The defendant, a solicitors’ clerk attending a trial, grew bored, and set out to release laughing gas into the court through a vent. He had been seen earlier and was caught before he achieved his end. He appealed his committal; for contempt, saying that his acts had not been in the face of the court.
Held: It was a contempt and the court had power to commit. The court’s power to commit a contemnor without charge or trial exists to protect the administration of justice, and is not limited to punishing for contempt ‘in the face of the court’ or what the judge himself sees and knows. Because it is arbitrary and contrary to natural justice it is to be exercised with scrupulous care and only when it is imperative to act immediately. Lord Denning MR: ‘a judge should act of his own motion only when it is urgent and imperative to act immediately.’ and ‘Returning to the present case, it seems to me that up to a point the judge was absolutely right to act of his own motion. The intention of Mr. Balogh was to disrupt the proceedings in a trial then taking place. His conduct was reported to the senior judge then in the court building. It was very proper for him to take immediate action, and to have Mr. Balogh brought before him. But once he was there, it was not a case for summary punishment. There was not sufficient urgency to warrant it. Nor was it imperative. He was already in custody on a charge of stealing. The judge would have done well to have remanded him in custody and invited counsel to represent him.’ Stephenson LJ: ‘… if the appellant was in contempt, could or should his contempt have been immediately punished by Melford Stevenson J. as a judge of the Crown Court in the way in which it was punished, namely, by committal to prison for six months? Again my answer is ‘No,’ and my reasons can be even more shortly stated – in two sentences. This procedure is one to which judges should resort in exceptional cases where a contempt is clearly proved and cannot wait to be punished. Here the facts alleged to constitute the contempt were admitted, but there was no need for immediate punishment.’ and ‘[The summary procedure] must never be invoked unless the ends of justice really require such drastic means; it appears to be rough justice; it is contrary to natural justice; and it can only be justified if nothing else will do … .’ Lawton LJ: ‘In my judgment this summary and draconian jurisdiction should only be used for the purpose of ensuring that a trial in progress or about to start can be brought to a proper and dignified end without disturbance and with a fair chance of a just verdict or judgment.’
Judges:
Lord Denning MR, Stephenson LJ, Lawton LJ
Citations:
[1975] 1 QB 73
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Regina v Griffin 1989
The court considered the extent of the jurisdiction to commit for contempt. Mustill LJ said: ‘We should add that certain dicta (for example, in Balogh) may be read as suggesting that the court has no jurisdiction to adopt the summary process unless . .
Cited – Santiago v Regina CACD 8-Mar-2005
The defendant had been convicted but refused to leave his cell to attend court to be sentenced. The judge had adjourned a hearing on contempt for seven days.
Held: The judge was under no duty to hear any allegation of contempt on the day. . .
Cited – Regina v M (Restraint order: Jurisdiction) CACD 14-Aug-2008
The defendant appealed against a decision that he should face a prosecution for contempt of court for breach of a restraint order.
Held: The court did have the jurisdiction to deal with such a complaint. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Contempt of Court
Updated: 06 February 2022; Ref: scu.224058
