v Walker HL 16-May-2007
The tenant was the son of the former tenant. The tenancy had originally been in the ownership of his father and his mother. The father died in 1969, when the tenancy not yet a secure tenancy. On the mother’s death, the council argued that the first . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 28 June 2021; Ref: scu.421076

Din and Another v London Borough of Wandsworth: HL 25 Mar 1982

Costs Judgment
Lord Wilberforce, Lord Fraser of Tullybelton, Lord Russell of Killowen, Lord Lowry, Lord Bridge of Harwich
[1982] 1 WLR 418
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Costs – Din (Taj) v Wandsworth London Borough Council HL 26-Nov-1981
The appellants had applied for emergency housing as homeless persons, anticipating loss of their secure accomodation after falling into arrears. The Council reject their application, but a County Court quashed that decision. The Court of Appeal . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 20 June 2021; Ref: scu.541966

EA and others (Public Funds: Housing Association Housing) Nigeria: AIT 25 Nov 2008

AIT Where housing is provided by a housing association it will amount to public funds within the meaning of para 6 of HC 395 if the housing association is acting as the delegate of a local authority in respect of the latter’s housing obligations.
[2008] UKAIT 00084
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 17 June 2021; Ref: scu.278544

Thurrock Council v Daoudi: UTLC 3 Jul 2020

Housing – Civil Penalty – Landlord Operating HMO Without Required Licence – FTT imposing no penalty – whether FTT entitled to treat ignorance of need for licensing as mitigation – appeal allowed – penalty of pounds 4,000 substituted
[2020] UKUT 209 (LC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 16 June 2021; Ref: scu.652541

Wandsworth London Borough Council v Atwell: CA 22 May 1995

The tenant took on a weekly tenancy in 1975 of Wandsworth under an ‘Acceptance of Offer of Accommodation’. The document made no provision for service. The tenant left for America leaving A as a caretaker. Wandsworth ended the tenancy serving a notice under the 1997 Act by post both at the property and at his address in the US. The tenant denied receiving either. The landlord claimed that service was deemed by section 196(2) of the 1925 Act. The tenant now appealed against the order for possession.
Held: The appeal succeeded. Section 196 only applied to a provision in an instrument and did not affect a mode of service specified in an Act. There could be no deemed service of a notice to quit under the 1977 Act.
Glidewell LJ, Waite LJ
Ind Summary 22-May-1995, (1995) 27 HLR 536
Law of Property Act 1925 1963-3, Protection from Eviction Act 1977
England and Wales

Updated: 09 June 2021; Ref: scu.90280

Brennan v London Borough of Lambeth: CA 3 Jun 1997

The appellant sought to resist his eviction from temporary hostel accomodation provided to him by the local authority, saying that the provisions of the 1977 Act protected him.
Held: The agreement was a licence excluded from protection by the definitions in the 1985 Act.
[1997] EWCA Civ 1776, [1997] 30 HLR 481
Housing Act 1985 63(1), Protection from Eviction Act 1977
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Westminster City Council v Clarke HL 29-Apr-1992
An occupant of a hostel for homeless and vulnerable single men had only a licence to occupy the room, and was not a tenant. There was a resident warden and a team of support workers. The intention was that residents should use the hostel as a . .
Cited – Street v Mountford HL 6-Mar-1985
When a licence is really a tenancy
The document signed by the occupier stated that she understood that she had been given a licence, and that she understood that she had not been granted a tenancy protected under the Rent Acts. Exclusive occupation was in fact granted.
Held: . .
Cited – Mohamed v Manek and Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea CA 28-Apr-1995
The claimant applied to the Council for accommodation, claiming to be homeless and in priority need. The council housed him in a hotel owned by Mr Manek in Tooting Bec . He had a room, a separate bathroom and lavatory, and shared use of a kitchen. . .

