J S Bloor (Wilmslow) Ltd -v- Homes and Communities Agency; CA 22-May-2015

Court: CA
Date: 22-May-2015
Judges: Jackson, Patten, Sales LJJ
Links: Bailii,
References: [2015] EWCA Civ 540,

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Filed under Land

Hirani and Others -v- Revenue & Customs; FTTTx 30-Nov-2011

FTTTx Application for leave to appeal out of time – whether reasonable excuse.

Court: FTTTx
Date: 30-Nov-2011
Links: Bailii,
References: [2011] UKFTT 775 (TC),

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Filed under Income Tax

Re Hellas Telecommunications (Luxembourg) II SCA; ChD 30-Nov-2011

Applications by company’s administrators for order terminating the administration.

Court: ChD
Date: 30-Nov-2011
Judges: Sales J
Links: Bailii,
References: [2011] EWHC 3176 (Ch),

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Filed under Insolvency

Regina -v- Wayte; 1983

Date: 01-Jan-1983
References: [1983] 76 Cr App Rep 110,
Cited By:

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Filed under Crime

HFO Capital Ltd -v- Burney; Misc 30-Nov-2011

The claimant said it had taken an assignment of the defendant’s consumer credit act debt to Barclaycard. There was evidential confusion as to the assignment, and as to the necessary notice of assignment.
Held: The claim failed.

Court: Misc
Date: 30-Nov-2011
Judges: Hill DJ
Links: Bailii,
References: [2011] EW Misc 23 (CC),

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Filed under Banking, Consumer

Gillespie -v- Gillespie and Others; SCS 30-Nov-2011

Outer House, Court of Session – suplementary opinion

Court: SCS
Date: 30-Nov-2011
Judges: Lord Hodge
Links: Bailii,
References: [2011] ScotCS CSOH_201,

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Filed under Company, Scotland

STU -v- UVW and Another; QBD 30-Nov-2011

Reasons for grant iof privacy injunction and anonymity order

Court: QBD
Date: 30-Nov-2011
Judges: Tugendhat J
Links: Bailii,
References: [2011] EWHC 3133 (QB),

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Filed under Litigation Practice

HM Revenue and Customs -v- PA Holdings Ltd; CA 30-Nov-2011

The company made available to certain employees discretionary annual bonuses paid by way instead of shares and received dividends. It now appealed against findings that the payments were taxable subject to Schedule F rates and were liable to National Insurance.

Court: CA
Date: 30-Nov-2011
Judges: Maurice Kay, Arden, Moses LJJ
Statutes: Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988
Links: Bailii,
References: [2011] EWCA Civ 1414,

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Filed under Employment, Taxes - Other

Boyce -v- Rendells; CA 1983

The court accepted the proposition as to the extent of a solicitor’s duty of care that: ‘if, in the course of taking instructions, a professional man like a land agent or a solicitor learns of facts which reveal to him as a professional man the existence of obvious risks, then he should do more than merely advise within the strict limits of his retainer. He should call attention to and advise upon the risks.’

Court: CA
Date: 01-Jan-1983
Judges: Lawton LJ
References: [1983] 268 EG 268,
Cited By:

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Filed under Professional Negligence

Gulati and Others -v- MGN Limited; ChD 21-May-2015

The claimants each claimed that their mobile phones had been hacked by or on behalf of the defendant newspaper group. The claims had now in substance been admitted, and the court set out to assess the damages (and aggravated damages) to be paid.
Held: The defendants had taken great steps to deny any culpability and only admitted their offences and apologised at the latest opportunity and when it represented a tactical advantage. Substantial damages were awarded to several defendants acknowledging the real damage caused by the defendant’s newspapers.

Court: ChD
Date: 21-May-2015
Judges: Mann J
Links: Bailii,
References: [2015] EWHC 1482 (Ch),
Cases Cited:

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Filed under Damages, Media, News, Torts - Other

Dudman Group Ltd -v- Revenue & Customs; FTTTx 30-Nov-2011

PAYE – late payment of. Penalty/surcharge – reasonable excuse. Insufficiency of funds – whether cause of insufficiency amounts to a reasonable excuse.

Court: FTTTx
Date: 30-Nov-2011
Links: Bailii,
References: [2011] UKFTT 771 (TC),

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Filed under Income Tax

QWE -v- SDF and Others; QBD 30-Nov-2011

Reasons for grant of injunction to prohibit the disclosure of information specified in the order, and in particular any information concerning the fact or details of the sexual relationships between the Claimant and the First or Second Defendants.

Court: QBD
Date: 30-Nov-2011
Judges: Tugendhat J
Links: Bailii,
References: [2011] EWHC 3121 (QB),

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Filed under Litigation Practice

European Asian Bank AG -v- Punjab and Sind Bank; CA 1983

The court heard a claim by the appellant bank against the issuing bank of a deferred payment letter of credit. The appellants had negotiated the credit by paying its discounted value to the Beneficiary. Between that date and the maturity date fraud, or alleged fraud, on the part of the Beneficiary was discovered and the issuing bank denied liability under the credit.
Held: There was no arguable defence and the court entered a summary judgment against the issuing bank. On the evidence the issuing bank had unequivocally represented to the appellants that they were entitled to act as negotiating bankers under the credit and that they would be paid as negotiating bankers on the maturity date.
The issuing bank submitted that the appellants were merely agents for collection for the beneficiary (and so fixed with its fraud). This was rejected: ‘Even if it were a fact that, as at August 13 (when the appellants had forwarded the documents to the issuing bank to enquire whether they would accept them) the appellants had been appointed agents for collection by (the Beneficiary) it is beyond question that by August 20 the appellants had negotiated the letter of credit, and there is no suggestion that they acted otherwise than in good faith in so doing. Thereafter, in February 1980, they claimed payment from the respondents; and this was refused. In our judgment it is not open to the respondents, on these facts, to say against the appellants that they were justified in refusing payment on the ground that the documents were fraudulent or even forged. In our judgment the relevant time for considering this question is the time when payment falls due and is claimed and refused. If, at that time, the party claiming payment had negotiated the relevant documents in good faith, the issuing bank cannot excuse his refusal to pay on the ground that at some earlier time the negotiating bank was a mere agent for collection on behalf of the seller and allege against him fraud or forgery (if that indeed be the case) on the part of the beneficiary of the letter of credit.’ and ‘After all it was obvious that the appellants as negotiating bankers, would be discounting the letter of credit and so paying out a very large sum of money on the faith of these messages (that is the messages which constituted the representation that the appellants were entitled to act as negotiating bankers under the letter of credit).’

