The House was asked whether the consignee of a cargo was in breach of a contractual obligation to discharge the relevant vessel within a reasonable time, that is to say, a single obligation to do something within a reasonable time, rather than an obligation to do a number of things, where there was a single cause of delay, namely a strike of dockworkers, over which the consignee had no control and the effect of which, while it lasted, was to prevent totally performance of the obligation.
Held: Lord Herschell: ‘The bills of lading in the present case contained no such stipulation [as to time for performance], and, therefore, in accordance with ordinary and well-known principles the obligation of the respondents was that they should take discharge of the cargo within a reasonable time. The question is, has the appellant proved that this reasonable time has been exceeded? This depends upon what circumstances may be taken into consideration in determining whether more than a reasonable time was occupied . . The appellant’s contention is, that inasmuch as the obligation to take discharge of the cargo, and to provide the necessary labour for that purpose, rested upon the respondents, the test is what time would have been required for the discharge of the vessel under ordinary circumstances, and that, inasmuch as they have to provide the labour, they must be responsible if the discharge is delayed beyond that period. The respondents on the other hand contend that the question is not what time would have been necessary or what time would have been reasonable under ordinary circumstances, but what time was reasonable under existing circumstances, assuming that, in so far as the existing circumstances were extraordinary, they were not due to any act or default on the part of the respondents. My Lords, there appears to me to be no direct authority upon the point, although there are judgments bearing on the subject to which I will presently call attention. I would observe, in the first place, that there is of course no such thing as a reasonable time in the abstract. It must always depend upon circumstances. Upon ‘the ordinary circumstances’ say the learned counsel for the appellant. But what may without impropriety be termed the ordinary circumstances differ in particular ports at different times of the year. As regards the practicability of discharging a vessel they may differ in summer and winter. Again, weather increasing the difficulty of, though not preventing, the discharge of a vessel may continue for so long a period that it may justly be termed extraordinary. Could it be contended that in so far as it lasted beyond the ordinary period the delay caused by it was to be excluded in determining whether the cargo had been discharged within a reasonable time? It appears to me that the appellant’s contention would involve constant difficulty and dispute, and that the only sound principle is that the ‘reasonable time’ should depend on the circumstances which actually exist. If the cargo has been taken with all reasonable despatch under those circumstances I think the obligation of the consignee has been fulfilled. When I say the circumstances which actually exist, I, of course, imply that those circumstances, in so far as they involve delay, have not been caused or contributed to by the consignee. I think the balance of authority, both as regards the cases which relate to contracts by a consignee to take discharge, and those in which the question what is a reasonable time has had to be answered when analogous obligations were under consideration, is distinctly in favour of the view taken by the Court below.’ Lord Watson: ‘When the language of a contract does not expressly, or by necessary implication, fix any time for the performance of the contractual obligation, the law implies that it shall be performed within a reasonable time. The rule is of general application, and is not confined to contracts for the carriage of goods by sea. In the case of other contracts the condition of reasonable time has been frequently interpreted; and has invariably been held to mean that the party upon whom it is incumbent duly fulfils his obligation, notwithstanding protracted delay, so long as such delay is attributable to causes beyond his control, and he has neither acted negligently nor unreasonably.’
Lord Watson said: ‘When the language of a contract does not expressly, or by necessary implication, fix any time for the performance of a contractual obligation, the law implies that it shall be performed within a reasonable time. The rule is of general application, and is not confined to contracts for the carriage of goods by sea. In the case of other contracts the condition of reasonable time has been frequently interpreted; and has invariably been held to mean that the party upon whom it is incumbent duly fulfils his obligation, notwithstanding protracted delay, so long as such delay is attributable to causes beyond his control, and he has neither acted negligently nor unreasonably.’
Lord Herschell LC
[1893] AC 22
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Astea (UK) Ltd v Time Group Ltd TCC 9-Apr-2003
The question of whether a reasonable time has been exceeded in performance of a contract is ‘a broad consideration, with the benefit of hindsight, and viewed from the time at which one party contends that a reasonable time for performance has been . .
Cited – Peregrine Systems Ltd v Steria Ltd CA 14-Mar-2005
The claimant provided computer software to the defendants. The defendants appealed dismissal of their defences arguing that the system had failed.
Held: No repudiatory breach was established, and moreover Steria had elected to affirm the . .
Cited – Shawton Engineering Ltd v Dgp International Ltd (T/A Design Group Partnership) and Another CA 18-Nov-2005
There had been a very substantial construction project, in which certain facets of design were sub-contracted and sub-contracted again to the parties. There were substantial delays and a sub-contractor purported to terminate the contract for failing . .
Cited – Coulson v Newsgroup Newspapers Ltd QBD 21-Dec-2011
coulson_NIQBD2011
The claimant had been employed by the defendant as editor of a newspaper. On leaving they entered into an agreement which the claimant said required the defendant to pay his legal costs in any action arising regarding his editorship. The defendant . .
These lists may be incomplete.
Updated: 12 July 2021; Ref: scu.223517