Arusha and Demushi (Deprivation of Citizenship – Delay) Albania: UTIAC 13 Mar 2012

UTIAC (i) The following rulings made by the First-tier Tribunal on the nature and scope of an appeal against the deprival of citizenship under s.40 of the British Nationality Act 1981 were not challenged by either party before the Upper Tribunal:
(a) The Tribunal has a wide-ranging power to consider, by way of appeal not a review, what the decision in an appellant’s case should have been. The Tribunal has to ask itself ‘does the evidence in the case establish that citizenship was obtained by fraud?’ If it does then it has to ask ‘do the other circumstances of the case point to discretionary deprival?’
(b) In terms of the proof of fraud, the Tribunal will consider any evidence, whether or not available to the respondent at the time he made his decision, which is relevant to the determination of that question.
(c) It is for the respondent to prove that the appellant’s conduct comes within the scope of s.40 of the 1981 Act.
(d) The appellant can raise general human rights grounds but they must be framed to deal with the breach alleged to be caused by the decision to deprive the appellant of his nationality, and giving effect to that decision, and not framed to deal with the fiction that the appellant would be removed.
(ii) To establish that a delay in the promulgation of a decision has led to an error of law it has to be shown that the decision was not safe and therefore unlawful. There must be a nexus between the delay and the safety of the decision: see Secretary of State v RK (Algeria) [2007] EWCA Civ 868.

Judges:

Latter UTJ

Citations:

[2012] UKUT 80 (IAC)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Immigration

Updated: 05 October 2022; Ref: scu.451919