Court: CA
Date: 01-Jan-1983
Judges: Robert Goff LJ
References: [1983] 1 LL Rep 611,
Cited By:

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Filed under Banking

Perera -v- Civil Service Commission (No 2); CA 1983

Upheld on Appeal.

Court: CA
Date: 01-Jan-1983
References: [1983] ICR 428,
Cases Cited:
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Filed under Discrimination

Regina -v- Lewis; 1983

The defendant appealed convictions for sexual assaults on minors.
Held: Evidence of paedophilic tendencies was properly admitted in relation to counts where the touching was said to have been innocent or accidental, but not in relation to an incident which could have had no innocent explanation, but which the defendant denied had ever taken place.

Date: 01-Jan-1983
References: (1983) 76 Cr App R 33,
Cited By:

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Filed under Criminal Evidence

Leeward Securities Ltd -v- Lilyheath Properties Ltd; 1983

The tenant had created a subletting which would attract the protection of the Rent Act. The landlord sought forfeiture.
Held: The court could envisage circumstances in which it might be unreasonable to refuse consent to an underletting, if the result would be that there was no way in which the tenant (the sublandlord) could reasonably exploit the premises except by creating a tenancy to which the Rent Act protection would apply, and which inevitably would affect the value of the landlord’s reversion.
O’Connor LJ said: ‘It must not be thought that, because the introduction of a Rent Act tenant inevitably has an adverse effect upon the value of the reversion, that that is a sufficient ground for the landlords to say that they can withhold consent and that the court will hold that that is reasonable.’ In this case however it was.

Date: 01-Jan-1983
Judges: Oliver, O'Connor LJJ
References: [1984] 2 EGLR 54, (1983) 271 EG 279

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Filed under Landlord and Tenant

Regina -v- Edwards; 1983

The trial judge had omitted to give a rape jury any direction on the standard of proof.
Held: The court regarded that as a serious defect, not cured by references in the speeches of counsel, but applied the proviso to the section so as to allow the conviction to stand.

Date: 01-Jan-1983
Statutes: Criminal Appeals Act 1968 2(1)
References: (1983) 77 Cr App R 5,
Cited By:

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Filed under Criminal Practice

Empresa Exportadora de Azucar -v- Industria Azucarera Nacional S.A, The Playa Larga; CA 1983

The effect of disregarding a provision of foreign law as manifestly contrary to public policy may be to render enforceable in England a contract which is not enforceable by its proper law. The court considered the measure of damages in relation to the non-delivery of goods sold by the defendants to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs claimed that the damages recoverable should be related to the highest price prevailing at any time between the date of the breach and the date of the arbitration award. This contention was rejected.
Ackner LJ said: ‘Mr. Rix, in his cross-appeal, argued that the damages recoverable by Iansa in contract should be related to the highest price prevailing at any time between the date of the breach and date of the award. Mr. Justice Mustill rejected this submission and has set out his reasons most fully, which we are happy to adopt. We would, however, venture to suggest that the matter can be put more simply. Iansa, as complainants, must establish what damage they have suffered. Mr. Rix had to accept: (a) That after the date when Iansa could have bought in to cover their loss there was no evidence at all that the fluctuations in the sugar market made the slightest financial difference to them. There was no evidence that they could have sold at the highest price. On the contrary, the reasonable inference was that the goods would have been resold for domestic or other consumption in Chile, (b) Although theoretically Cubazucar was capable of selling the sugar at the highest price, there is no evidence that it did so.
Accordingly, to the plaintiffs’ contention that Cubazucar should not profit from its own wrong comes the simple reply: they have not shown that Cubazucar have done so. We cannot, therefore, see any basis upon which Iansa can seek to achieve a windfall in the form of an extra $1,200 per tonne over and above the price which was prevailing when they should have bought in the market.’

Court: CA
Date: 01-Jan-1983
Judges: Ackner LJ, Stephenson LJ, Sir Segab Shaw
References: [1983] 2 Lloyds Rep 171,
Cited By:

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Filed under Contract, Jurisdiction, Transport

Smout -v- Welsh Ministers and Wrexham CBC; CA 30-Nov-2011

Court: CA
Date: 30-Nov-2011
Judges: Laws, Pitchford, Lloyd Jones LJJ
Links: Bailii,
References: [2011] EWCA Civ 1750,

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Filed under Planning

Finelvet AG -v- Vinava Shipping Co Ltd (The Chrysalis”); 1983″

The Chrysalis was trapped in the Shatt-al-Arab waterway in the course of the Iran-Iraq war, and the parties disputed the frustration of the charter contract.
Held: Mustill J set out stages for considering an appeal from an arbitration award by differentiating between points of law and of fact: ‘Starting therefore with the proposition that the court is concerned to decide, on the hearing of the appeal, whether the award can be shown to be wrong in law, how is this question to be tackled? In a case such as the present, the answer is to be found by dividing the arbitrator’s process of reasoning into three stages:
(1) The arbitrator ascertains the facts. This process includes the making of findings on any facts which are in dispute.
(2) The arbitrator ascertains the law. This process comprises not only the identification of all material rules of statute and common law, but also the identification and interpretation of the relevant parts of the contract, and the identification of those facts which must be taken into account when the decision is reached.
(3) In the light of the facts and the law so ascertained, the arbitrator reaches his decision.
In some cases, the third stage will be purely mechanical. Once the law is correctly ascertained, the decision follows inevitably from the application of it to the facts found. In other instances, however, the third stage involves an element of judgment on the part of the arbitrator. There is no uniquely ‘right’ answer to be derived from marrying the facts and the law, merely a choice of answers, none of which can be described as wrong.’
Only items at stage 2 are properly appealable: ‘The second stage of the process is the proper subject matter of an appeal under the 1979 Act. In some cases an error of law can be demonstrated by studying the way in which the arbitrator has stated the law in his reasons. It is, however, also possible to infer an error of law in those cases where a correct application of the law to the facts found would lead inevitably to one answer, whereas the arbitrator has arrived at another: and this can be so even if the arbitrator has stated the law in his reasons in a manner which appears to be correct – for the Court is then driven to assume that he did not properly understand the principles which he had stated.
Whether the third stage can ever be the proper subject of an appeal, in those cases where the making of the decision does not follow automatically from the ascertainment of the facts and the law, is not a matter upon which it is necessary to express a view in the present case. The Nema and The Evia show that where the issue is one of commercial frustration, the Court will not intervene, save only to the extent that it will have to form its own view, in order to see whether the arbitrator’s decision is out of conformity with the only correct answer or (as the case may be) lies outside the range of correct answers. This is part of the process of investigating whether the arbitrator has gone wrong at the second stage. But once the Court has concluded that a tribunal which correctly understood the law could have arrived at the same answer as the one reached by the arbitrator, the fact that the individual judge himself would have come to a different conclusion is no ground for disturbing the award.’