Cited by:
Cited – Rogerson v Wigan Metropolican Borough Council QBD 14-Jul-2004
The claimant sought damages under the 1977 Act. The defendant said it had behaved lawfully. He had been housed in a hostel pending a decision on the application for permanent housing as a homeless person, which the defendant said excluded him from . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 June 2021; Ref: scu.142172

Gay v Sheeran, London Borough of Enfield: CA 18 Jun 1999

The ability for a court to order the transfer of a secure tenancy between partners under the Act depended upon the court first making an occupation order in favour of the party from whom the tenancy was to be transferred, but the order could be made on the same occasion. To make an occupation order the tenant had to be entitled to it at the date of the application and the hearing. The Act required also that for a transfer to be made, the applicant had to have one of the rights specified. The applicant did not have such a right, and a transfer could not be ordered.
Times 30-Jun-1999, Gazette 28-Jul-1999, [1999] EWCA Civ 1621
Family Law Act 1996 36
England and Wales
Citing:
Leave applied for – Lewis v Lewis HL 1985
The House considered the position of a statutory tenant under the 1977 Act, when application was made under the 1967 Act. . .
Cited – Newlon Housing Trust v Alsulaimen and Another HL 29-Jul-1998
A tenancy which had been terminated by a notice given by one of the joint tenants had expired. It did not come to an end by any deed, and so was not capable of being set aside by a family court in the course of divorce proceedings. The possession . .
Cited – Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council v Monk HL 5-Dec-1991
One tenant of two joint tenants of a house left and was granted a new tenancy on condition that the existing one of the house, still occupied by her former partner, was determined. She gave a notice to quit as requested, the council claimed . .

Cited by:
Cited – Morris, Regina (on the Application of) v Westminster City Council and Another Admn 7-Oct-2004
The applicant questioned the compatibility of s185 of the 1996 Act with Human Rights law. The family sought emergency housing. The child of the family, found to be in priority housing need, was subject also to immigration control. Though the matter . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 June 2021; Ref: scu.146536

Awad v Hooley (Housing – Rent Repayment Order): UTLC 12 Mar 2021

HOUSING – RENT REPAYMENT ORDER – calculation of the rent paid in respect of the relevant period – factors to be taken into account when determining the amount of rent to be repaid – relevance of conduct to the relationship of landlord and tenant – discretion of the First-tier Tribunal
[2021] UKUT 55 (LC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 04 June 2021; Ref: scu.662168

City of Westminster v Boraliu: CA 2 Nov 2007

The Council had taken leases of properties from a Housing Association to provide accomodation to the homeless, satisfying its statutory duties. The tenant B was said to be a non-secure tenant, but the tenancy agreement did not reflect the terms of the 1996 Act. The Council served a notice to quit. B did not leave, and the Council offered temporary alternative accomodation, which B did not accept. The council said it had satisfied its duties to her and after a review at B’s request, it sought possession. On appeal the judge rejected the council’s claim saying that a tenancy of property held by a local authority as lessees from a private landlord fell within paragraph 6 of Schedule 1 of the 1985 Act, if at all, and so could not fall within paragraph 4 of that Schedule. Paragraphs 4 and 6 were mutually exclusive. The Council appealed.
Held: The appeal succeeded. ‘The question in the present case is whether condition (a) – ‘for use as temporary housing accommodation’ – is coextensive with the condition in paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 – ‘in pursuant of any function under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996′. If the condition in paragraph 6 extends beyond the performance of functions under Part VII of the 1996 Act, then paragraph 6 cannot be said to be otiose: it covers circumstances which would not fall within paragraph 4. The fact that paragraph 6 also applies to circumstances which do fall within paragraph 4 is not a sufficient reason for qualifying the plain words of paragraph 4 itself.’ Paragragh 6 does so extend.
Chadwick, Gage, Lawrence Collins LJJ
[2007] EWCA Civ 1339, [2008] HLR 42, [2008] 1 WLR 2408
Bailii
Housing Act 1996, Housing Act 1985 79
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Regina, ex parte O v The London Borough of Haringey, The Secretary of State for the Home Department CA 4-May-2004
The court considered the duties of local authorities to support infirm asylum seekers with children.
Held: The authority had an obligation to support the adult, but the responsibility for the children fell on the National Asylum Support . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 02 June 2021; Ref: scu.341671

