A claim was brought against the company for malicious prosecution. The jury acquitted it. And the plaintiff appealed.
Held: The judge’s direction had been correct.
Bowen LJ said: ‘Wherever a person asserts affirmatively as part of his case that a certain state of facts is present or is absent . . that is an averment which he is bound to prove positively.’
. . And ‘If there is a conflict of evidence as to these questions, it is unnecessary, except for the purpose of making plain what the judge is doing, to explain to the jury about onus of proof, unless there are presumptions of law, such as, for instance, the presumption of consideration for a bill of exchange, or a presumption of consideration for a deed. And if the jury is asked by the judge a plain question, as, for instance, whether they believe or disbelieve the principal witness called for the plaintiff, it is unnecessary to explain to them about the onus of proof, because the only answer which they have to give is Yes or No, or else they cannot tell what to say. If the jury cannot make up their minds upon a question of that kind, it is for the judge to say which party is entitled to the verdict. I do not forget that there are canons which are useful to a judge in commenting upon evidence and rules for determining the weight of conflicting evidence; but they are not the same as onus of proof. Now in an action for malicious prosecution the plaintiff has the burden throughout of establishing that the circumstances of the prosecution were such that a judge can see no reasonable or probable cause for instituting it. In one sense that is the assertion of a negative, and we have been pressed with the proposition that when a negative is to be made out the onus of proof shifts. That is not so. If the assertion of a negative is an essential part of the plaintiff’s case, the proof of the assertion still rests upon the plaintiff. The terms ‘negative ‘ and ‘ affirmative’ are after all relative and not absolute. In dealing with a question of negligence, that term may be considered either as negative or affirmative according to the definition adopted in measuring the duty which is neglected. Wherever a person asserts affirmatively as part of his case that a certain state of facts is present or is absent, or that a particular thing is insufficient for a particular purpose, that is an averment which he is bound to prove positively. It has been said that an exception exists in those cases where the facts lie peculiarly within the knowledge of the opposite party. The counsel for the plaintiff have not gone the length of contending that in all those cases the onus shifts, and that the person within whose knowledge the truth peculiarly lies is bound to prove or disprove the matter in dispute. I think a proposition of that kind cannot be maintained, and that the exceptions supposed to be found amongst cases relating to the game laws may be explained on special grounds come back to the question of the present trial, it is possible that the language of Cave, J., has been misunderstood; and must look and see out of the ways in which the question might possibly be tried, which way he has selected, because as soon as it is seen which mode of trial he has selected a great advance is made towards seeing that the criticisms which have been made on his direction are unsound. A judge may leave the jury to find a general verdict, explaining to the jury what the disputed facts are, telling them that if they find the disputed facts in favour of one side or the other, his opinion as to reasonable and probable cause will differ accordingly, telling them what, in each alternative, his view will be, and enabling them to apply that statement with reference to the issue as to malice; that is a way which in a very simple kind of case may be adopted. But I think it necessary only to state as much as I have stated about it, to see that a very clear head and a very clear tongue will be required to conduct a complicated case to a general verdict in that way. Accordingly, judges have, been in the habit of adopting a different course whenever there are circumstances of complication. A judge may accordingly, do this; he may tell the jury what the issues or questions are, and at the same time inform them what will be the effect upon the verdict, which they will ultimately be asked to find, of the answers they give to the specific questions, leaving the jury both to answer the questions and then to find a verdict, after he has explained to them what result the answers to the questions will involve. That is the way in which Cave, J. really did try this case. There is a third way in which a judge may conduct the trial, by asking the jury specific questions, and not leaving it to them to find the verdict, but entering the: judgment upon their findings himself. That is a third way, and that was not adopted in form by the learned judge, although it will be observed it differs only slightly in form from the second mode of procedure, which he, in fact, did adopt. Now, if the judge adopts the second method of procedure, it is obvious that he is putting specific questions to the jury with the intention, as soon as they have answered the specific questions, to request them to go still further, and to find a general verdict one way or the other on such answers.’
Lord Brett MR said that any party wishing to assert a negative proposition bears the onus of proving that negative.
Bowen LJ, Lord Brett MR
[1883] 11 QBD 440, [1883] UKLawRpKQB 122
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal from – Abrath v North Eastern Railway Co HL 15-Mar-1886
The plaintiff had brought an action against the company of malicious prosecution. It was rejected by the jury and again on appeal.
Held: The appeal failed. In an action for damages for the tort of malicious prosecution one of the elements of . .
Cited – Jetivia Sa and Another v Bilta (UK) Ltd and Others SC 22-Apr-2015
The liquidators of Bilta had brought proceedings against former directors and the appellant alleging that they were party to an unlawful means conspiracy which had damaged the company by engaging in a carousel fraud with carbon credits. On the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 23 August 2021; Ref: scu.565827