Date: 01-Jan-1983
Judges: Mustill J
Statutes: Arbitration Act 1979 1(3)
References: [1983] 1 WLR 1469, [1983] 1 Lloyds Rep 503
Cited By:

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Filed under Arbitration, Contract

My Kinda Town Ltd -v- Soll; CA 1983

The appeal succeeded. Where there is already a substantial potentiality for confusion of two businesses simply by reason of their being engaged in the same trade, a trader cannot legitimately build on and increase that potentiality in such a way that confusion becomes worse confounded. This would amount to passing off.
Oliver LJ said: ‘The question to be asked is, no doubt, in all cases the same – is the get-up, or the method of training’ (sic, presumably this is a misprint for `trading’) ‘or the use of a particular trading name by the defendants calculated to lead to the belief that their business is the plaintiff’s business? But it becomes an extraordinarily difficult question to answer where there is already a substantial potentiality for confusion of the two businesses, simply by reason of their being engaged in the same trade. That does not mean, of course, that a defendant is legitimately entitled to build on and increase that potentiality in such a way that confusion becomes worse confounded, but it does mean that where evidence of actual confusion is tendered it has to be approached … with the caveat that there may well be reasons why it occurs which involve no question of legal liability at all.’

Court: CA
Date: 01-Jan-1983
Judges: Oliver LJ
References: [1983] RPC 407,
Cases Cited:
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Filed under Intellectual Property

Dimbleby & Sons -v- National Union of Journalists; CA 1983

Court: CA
Date: 01-Jan-1983
References: [1984] 1 WLR 67 and 427,
Cited By:

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Filed under Contract

Hill -v- Rochard; CA 1983

The statutory tenant appealed an order for possession made on the basis that an offer of suitable alternative accommodation had been made and that it was reasonable to make the order. The tenancy had been of a large isolated country house with a paddock and outbuildings. The alternative offered was a modern four bedroom house.
Held: The tenant’s appeal failed. Nevertheless, the court should have regard to the housing needs of the tenant when deciding that the alternative offered was reasonably suitable for the tenant and her family as regards extent and character, and this would include allowing for the tenant having become accustomed to her environment. The Rent Acts were not intended to protect ‘incidental advantages’ relating to the tenant’s own particular tase for amenities.

Court: CA
Date: 01-Jan-1983
Judges: Dunn LJ
Statutes: Rent Act 1977 Schedule 15 Part IV paragraph 5(1)(b)
References: Times, 01-Feb-1983, [1983] 1 WLR 478

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Filed under Landlord and Tenant

Regina -v- South Tameside Magistrates Court, ex parte Rowland; 1983

If after the defendant enters an unequivocal plea of guilty it becomes clear that the defendant did not appreciate the elements of the offence to which he was pleading guilty, then it may be appropriate to permit him to withdraw his plea.

Date: 01-Jan-1983
Judges: Glidewell LJ
References: [1983] 3 All ER 689,
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Filed under Criminal Practice

I Congreso del Partido; HL 1983

The House restricted the doctrine of state immunity so as to exclude trading and commercial activities from immunity. The doctrine should be upheld as a modern application of the principle of ‘par in parem non habet imperium.’

Court: HL
Date: 01-Jan-1983
Judges: Lord Wilberforce
References: [1983] 1 AC 244,
Cases Cited:
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Filed under Jurisdiction

Marco (Croydon) Ltd -v- Metropolitan Police Commissioner; QBD 1983

The defendant company traded as A & J Bull Containers. They hired out a builder’s skip which was left out, unlit, on the highway at night. A cyclist rode into it and died. An information was laid against ‘A J Bull Ltd’, charging an offence under the Highways Act 1980. The hearing took place after the expiry of the six-month limitation period permitted by Section 127 of the 1980 Act. Counsel appeared for A & J Bull Limited, a separate company entirely. The offending skip bore the name ‘A & J Bull’. A delivery and collection note in respect of it bore the inscription ‘Marco (Croydon) Limited T/A A & J Bull Containers’. The prosecution applied for the amendment of the name, which was allowed. The company appealed its conviction.
Held: The justices had been wrong to permit the amendment, and the appeal was allowed. The justices had correctly formulated the law in the case stated as follows: ‘We were of the opinion that, where the wrong person has been summoned, amendment should not be allowed but where the prosecutor has correctly identified the defendant but merely misstated the name, amendment should be allowed . .’ They applied that test in this way: ‘Applying those principles to the present case we were of the opinion that the prosecutor clearly intended to summon the corporation which supplied the skip whose name was wrongly copied from the delivery note. We therefore allowed the amendment.’ Glidewell J: ‘What the justices do not say and do not specifically find is that the correct company, Marco (Croydon) Limited, received the summons and were apprised that they were being blamed for breach of Section 139 ….. and it was that company, through [counsel], which appeared before the justices on 11 June’ – the date of the hearing – ‘[Counsel] says that he appeared instructed by another company called A & J Bull Limited which is a separate legal entity. ‘

Court: QBD
Date: 01-Jan-1983
Judges: Glidewell J, Nolan J
Statutes: Magistrates' Court Act 1980
References: [1983] Crim LR 395,
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Filed under Magistrates

Re P (A Minor)(Custody); 1983

Date: 01-Jan-1983
References: [1983] 4 FLR 401,
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Filed under Children

Wilson -v- Craig; 1983

Date: 01-Jan-1983
References: 1983 SLT 556,
Cited By:

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Filed under Legal Professions, Scotland

Thoms Executrix -v- Russel & Aitken; 1983

The court was asked as to how the value of the interest of a deceased partner was to be calculated.
Held: There had been prior dealings at book value as between the partners, and the payment of the deceased partner’s share was restricted to book value of the capital. The court considered the case law and ‘That is sufficient for the disposal of the case but there is another and equally cogent reason for reaching the same conclusion namely, the actings of the parties under the contract. It was clearly recognised in the three cases to which I have referred that even if the contract is silent as to the accounting principles to be applied fair market valuations of assets will not be required to appear in the accounts if it can reasonably be inferred from the actings of the partners that they intended otherwise. ‘ and ‘Taking all the foregoing factors into account I conclude that even if the correct position were that the contract of co-partnery were silent on the matter nevertheless the actings of the partners thereunder and under the two preceding contracts demonstrate clearly that there was no intention on their part that a partner leaving the partnership either by retiral or by death should receive his share calculated other than by reference to book value.’

