UTIAC 1. In establishing for the purposes of Art 1F(a) of the Refugee Convention that an individual was complicit under Art 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (‘ICC Statute’) in crimes against humanity perpetrated by others in an organisation, it was necessary to consider all the circumstances of the appellant’s involvement in that organisation in order to determine whether what the appellant did made a significant contribution to the organisation’s ability to carry out crimes against humanity: R (on the application of JS) (Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 15. (See also Joined Cases C-57/09 and C-101/09 Bundesrepublik Deutschland v B and D [2011] Imm AR 190).
2. However, in establishing this (wider) form of complicity liability under international criminal law it was not necessary to establish that the appellant’s acts formed ‘part of’ a crime against humanity committed by others in the sense that the appellant’s acts were of such a character as, in themselves, to fall within one or more of the categories of acts which if committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population were capable of amounting to a crime against humanity under Art 7 of the ICC Statute.
Citations:
[2011] UKUT 339 (IAC)
Links:
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Immigration
Updated: 19 September 2022; Ref: scu.444054