Timothy Beck Brown v Barbara Victoria Myerson: CA 21 Jul 1998

The claimant let a house to the defendant under an assured shorthold tenancy. In breach of condition, the defendant operated her licensed conveyancer’s business from the premises. Under an associated arrangement land was let to the defendant for her horses. On a possession action, the defendant asserted that the letting was a business tenancy protected under the 1954 Act, and also claimed for improvements and counterclaimed for damages for nuisance caused by rats. The judge had found a surrender and regrant, but there had been no acquiescence in the business operation.
Held: The defendant had not made out any sufficient grounds of appeal, and leave to appeal was refused.
[1998] EWCA Civ 1253
Bailii
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954, Housing Act 1985 11
England and Wales

Updated: 31 December 2020; Ref: scu.144732

Sturolson v Weniz: CA 1984

The plaintiffs took occupation under an agreement which purported to grant a non exclusive right of possession of the flat, and to be personal. Occupation could only be shared with persons approved in advance by L. L’s agent had said the agreement was intended to get around the Rent Acts. L purported to terminate the agreement, and the occupiers claimed a tenancy.
Held: The right reserved to the owner to require them to share with others was contrary to the provisions of the Rent Acts and was in any event a pretence intended only to get round the Rent Acts. However the parties knew of the pretence, and the agreement created a licence.
References: [1984] 272 EG 326
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case cites:

  • Considered – Snook v London and West Riding Investments Ltd CA 1967
    Sham requires common intent to create other result
    The court considered a claim by a hire-purchase company for the return of a vehicle. The bailee said the agreement was a sham.
    Held: The word ‘sham’ should only be used to describe an act or document where the parties have a common intention . .
    ([1967] 2 QB 786, [1967] 1 All ER 518, [1967] 2 WLR 1020)
  • Cited – Somma v Hazelhurst CA 1978
    s
    A young unmarried couple H and S occupied a double bedsitting room for which they paid a weekly rent. The landlord did not provide services or attendance and the couple were not lodgers but tenants enjoying exclusive possession.
    Held: The . .
    ([1978] 1 WLR 1014)

This case is cited by:

  • Disapproved – Street v Mountford HL 6-Mar-1985
    When a licence is really a tenancy
    The document signed by the occupier stated that she understood that she had been given a licence, and that she understood that she had not been granted a tenancy protected under the Rent Acts. Exclusive occupation was in fact granted.
    Held: . .
    ([1985] 1 EGLR 128, [1985] 2 All ER 289, [1985] 2 WLR 877, [1985] AC 809, [1985] UKHL 4, )
  • Cited – A G Securities v Vaughan; Antoniades v Villiers and Bridger HL 10-Nov-1988
    In Antoniades, the two tenants occupied an attic, living together. Each had at the same time signed identical agreements purporting to create licences. The landlord had reserved to himself the right to occupy the property and to allow others to . .
    ([1988] 1 EGLR 36, [1990] 1 AC 417, [1988] 3 WLR 1205, , [1988] UKHL 8, [1988] 3 All ER 1058)

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 27 November 2020; Ref: scu.191970