Date: 01-Jan-1983
Judges: Lord Jauncey
References: 1983 SLT 335,
Cases Cited:
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Filed under Company, Scotland

Murray -v- Nicholls; 1983

A car was driven without stopping out of a side street colliding with another car. One driver was killed and his passengers were injured. They sued the driver’s widow and Strathclyde Regional Council as roads authority. It was averred that, some considerable time before the accident, Strathclyde had caused white lines to be painted at the junction, indicating that priority should be given to traffic in Victoria Place. But the lines had been all but obliterated as a result of road works some months before the accident and they had not been repainted. There were no signs at the junction. The pursuers averred that Strathclyde were in breach of their duty to take reasonable care that roads in their area were maintained in such a condition that persons using them could do so in safety. They had failed to have the lines repainted as soon as was reasonably practicable after the works were completed and they had failed to erect and maintain warning signs.
Held: The pursuers’ averments directed against Strathclyde were irrelevant and so the action against them was dismissed. The previous existence of the white lines at the junction was sufficient to show that it was reasonably foreseeable that, in the absence of such an indication, a vehicle might be driven into Victoria Place without stopping. ‘But while foreseeability is no doubt necessary to found a duty it does not follow from the mere fact of foreseeability that a duty will necessarily arise. No case was cited to me in which a road authority has been held to be at fault merely by reason of failure to mark white lines on the roadway or erect a warning sign at a road junction in a built-up area. The only authority referred to by counsel for the pursuers was Bird v Pearce where the point was expressly reserved. The ratio of the decision whereby the road authority was found to be at fault was that by markings on the road they had created a pattern of traffic flow on which drivers could expect to rely and that the obliteration of the markings caused something of the nature of a trap of which the defendants ought to have given warning. In the present case there is no averment to suggest that either driver was influenced by the existence of the markings at an earlier date. What is said is that because of houses and walls adjacent to the road, those driving northwards towards the junction would have no visibility to the east until they actually reached it, but that is no more than the normal state of affairs in a built-up area. The fact that white lines had been put there before while relevant to the question of foreseeability has no bearing otherwise on the existence of a duty. If the pursuers’ contention were accepted it would open up a wide field for actions against road authorities. It would seem, for instance, to follow that the pedestrian run down when crossing a busy thoroughfare would be entitled to say that his injuries were caused by the failure of the authority to set the machinery in motion for the provision of a pedestrian crossing. If such duties are to be imposed on road authorities, that should in my opinion be done by Parliament and not by courts of law, and in the absence of authority I am not prepared to hold that the power given to a local authority to mark white lines on the roadway and erect warning signs implies a duty to do so at every crossing in a built-up area where there is a considerable volume of traffic.’

Date: 01-Jan-1983
References: 1983 SLT 194,
Cited By:

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Filed under Negligence, Scotland

Pennine Raceway Ltd -v- Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council; CA 1983

The claimant had been granted a contractual right to use an airfield for arranging motor racing events. The planning consent was revoked, and compensation was claimed under s164 as ‘a person interested in the land’ which ‘is a section designed to compensate those who have incurred expenditure in reliance upon a permitted use only to find that they now face loss because the planning authority has revoked the permission. The subject matter of the compensation is not the compulsory acquisition of land, but the restriction upon use. Clearly some limit has to be placed upon the right to claim compensation because many a person may be affected by a change in the permitted use of land while not themselves being directly concerned to make any use of it. In the present case, for example, an omnibus company might have planned to lay on transport facilities to and from the airfield. In my opinion this section envisages as deserving of compensation a person who has a right in relation to the land, which right is adversely affected by the restriction on use.’ and ‘The Act refers to an ‘interest in land’ in other sections and to my mind the change to the less technical language of ‘interested in the land’ in section 164 is deliberate. I cannot see that it was dictated by the desire to achieve economy of language, for the saving between ‘a person interested in the land’ and ‘a person with an interest in the land’ is minimal. I therefore feel free to interpret the phrase without regard to technical terms. In the context of the Act, and section 164 in particular, a person who, like the appellants, has an enforceable right as against the owner to use the land in the way which has now been prohibited is ‘a person interested in the land’ within section 164.’

Court: CA
Date: 01-Jan-1983
Judges: Eveleigh LJ, Kerr LJ, Stephenson LJ
Statutes: Town and Country Planning Act 1971 164
References: [1983] QB 382,
Cases Cited:
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Filed under Planning

Regina -v- Carey; 1983

Magistrates had failed to sign the committal papers when sending the case to the crown court.
Held: Applying Hall, the committal remained effective.

Date: 01-Jan-1983
References: [1983] 76 Cr App R 152,
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Filed under Magistrates

Customs & Excise Commissioners -v- Viva Gas Appliances Limited; HL 1983

Any work on the fabric of a building constituted its alteration ‘except that which is so slight or trivial as to attract the application of the de minimis rule’. The word ‘demolition’ meant destroying the building as a whole.

Court: HL
Date: 01-Jan-1983
References: [1983] 1 WLR 1445,
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Filed under VAT

Backer -v- Secretary of State for the Environment; 1983

Complaint was made that the occupier had taken up occupation of a vehicle, a Commer van, ‘adapted’ for human habitation, and therefore under the control of the 1960 Act, but on land for which there was no planning permission for use for caravans.
Held: The defendant had merely placed bed and other furniture in an otherwise unchanged motor vehicle. It was not adapted in the absence of some physical alteration. When considering whether

Date: 01-Jan-1983
Judges: David Widdecombe QC
Statutes: Caravan Sites and Control of development Act 1960 29(1), Town and Country Planning Act 1971 87(3) 290(5)
References: [1983] 2 All ER 1021, [1983] 1 WLR 1485, (1984) 47 P & CR 149
Cases Cited:
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Filed under Planning

Regina -v- Miller & Glennie; Miller v- Glennie; 1983

The question was whether or not the litigants had incurred liability for costs in cases in which they had been supported by their employer.
Held: Where the solicitor is on the record for the client in the litigation, there is a rebuttable presumption that the client is liable to pay his solicitors.

