Hughes LJ analysed the authorities on the requirements to establish joint venture criminal liability saying: ‘the liability of D2 . . rests, as all these citations show, on his having continued in the common venture of crime A when he realises (even if he does not desire) that crime B may be committed in the course of it. Where crime B is murder, that means that he can properly be held guilty if he foresees that D1 will cause death by acting with murderous intent (viz either intent to kill or intent to do GBH). He has associated himself with a foreseen murder’ and ‘It is necessary to remember that guilt based upon common enterprise is a form of secondary liability. The principle is that D2 is implicated in the guilt of D1 not only for the agreed crime A but for the further crime B which he foresaw D1 might commit in the course of A. This form of liability therefore arises only where D1 has committed the further crime B.’ and ‘That the joint participant can only be guilty of murder on the basis that he participates in the common enterprise and foresees that in the course of that common enterprise another joint participant may, not will, commit murder, that is to say act with the intention to kill or cause grievous bodily harm.’
Hughes LJ, Wyn Williamsom King JJ
 EWCA Crim 1622,  2 WLR 647,  2 Cr App R 32,  QB 841,  Crim LR 61
England and Wales
Cited – Gnango, Regina v SC 14-Dec-2011
The prosecutor appealed against a successful appeal by the defendant against his conviction for murder. He and an opponent had engaged in a street battle using guns. His opponent had shot an innocent passer by. The court was now asked as to whether . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 09 November 2021; Ref: scu.420803