Minister of Health v Bellotti: CA 1944

298 blocks of flats had been requisitioned to provide accommodation for persons evacuated from Gibraltar during the war. The evacuees occupied the various flats as licensees. They were given only one week’s notice terminating their licences.
Held: Where the relevant period has not been specified by the licence itself, a licensee is entitled, following revocation of the licence, to whatever in all the circumstances is a reasonable time to remove himself and his possessions. It was an unreasonably short period, although possession proceedings were not in fact begun until after the lapse of a reasonable time.
Had the licences been validly terminated? A licensor can terminate a licence at any time as long as reasonable time is given within which the determination is to take effect. However, the question of what the licensee is entitled to expect and the matter of determination of his licence is one that is impossible to answer by reference to other cases in different circumstances.
Mackinnon LJ said: ‘I think the rule of law is that the licensor can revoke his licence at any time, but the licensee has thereafter a reasonable time, having regard to all the circumstances, to comply with the revocation.’
Lord Greene rejected the proposition that the only notice to terminate a licence which the law required was a period sufficient to enable the licensee to remove himself and his property from the premises comprised in the licence: ‘I refer to that because it appears to me that where a question arises as to the lawful method of terminating a licence, the circumstances in which the licence came to be granted are most relevant to consider. Where a licence is granted under a contract, it may very well be that the contract will make express provision for those matters which must be observed, but what is to happen where the contract is silent in that regard? I cannot take the view that there is some cast-iron principle of law which lays down for every type of contract, whatever the circumstances and whatever the purposes for which it was entered into, some rule which is always to operate. In my opinion, the true rule is that the implications of the contract are to be determined by regard to all the relevant circumstances of the case. Thus, in the judgment of the Privy Council in Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. The King, the following paragraph appears: ‘Whether any and what restrictions exist on the power of a licensor to determine a revocable licence must, their Lordships think, depend upon the circumstances of each case.’ That is the only proposition of general application which I find it possible to extract from that authority; and although the case is not binding on this court, the law there is, in my opinion, laid down with complete accuracy.
The notice given by each letter operates as a clear determination of the licence at the expiration of one week. It conveys to the mind of the recipient as clearly as anything can notice that the licence is determined. It goes on, however, to indicate that the recipient of the letter, together with his possessions, is to be removed from the premises within one week. So far as the letter gives that instruction, it was, in my opinion, quite inoperative. The true view is that where a licence is revoked, the licensee has, in spite of the revocation, whatever in the circumstances is a reasonable time to enable him to remove himself and his possessions from the scene of the licence. I have already said that in the circumstances of this case such a reasonable time must extend to whatever is a reasonable time to find alternative accommodation, and, if the day after this notice expired, proceedings had been taken by the minister to eject the defendants, those proceedings would have failed because the defendants were entitled to a reasonable time, and a week was not a reasonable time, to enable them to find alternative accommodation. The circumstance that the threat to remove them before the expiration of what would have been a reasonable time was inserted in the letter does not prevent the letter from being a good notice to determine the licence. That being the position, the county court judge decided that the interval which elapsed between the expiration of the week mentioned in that document and the commencement of these proceedings was a sufficient time to enable alternative accommodation to be found. In view of that finding of fact, the defendants could not complain at the time these proceedings were instituted that they had not been allowed sufficient time in the circumstances to remove themselves and their possessions and find alternative accommodation.’
References: [1944] 1 KB 298, [1944] 1 All ER 238
Judges: Lord Greene MR, Mackinnon LJ
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case cites:

  • Approved – The Canadian Pacific Railway Company v The King PC 19-Feb-1931
    (Canada) ‘Whether any and what restrictions exist on the power of a licensor to determine a revocable licence must, there Lordships think, depend upon the circumstances of each case.’
    A licencee whose licence is revocable is entitled to . .
    (, [1931] UKPC 18, [1931] AC 414)

This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Gibson v Douglas and Another CA 8-Dec-2016
    Appeal against rejection of claim for damages for wrongful eviction and damages to goods.
    Held: The judge had found not that the defendant had failed to give appropriate notice, but that he had not been personally involved other than as an . .
    (, [2016] EWCA Civ 1266)

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 27 November 2020; Ref: scu.192089