Date: 01-Jan-1983
Judges: Lloyd J
References: [1983] 1 WLR 1056, [1983] 1 All ER 978
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Filed under Costs, Crime

Ronex Properties v. John Laing Construction Ltd; CA 1983

The court considered a claim for contribution between tortfeasors. Donaldson LJ said: ‘The starting point of this submission is that a cause of action for contribution, under the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935, arises at the earliest when the claimant tortfeasor has been held liable, or has admitted liability to the plaintiff, and the amount of that liability has been ascertained by judgment or admission. This proposition is supported by dicta in George Wimpey & Co. Ltd. v. British Overseas Airways Corporation [1955] A.C. 169, per Viscount Simonds at p. 177, Lord Porter at p. 182 and Lord Keith at p. 193. It is also in accordance with the dictum of McNair J. in Harvey v. R.G.O’Dell Ltd. [1958] 2 Q.B. 78, 108, and it is consistent with the approach of Parliament in section 4 of the Limitation Act 1963. For my part I am content to assume that it is right.’
Stephenson LJ said: ‘There are many cases in which the expiry of the limitation period makes it a waste of time and money to let a plaintiff go on with his action. But in those cases it may be impossible to say that he has no reasonable cause of action. The right course is therefore for a defendant to apply to strike out the plaintiffs’ claim as frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court, on the ground that it is statute-barred. Then the plaintiff and the court know that the Statute of Limitations will be pleaded; the defendant can, if necessary, file evidence to that effect; the plaintiff can file evidence of an acknowledgment or concealed fraud or any matter which may show the court that his claim is not vexatious or an abuse of process.’

Court: CA
Date: 01-Jan-1983
Judges: Donaldson LJ, Stephenson LJ
Statutes: Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935
References: [1983] 1 QB 398,
Cases Cited:
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Filed under Limitation

Regina -v- Westminster City Council, ex parte Ali; 1983

McCullough J considered whether it was reasonable to expect the applicant to continue to live in overcrowded accomodation: ‘That anyone should regard as reasonable that a family of that size should live in one room 10 ft x 12 ft in size, or thereabouts, is something which I find astonishing. However, the matter has to be seen in the light of s 17(4) which requires that reasonableness must take account of the general circumstances prevailing in relation to housing in the area. No evidence has been placed before me that accommodation in the area of the Westminster City Council is so desperately short that it is reasonable to accept overcrowding of this degree. In the absence of such evidence I am driven to the conclusion that this question could not properly have been determined against the applicant.’

Date: 01-Jan-1983
Judges: McCullough J
References: [1983] 11 HLR 83,
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Filed under Housing

Robinson -v- Robinson (Disclosure) Practice Note; CA 1983

The court considered the duty of parties to give full disclosure.
Held: In proceedings for ancillary relief, there was a duty, both under the rules and by authority, on the parties to make full and frank disclosure of their property and financial resources; accordingly the power to set aside orders was not limited to cases of fraud or mistake, but extended to cases of material non-disclosure; where it could be said that, on the true facts, the orders should not have been made, then the orders could be set aside.
Templeman LJ said: ‘There is no doubt that both the Court of Appeal and the judge at first instance have jurisdiction in the situation with which we are faced in this case, where the application is to set aside a final order. ‘ After quoting from de Lasala, he continued: ‘There are many references in the books to separate actions to set aside a judgment on the ground of fraud. In the Family Division, as has been said many times, this power to set aside final orders is not limited to cases when fraud or mistake can be alleged. It extends, and has always extended, to cases of material non- disclosure.
A distinction has to be drawn between the restrictions imposed by the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 on varying lump sum orders or property adjustment orders which cannot be varied, and the power to set aside an order which has been obtained by fraud or mistake, or by material non-disclosure. The essence of the distinction is that the power to vary usually reflects changes of circumstances subsequent to the date of the order, whereas the power to set aside arises where there has been fraud, mistake, or material non-disclosure as to the facts at the time the order was made. From the point of view of convenience, there is a lot to be said for proceedings of this kind taking place before a judge at first instance, because there will usually be serious and often difficult issues of fact to be determined before the power to set aside can be exercised. These can be determined more easily, as a rule, by a judge at first instance. Moreover, he can go on to make the appropriate order which we cannot do in this court. I think that these proceedings should normally be started before a judge at first instance, although there may be special circumstances which make it better to proceed by way of appeal.’
He referred to the principles in Minton before saying.
After referring to the clean break principle in Minton v. Minton, Ormrod LJ went on: ‘It is essential in these cases that the court retains its power to protect both parties against injustice which may arise from failure to comply with their obligations to disclose. In other words there is a lot to be said for the principle of the clean break but I have no doubt that Lord Scarman, when he used the phrase, had in mind that the break should be clean in more senses than one.’

Court: CA
Date: 01-Jan-1983
Judges: Templeman LJ, Ormrod LJ, Wood J
Statutes: Matrimonial Causes Act 1973
References: (1983) FLR 102, [1982] 1 WLR 786
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Atisa SA -v- Aztec AG; 1983

The sellers sold to the buyers 13,000 -14,000 tonnes of Kenyan white crystal sugar fob stowed Mombasa, subject to the rules of the Refined Sugar Association including that the sellers were to obtain an export licence and that failure to obtain such a licence was not to be a ground of force majeure. The sellers expected to deliver sugar purchased under a nearly matching contract with the Kenyan Government which was the only source of supply. The Kenyan Government failed to honour this contract claiming it was not binding for lack of authority and the buyers instituted arbitration proceedings for non-delivery.
Held: Parker J upheld the arbitrators’ award that the contract had not been frustrated. He said: ‘There was, here, no change in the law and nothing of the nature of a failure or destruction of the subject matter. At all times an export licence was required and the risk of being unable to obtain one was upon the sellers. No doubt they would certainly have been provided with one by the government had it decided to proceed with K G Ex 10. No doubt also the government would not have provided one having decided not to proceed but that circumstance does not affect the matter. In essence no more has happened than that (1) the sellers’ supplier which was the sole supplier did not wish to supply partly for financial reasons and partly to preserve the build up of stocks and (2) that, having been advised that the contract was not binding, the supplier refused to perform. If the Attorney-General’s advice was correct the sellers failed to make a proper supply contract. If it was incorrect then they will have an action on upon the supply contract. ‘

Date: 01-Jan-1983
Judges: Parker J
References: [1983] 2 Lloyds Rep 579,
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Filed under Contract

Barclay -v- Glasgow District Council; 1983

B who was mentally disabled, worked cleaning up swing-parks. There was an altercation with the District Manager and the Foreman which ended by Mr Barclay saying that he wanted his books ‘the next day.’ The next day was a pay day and the manager gave instructions for B to sign the form to terminate his employment. Though not keen to B did sign, but over the weekend realised what had happened and went into work on the Monday. He was sent home by the foreman saying that he had resigned.
Held: Lord McDonald said ‘It may be that the majority of the tribunal were correct in holding that when the appellant demanded his books on the Thursday, notwithstanding that it was in the heat of the moment, he meant it at the time. The real question however is whether or not in the special circumstances the respondents were entitled to assume that this was a conscious rational decision. It is true that the majority refer to the exceptional circumstances of the case but we do not consider that having regard to the observations in Sothern v. Franks Charlesly & Co, it is sufficient to dismiss the unusual aspect of this case in this way. We consider that the proper approach is to have regard, not merely to what was said on the Thursday, but to what happened the following day and indeed to the fact that the appellant did report for work on the following Monday apparently under the impression that he was still employed. At the very least there was, in our view, an obligation upon the respondents when the appellant reported on Friday to seek some form of confirmation that his act of resignation was in fact a genuine one and fully understood. Instead of that they adopted what we consider to be the indefensible practice of requiring him against his will, to sign a blank document which presumably on some subsequent occasion was filled in by them with the word ‘resigned’ written opposite the entry ‘Reason for Leaving’. Further we agree with the observation of the dissenting member that in the special circumstances of this case a reasonable employer would at least have consulted with one of the appellant’s sisters before assuming the appellant meant the words that he had used. For these reasons we propose to allow the appeal’

Date: 01-Jan-1983
Judges: Lord McDonald
References: [1983] IRLR 313,
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Filed under Employment

J & J Stern -v- Simpson; 1983

Unambiguous words of an employee resigning should be accepted as such.

Date: 01-Jan-1983
References: [1983] IRLR 52,
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Regina -v- Eastleigh Borough Council, Ex parte Betts; In re Betts; CA 1983

Mr Betts appealed a refusal of accomodation by Eastliegh who had said he had no local connection, but had lived in Blaby.
Held: Lord Justice Stephenson the chief housing officer ‘did fetter the council’s decision by a rigid application of the suggested definition of normal residence [in the Agreement on Procedures]’ and allowed his appeal.

Court: CA
Date: 01-Jan-1983
Judges: Lord Justice Stephenson
References: [1983] 1 WLR 774,
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Regina -v- Liverpool City Justices ex parte Topping; 1983

When the Applicant appeared before the Justices, his solicitor submitted that the Justices should acknowledge that they were aware that in addition to the matter which they were about to try (that is to say an offence of criminal damage against a door) the Applicant was also facing six complaints of failing to answer to bail and one of being drunk in a public place, and with that knowledge, they should not continue to hear the allegation, as they would or might not be prejudiced by their knowledge from the court sheets of those outstanding charges.
Held: The test of whether there had been a fair hearing in a case of doubt ‘We conclude that the test to be applied can conveniently be expressed by slightly adapting the ‘words of Lord Widgery CJ in a test which he laid down in Reg v Uxbridge Justices, ex parte Burbridge apparently only reported in The Times June 20th, 1972, but referred to by him [in a later case]: Would ‘a reasonable and fair-minded person sitting in the court and’ knowing all the relevant facts have a ‘reasonable suspicion that a fair trial for’ the applicant ‘was not possible’.’

Date: 01-Jan-1983
Judges: Ackner LJ
References: [1983] 1 WLR 119,
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Filed under Magistrates, Natural Justice

Dove -v- Banhams Patent Locks; 1983

The defendants installed a security gate. The plaintiff, a subsequent purchaser of the property claimed damages when the property was burgled and a defect in the security gate was revealed.
Held: The defendant owed a duty of to the subsequent owner, and the limitation began when the defect came to light on the burglary.

Date: 01-Jan-1983
Judges: Hodgson J
References: [1983] CLY 2215, [1983] 2 All ER 833
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Filed under Limitation

Industrie Chimiche -v- Nea Ninemia Shipping; 1983

Construction of exemption clause in time charterparty: ‘Since it is inherently improbable that one party to a contract should intend to absolve the other party from the consequences of the latter’s own negligence, the court will presume a clause not to have that effect unless the contrary is plainly shown by clear words or by implication.’ and ‘In carrying out that task of construction, the court should not treat commercial parties as if they were law students.’

Date: 01-Jan-1983
Judges: Bingham J
References: [1983] 1 All ER 686,
Cases Cited:
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Filed under Contract, Transport

Catlin -v- Cyprus Finance Corporation (London) Ltd; 1983

As between a banker and joint account holders, the banker has a duty of care to the account holders and each of them separately.

Date: 01-Jan-1983
References: [1983] QB 759,
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Filed under Banking

Lavery -v- Plessey Telecommunications Ltd; 1983

The court considered a claim for maternity leave where the employee had failed to give the full notice required.

Date: 01-Jan-1983
References: [1983] ICR 533,
Cited By:

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Filed under Employment

Dennis -v- Charnwood Borough Council; CA 1983

The respondent approved plans for a new house. The raft foundation was inadequate and serious cracks developed. The authority appealed a finding of negligence in having approved defective plans.
Held: The appeal failed. The authority had a duty of care when passing the plans submitted for approval for the building regulations.

Court: CA
Date: 01-Jan-1983
References: [1983] CLY 2535, [1983] 81 LGR 275
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Filed under Local Government, Negligence

Sopwith -v- Stuchbury; 1983

The tenant had been allowed into occupation of residential property pending agreement of the terms of a tenancy. He argued that he was a tenant at will.
Held: He was a mere licensee, and so was not entitled to go back on an agreed rent increase would have been unlawful because of certain provisions of the Rent Act.

Date: 01-Jan-1983
References: (1983) 17 HLR 50,
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Filed under Housing

Regina -v- Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport, and the Regions, Ex Parte International Air Transport Association; QBD 3-Jun-1999

Where an EC regulation was properly completed, it was valid even though different member states had, before joining the EC, had subscribed to International Treaties inconsistent with the Regulation, but were not bound by it because of such subscription.