Brown v Young: SCS 21 Feb 1900

(Inner House Second Division) The Burgh Police (Scotland) Act 1892, section 170, enacts that ‘every building erected for the purpose of being used as a dwelling-house . . shall have all the rooms sufficiently lighted and ventilated from an adjoining street or other open space directly attached thereto equal to at least three-fourths of the area to be occupied by the intended building.’ All the rooms in a proposed building were designed to have each a door and a chimney and one window which opened upon a court containing more than the minimum area specified in the section, and belonging to the proprietor of the proposed building. Held that the provisions of the statute as to ventilation and lighting had been sufficiently complied with.
The section does not require that there should be any open space upon more than one side of a proposed building, provided that all the rooms in it have windows which look out upon some open space which satisfies the requirements of the statute.
When all the rooms are each provided with a door, a chimney, and a window opening upon a space which satisfies the requirements of the statute, the Dean of Guild is not entitled to refuse a lining upon the ground that, looking to the character of the locality, of the proposed building, and of the buildings already erected upon the proprietor’s ground, and to the class of tenants to be expected, the arrangements made are not such as in fact to secure the adequate lighting and ventilation of the rooms.
References: [1900] SLR 37 – 466
Links: Bailii
Jurisdiction: Scotland

Last Update: 23 September 2020; Ref: scu.611704

Alansi, Regina (on The Application of) v London Borough of Newham: Admn 27 Nov 2013

The claimant challenged the decision by the respondent no longer to treat her as being in the Priority Homeseeker category for rehousing.
References: [2013] EWHC 3722 (Admin), [2014] WLR(D) 117, [2014] PTSR 948
Links: Bailii, WLRD
Judges: Stuart-Smith J
Jurisdiction: England and Wales

Last Update: 23 September 2020; Ref: scu.518475

Enfield London Borough Council v French: CA 1984

In considering a request for a possession order for which it was a requirement that an odder of suitable alternative accomodation, the question of whether the accommodation was suitable should be decided before the question whether it was reasonable to make an order for possession.
References: (1984) 17 HLR 211
Judges: Stephenson LJ
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Bracknell Forest Borough Council v Green and Another CA 20-Mar-2009 (, [2009] EWCA Civ 238, [2009] CP Rep 31, [2009] PTSR CS49, [2009] NPC 45, [2009] HLR 38)
    The council sought possession of the property saying that the three bedroomed property was underused by the tenant and his sister. The respondents said that it was not too extensive, and that no satisfactory alternative accommodation had been . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 22 September 2020; Ref: scu.323742

Cumming v Danson: CA 1942

The court considered what amounted to reasonable alternative accomodation.
Held: it was the judge’s duty to take into account all relevant circumstances as they exist at the date of the hearing. There is a fundamental difference in the Rent Acts between an application for possession where no alternative accommodation is offered and an application where it is offered. Lord Greene MR said: ‘In considering reasonableness . . it is, in my opinion, perfectly clear that the duty of the judge is to take into account all relevant circumstances as they exist at the date of the hearing. That he must do in what I venture to call a broad, commonense way as a man of the world, and come to his conclusion giving such weight as he thinks right to the various factors in the situation. Some factors may have little or no weight, others may be decisive, but it is quite wrong for him to exclude from his consideration matters which he ought to take into account.’
References: [1942] 2 All ER 653, [1942] 112 LJKB 145, [1942] 59 TLR 70, [1942] 87 Sol Jo 21
Judges: Lord Greene MR
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:

  • Applied – Battlespring Ltd v Gates CA 1983 ([1983] EGLR 103, [1983] EG 355, (1984) 11 HLR 6)
    The tenant had occupied the house for 35 years. She resisted an application by her landlord to rehouse her. She had brought up her family there and did want to leave.
    Held: The landlord’s appeal was dismissed. The landlord’s interest which was . .
  • Cited – Moat Housing Group-South Ltd v Harris and Another CA 16-Mar-2005 (, [2005] EWCA Civ 287, Times 23-Mar-05)
    The defendant family was served without notice with an anti-social behaviour order ordering them to leave their home immediately, and making other very substantial restrictions. The evidence in large part related to other people entirely.
  • Cited – London Borough of Southwark v Kofi-Adu CA 23-Mar-2006 (, [2006] EWCA Civ 281, Times 01-Jun-06)
    The authority complained that during the course of the trial, the judge had repeatedly intervened during oral evidence.
    Held: A judge must be careful not to repeatedly intervene during oral evidence as opposed to counsel making submissions. . .
  • Cited – Bracknell Forest Borough Council v Green and Another CA 20-Mar-2009 (, [2009] EWCA Civ 238, [2009] CP Rep 31, [2009] PTSR CS49, [2009] NPC 45, [2009] HLR 38)
    The council sought possession of the property saying that the three bedroomed property was underused by the tenant and his sister. The respondents said that it was not too extensive, and that no satisfactory alternative accommodation had been . .
  • Cited – Whitehouse v Lee CA 14-May-2009 (, [2009] EWCA Civ 375, Times 12-Jul-09)
    The tenant appealed against an order requiring her to give up possession of her flat, held under the 1977 Act, saying that the court should not have found it reasonable to make an order after finding alternative accommodation suitable.
    Held: . .
  • Cited – Manchester City Council v Pinnock SC 9-Feb-2011 (, [2011] UKSC 6, [2011] 2 All ER 586, [2011] NPC 16, [2011] 2 WLR 220, UKSC 2009/0180, , , [2011] 2 AC 104)
    The council tenant had wished to appeal following a possession order made after her tenancy had been demoted. The court handed down a supplemental judgment to give effect to its earlier decision. The Court had been asked ‘whether article 8 of the . . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 22 September 2020; Ref: scu.221513

Regina v Kensington and Chelsea Royal London Borough Council Ex parte Hammell: CA 1989

Parker LJ said of the plaintiff’s application for a review of the decision on her homelessness application: ‘She is entitled to protection with regard to her public law right to have the necessary inquiries made and the decision properly made . . the injustice to the applicant, if she is not housed but is right, is clearly immense . . This is no more than interim protection for as long as it takes to decide the substantive matter . .’
An interim injunction might be discharged where the plaintiff cannot make out the strong prima facie case that is required, where the potential balance of injustice favours not granting an injunction, and where the public interest likewise lies in not granting an injunction.
References: [1989] QB 518, [1989] 1 All ER 1202, [1989] 2 WLR 90, [1989] Fam Law 430
Judges: Parker LJ
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case cites:

  • Cited – London and Clydeside Estates v Aberdeen District Council HL 8-Nov-1979 ([1980] SC (HL) 1, [1980] 1 WLR 182, , [1979] UKHL 7)
    The appellants had sought a Certificate of Alternative Development. The certificate provided was defective in that it did not notify the appellants, as required, of their right to appeal. Their appeal out of time was refused.
    Held: The House . .

This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Regina v Soneji and Bullen HL 21-Jul-2005 (, [2005] UKHL 49, , Times 22-Jul-05, [2005] 3 WLR 303, [2006] 1 AC 340, [2006] 1 Cr App R(S) 79, [2006] Crim LR 167, [2005] 4 All ER 321, [2006] 2 Cr App R 20)
    The defendants had had confiscation orders made against them. They had appealed on the basis that the orders were made more than six months after sentence. The prosecutor now appealed saying that the fact that the order were not timely did not . .
  • Cited – Lawer, Regina (on the Application of) v Restormel Borough Council Admn 12-Oct-2007 (, [2007] EWHC 2299 (Admin))
    The applicant was joint tenant of a council property. She suffered domestic violence, and said she was advised by the local authority to surrender her tenancy on the basis that they would rehouse her. She did so. The authority refused to provide a . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 22 September 2020; Ref: scu.228956

Regina v Waveney District Council ex parte Bowers; 25 May 1982

References: Times 25-May-1982
Coram: Stephen Brown J
Ratio:The applicant sought judicial review of a decision that he was not homeless under section 1 of the Act. For 15 months he had been using a night shelter in Lowestoft. It was an unheated dormitory in a derelict building. It was empty and closed between 8:00am and 8:00pm each day. If on any evening he presented himself at the shelter at or after 8:00pm, he was offered a bed, unless it was already full, in which case he was turned away.
Held: The housing authority’s decision that he had accommodation at the shelter was irrational.
Statutes: Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977
This case is cited by:

  • Reversed in part – Regina -v- Waveney City Council, ex parte Bowers CA ([1983] QB 238, Times 25-May-82, [1982] 3 WLR 661, [1982] 3 All ER 727)
    The applicant was an alcoholic and had in 1980 been hit by a motor vehicle and suffered a severe head injury. He sought judicial review of the respondent’s failure to house him.
    Held: The appeal was allowed: ‘The question we have to consider . .
  • Cited – Manchester City Council -v- Moran and Another; Richards -v- Ipswich Borough Council CA (Bailii, [2008] EWCA Civ 378, Times 20-May-08, [2008] 1 WLR 2387)
    The two applicants had occupied a women’s refuge. They appealed against a refusal to consider them as homeless when they acted in such a way as to be evicted from the refuge, saying that the refuge did not constitute ‘accommodation . . which it . .
  • Cited – Birmingham City Council -v- Ali and Others; Moran -v- Manchester City Council HL (Bailii, [2009] UKHL 36, Times, [2009] NPC 88, [2009] 1 WLR 1506, [2009] PTSR 1270, [2009] 4 All ER 161, [2009] BLGR 749)
    The House considered appeals challenging whether local authorities who gave unacceptable housing to the homeless had satisfied their obligations to them as homeless people. What was meant by the phrase ‘accommodation which it would be reasonable for . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 26-Jun-16
Ref: 266980

Regina v London Borough of Ealing Ex parte Sidhu; 2 Jan 1982

References: (1982) 2 HLR 48
Coram: Hodgson J
The applicant, in flight from domestic violence, had gone with her two young children, to stay in a women’s refuge. The local authority argued that she was not homeless because she had accommodation available to her in the refuge.
Held: The application for judicial review succeeded. The court approved the conclusion of a county court judge in another case that ‘women living in refuges were still homeless’ under the terms of the 1977 Act. Hodgson J did not regard a crisis refuge as accommodation within the meaning of the 1977 Act. It was essential that women who had gone to refuges were still seen as homeless. Otherwise the refuges would have to give them 28 days notice when they came in so that they would be under threat of homelessness (under s 1(3) of the 1977 Act).
Statutes: Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977
This case cites:

  • Cited – Din (Taj) -v- Wandsworth London Borough Council HL ([1983] 1 AC 657, Bailii, [1981] UKHL 14, [1981] 3 WLR 918, [1982] 1 All ER 1022, (1981-82) 1 HLR 73, [1981] 3 All ER 881)
    The appellants had applied for emergency housing as homeless persons, anticipating loss of their secure accomodation after falling into arrears. The Council reject their application, but a County Court quashed that decision. The Court of Appeal . .

This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Manchester City Council -v- Moran and Another; Richards -v- Ipswich Borough Council CA (Bailii, [2008] EWCA Civ 378, Times 20-May-08, [2008] 1 WLR 2387)
    The two applicants had occupied a women’s refuge. They appealed a refusal to consider them as homeless when they acted in such a way as to be evicted from the refuge, saying that the refuge did not constitute ‘accommodation . . which it would have . .
  • Cited – Birmingham City Council -v- Ali and Others; Moran -v- Manchester City Council HL (Bailii, [2009] UKHL 36, Times, [2009] NPC 88, [2009] 1 WLR 1506, [2009] PTSR 1270, [2009] 4 All ER 161, [2009] BLGR 749)
    The House considered appeals challenging whether local authorities who gave unacceptable housing to the homeless had satisfied their obligations to them as homeless people. What was meant by the phrase ‘accommodation which it would be reasonable for . .

Metropolitan Properties Company (FGC) Limited v Lannon; 11 Jul 1968

References: [1968] RVR 490, [1968] EWCA Civ 5, [1968] 3 All ER 304, [1968] 3 WLR 694, (1968) 19 P & CR 856, [1969] 1 QB 577
Links: Bailii
Coram: Lord Denning MR, Danckwerts LJ, Edmund Davies LJ
Tenants of apartments asked the Rent Officer to fix the fair rents. On appeal, the rents were then set at a rate lower even than they had requested. The rents would serve as a guide for other local rents. The landlords now complained that the chairman of the Rent Assessment Committee had been assisting his own father in negotiating a rent for such a local property, and had represented other tenants. They complained of bias.
Held: He should not have sat. It was accepted that he had had no pecuniary interest himself, and had acted scrupulously. It was a question of whether there was any appearance of bias.
Lord Denning MR considered the test for apparent bias, and said: ‘The court looks at the impression which would be given to other people. Even if he was as impartial as could be, nevertheless if right-minded persons would think that, in the circumstances, there was a real likelihood of bias on his part, then he should not sit. And if he does sit, his decision cannot stand.’
Statutes: Rent Act 1965
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Regina -v- Abdroikof, Regina -v- Green; Regina -v- Williamson HL (Bailii, [2007] UKHL 37, Times 08-Nov-07, [2007] 1 WLR 2679, [2008] 1 Cr App R 21, [2008] Crim LR 134, [2008] 1 All ER 315, (2007) 151 SJLB 1365)
    The House was asked whether a jury in criminal trials containing variously a Crown Prosecution Service solicitor, or a police officer would have the appearance of bias. In Abdroikof, the presence of the police officer on the jury was discovered only . .

Wilson v Lord Finch Hatton; CExC 1877

References: (1877) 2 Ex D 336
Coram: Pollock B
It was said that the premises had previously been occupied by someone with measles and were therefore not fit for human habitation.
Held: A term of fitness for occupation was implied into a lease of furnished premises at its commencement and meant: ‘that it should be reasonably healthy, and so not dangerous to the life of those inhabiting it.’
Pollock B said that furnished lettings were an exception to the doctrine that rent issues out of the realty and held instead that rent was simply ‘a sum paid for the accommodation afforded by the use of the house’.
This case cites:

  • Applied – Smith -v- Marrable, Knt ([1842] EngR 1137, Commonlii, (1842) Car & M 479, (1842) 174 ER 598)
    If premises be let for the purposes of occupation, it is on an implied condition that they should be fit for occupation. . .

This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Hussain -v- Mehlman CC (Bailii, [1992] 2 EGLR 287, [1992] 32 EG 59, [1992] EW Misc 1)
    (County Court) The defendant landlord granted the plaintiff a three year assured shorthold tenancy. He now appealed a finding that he was in breach of an implied covenant to maintain the space heating, and otherwise. The tenant had returned the . .

Delahaye v Oswestry Borough Council; 29 Jul 1980

References: Times 29-Jul-1980
Coram: Woolf J
The applicant had made more than one application for emergency housing and temporary accomodation pending the result of her application.
Held: It could not have been the intention of Parliament that a similar statute should be used by someone, who is not entitled to permanent accommodation to obtain the continuous use of temporary accommodation by means of successive applications.
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Griffin, Regina (on the Application of) -v- London Borough of Southwark Admn (Bailii, [2004] EWHC 2463 (Admin), Times 03-Jan-05)
    The applicant had sought emergency housing with her husband, but refused accomodation on a particuar estate for her safety. She had then been evicted form the temporary housing supplied on the application. After a series of temporary arrangements . .
  • Cited – Regina -v- Harrow London Borough Council Ex Parte Fahia HL (Times 24-Jul-98, Gazette 16-Sep-98, House of Lords, Bailii, [1998] UKHL 29, [1998] 1 WLR 1396)
    The local authority submitted first that a person making a second application for emergency housing had to demonstrate a change of circumstance which might lead to a second application being successful and second that it was for the local authority . .