Court: QBD
Date: 03-Jun-1999
Statutes: Council Regulation 2027/97, EC Treaty art 234, Warsaw Convention 1929
Links: Times,
References:

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Filed under European, Transport

Dillon -v- The Queen; PC 25-Jan-1982

The appellant police officer had been convicted that by his negligence he had allowed two prisoners to escape from custody. Given doubt that they were in fact lawfully in custody he argued that there was an onus on the prosection to establish that there was a lawful custody from which to escape.
Held: The appeal was allowed. The courts will not allow a point central to the allegation to be presumed.

Court: PC
Date: 25-Jan-1982
Links: Bailii,
References: [1982] AC 484, [1982] UKPC 1a
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Filed under Commonwealth, Crime

Kolfor Plant Ltd -v- Wright; CA 1982

The court considered a claim for Maternity leave.
Lord McDonald said: ‘In our opinion an employee who claims to have been dismissed through the failure of her employer to permit her to return to work after absence due to pregnancy or confinement must bring herself within the provisions of section 56. Paragraph 6(2) of Schedule 2 makes it quite clear that even where her contract of employment subsists an ordinary claim for unfair dismissal is not open where the dismissal occurs in the course of her attempting to return to work, which is the position here.’

Court: CA
Date: 01-Jan-1982
Judges: Lord McDonald
References: [1982] IRLR 311,
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Filed under Employment

1-9 Roding Hall 1 Ongar Road – Epping Forest : Midland : Birmingham; LVT 14-Jul-2014

LVT Service Charges

Court: LVT
Date: 14-Jul-2014
Links: Bailii,
References: [2014] EWLVT CAM_LV_SVC_22UH_0

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Filed under Landlord and Tenant

IA268462013; AIT 14-Jul-2014

Court: AIT
Date: 14-Jul-2014
Links: Bailii,
References: [2014] UKAITUR IA268462013,

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Filed under Immigration

AA004562014; AIT 14-Jul-2014

Court: AIT
Date: 14-Jul-2014
Links: Bailii,
References: [2014] UKAITUR AA004562014,

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Filed under Immigration

RQ (Jordan)), Regina (on The Application of) -v- Secretary of State for The Home Department and Another; Admn 5-Mar-2014

Court: Admn
Date: 05-Mar-2014
Links: Bailii,
References: [2014] EWHC 559 (Admin),

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Filed under Immigration

Office of The First Minister and Deputy First Minister (Decision Notice); ICO 16-Jul-2012

ICO The complainant has requested information held by the Office of the First Minister and deputy First Minister (OFMDFM) in relation to the appointment of the Head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service. Despite the Commissioner’s intervention OFMDFM has failed to respond fully to the request. The Commissioner requires that OFMDFM respond to the complainant’s request, either by disclosing the requested information or by issuing a refusal notice which includes the outcome of the public interest considerations.
Section of Act/EIR & Finding: FOI 1 – Complaint Upheld, FOI 10 – Complaint Upheld, FOI 17 – Complaint Partly Upheld

Court: ICO
Date: 16-Jul-2012
Links: Bailii,
References: [2012] UKICO FS50443962,

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Filed under Information

Whittington Hospital NHS Trust (Decision Notice); ICO 16-Jul-2012

ICO The complainant requested from Whittington Hospital NHS Trust a copy of the full documentation for the assessment of eligibility for the Blue Badge Scheme which provides parking concessions for disabled people. The Trust provided some information but withheld the detailed scoring criteria for the assessment under section 31(1)(a) (prejudice to the prevention or detection of crime). The Commissioner’s decision is that the Trust has correctly applied section 31(1)(a) to the withheld information and he does not require it to take any steps to ensure compliance with the legislation.
Section of Act/EIR & Finding: FOI 31 – Complaint Not upheld

Court: ICO
Date: 16-Jul-2012
Links: Bailii,
References: [2012] UKICO FS50434032,

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Filed under Information

IA091332010 (Unreported); AIT 16-Jul-2012

Court: AIT
Date: 16-Jul-2012
Links: Bailii,
References: [2012] UKAITUR IA091332010),

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Filed under Immigration

IA315192011 (Unreported); AIT 16-Jul-2012

Court: AIT
Date: 16-Jul-2012
Links: Bailii,
References: [2012] UKAITUR IA315192011),

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Filed under Immigration

IA325232011 (Unreported); AIT 16-Jul-2012

Court: AIT
Date: 16-Jul-2012
Links: Bailii,
References: [2012] UKAITUR IA325232011),

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Filed under Immigration

IA342302011 (Unreported); AIT 16-Jul-2012

Court: AIT
Date: 16-Jul-2012
Links: Bailii,
References: [2012] UKAITUR IA342302011),

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Filed under Immigration

AA061422011 (Unreported); AIT 16-Jul-2012

Court: AIT
Date: 16-Jul-2012
Links: Bailii,
References: [2012] UKAITUR AA061422011),

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Filed under Immigration

IA347532011 (Unreported); AIT 16-Jul-2012

Court: AIT
Date: 16-Jul-2012
Links: Bailii,
References: [2012] UKAITUR IA347532011),

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Filed under Immigration

OA125052011 (Unreported); AIT 16-Jul-2012

Court: AIT
Date: 16-Jul-2012
Links: Bailii,
References: [2012] UKAITUR OA125052011),

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Filed under Immigration

OA247102011 (Unreported); AIT 16-Jul-2012

Court: AIT
Date: 16-Jul-2012
Links: Bailii,
References: [2012] UKAITUR OA247102011),

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Filed under Immigration

OA153332011 (Unreported); AIT 16-Jul-2012

Court: AIT
Date: 16-Jul-2012
Links: Bailii,
References: [2012] UKAITUR OA153332011),

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Filed under Immigration

IA287132010 (Unreported); AIT 16-Jul-2012

Court: AIT
Date: 16-Jul-2012
Links: Bailii,
References: [2012] UKAITUR IA287132010),

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Filed under Immigration

England -v- Secretary of State for Social Services; 1982

Although the children spent weekdays in voluntary care because the parents were at work, their bedrooms were maintained, they saw their parents on the weekend, and the arrangement was not intended as permanent. The court was asked whether they remained members of the same household.
Held: They were: ‘children can remain members of the household even though temporarily absent as long as ties with the parents and home are sufficiently closely maintained.’

Date: 01-Jan-1982
Judges: Woolf J
References: [1982] 3 FLR 222,
Cited By:

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Filed under Family

X -v- Germany; ECHR 1979

Paragraph (3)(d) rights applied at the trial and not when a witness was being questioned by the police.

Court: ECHR
Date: 01-Jan-1979
Statutes: European Convention on Human Rights 6(3)(d)
References: (1979) 17 DR 231,
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Filed under Human Rights

A and Scottish Prison Service; SIC 5-Mar-2014

SIC Details of items bought and sold – On 23 September 2013, Mr A asked the Scottish Prison Service (the SPS) about the quantities of items bought in from suppliers and sold in the prison canteen on certain dates in July 2013. The SPS released information to Mr A. Mr A complained that some of it was illegible. He also queried whether the information was for the dates he had specified.
Following an investigation, the Commissioner found that the SPS had provided Mr A with all of the information it held and which fell within the scope of his request. The Commissioner commented that the SPS could have been more helpful in its response to his request, but did not require the SPS to take any action, for reasons explained in the decision.

Court: SIC
Date: 05-Mar-2014
Links: Bailii,
References: [2014] ScotIC 055_2014,

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Filed under Information, Scotland

Intermare Transport GmbH -v- International Copra Export Corporation (The Ross Isle and Ariel); ChD 1982

Disputes arose from the carriage of two cargoes of copra from the Philippines to Europe in the vessels Ross Isle and Ariel. The disputes were referred to the same arbitrator and heard together, but with separate awards. After the hearing the owners asked the arbitrator to state his award in relation to the charterers’ counterclaim in each case in the form of a special case, but he declined to do so saying the questions raised were almost entirely of a factual nature, and he would issue the awards in a non-speaking form. He gave the parties 14 days to apply to court for a special case. The owners’ solicitors mistakenly took the view that their question of law did not in fact arise and made no application. The arbitrator published unreasoned awards, but provided the parties with separate confidential reasons for their information. Seeing their mistake, the owners applied under section 22 to remit the awards for special cases, because as a result of a misunderstanding, there had been a procedural mishap giving rise to injustice, and a cause for intervention. The owners sought to refer to the arbitrator’s confidential reasons, but each expressly said that the reasons did not form part of the award and were issued on the understanding that no use should be made of them in any proceedings arising on or in connection with the award. Could the court properly look at them on an application of that kind?
Held: ‘ Mr. Evans submits that in Court he is entitled to look at those documents and should do so for the purpose of these applications if the Court is not satisfied, merely from looking at the award, that the arbitrator has decided the case on matters of law, that is to say, the interpretation of cl. 35. It is, I think, quite clear, and Mr. Evans does not dispute, that if the application were to set aside or remit the awards for error of law on their face then it would not be permissible to look at these reasons. They are not incorporated in the awards expressly or by reference to anything that is to be found in the awards. But that is not the application which is made here – it is an application to remit or set aside on other grounds. For that purpose Mr. Evans submits that all relevant evidence is admissible. I am disposed to agree with that (although again I have not heard Mr. Thomas on this point) subject to any special restriction that may attach to any particular category of evidence. Is there some special restriction applying to the reasons given by the arbitrator, and if so what is the legal basis of it? Mr. Evans submits, or accepts, that the plaintiffs, by their acceptance of the reasons with that note upon them, agreed to some implied contract that they would not use the reasons, at any rate for some purposes. In my judgment Mr. Evans is right to accept that. It is extremely common practice in maritime arbitrations in London for such documents to be issued together with the award but separate from it. Sometimes the arbitrator will ask the parties before the conclusion of the hearing whether they wish him to issue separate reasons and whether they will accept them with such a note upon them. I, indeed, have known of one case where one party said that he would not accept reasons on those terms and the consequence was that no reasons were issued. But in the ordinary way if that is expressly said then there is clearly to my mind a contract that the reasons will be treated in confidence as the note requires. Even where nothing is said by the arbitrator before the conclusion of the hearing (and as far as the evidence goes, nothing was said by the arbitrator in this case) the practice is so commonplace in maritime arbitrations in London that I would regard it as implied by custom that an arbitrator may, if he wishes, issue reasons with such a note upon them and the parties agree to be bound by it. That, as I say, was accepted by Mr. Evans; but he has a powerful point that there is a public interest which overrides any private contract as to the admissibility of evidence in certain cases . . . I accept that there are circumstances in which the public interest requires that notwithstanding the private contract of the parties that they will treat such reasons confidentially, still they may be disclosed to the Court. On the other hand there is, as it seems to me, a strong public interest that arbitrators, if they choose, should be free to publish reasons of a confidential nature and the parties should be free, if they choose, to accept reasons on that basis. Whether, in any particular case, the public interest in favour of disclosure to the Court overrides the general public interest that confidential reasons may be published for the interest of the parties without endangering the rule that there must be an end to litigation, is a matter for decision in that case. If it had arisen in the present case I would have held that the public interest here did not require me to look at the reasons for the purposes of investigating a possible misunderstanding between the arbitrator and the legal advisers of the plaintiffs.’

Court: ChD
Date: 01-Jan-1982
Judges: Staughton J
Statutes: Arbitration Act 1950 22
References: [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep 589,
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Filed under Arbitration

Regina -v- Spinks; CACD 1982

Spinks was charged under section 4(1) of the 1967 Act, in that knowing or believing that a Mr Fairey had committed an arrestable offence, he acted with intent to impede his apprehension or prosecution. To prove that Fairey had committed an arrestable offence, the prosecution relied on police officers statements as to statements made by Fairey, in the absence of the defendant, in which he said that he had stabbed someone. A submission of no case to answer was rejected and Spinks was convicted.
Held: The Court allowed his appeal. The court referred to ‘the universal rule which excludes out of court admissions being used to provide evidence against a co-accused, whether indicted jointly or separately’. ‘In the judgment of this Court the offence with which the appellant was charged and the means of establishing it do not provide any exception to the universal rule which excludes out of court admissions being used to provide evidence against a co-accused, whether indicted jointly or separately’ and ‘In his summing-up the learned recorder left the jury with the clear impression that they could, if they wished, rely upon Fairey’s admissions to prove the wounding, not only against him but against the appellant. In doing so there was a plain misdirection.’

Court: CACD
Date: 01-Jan-1982
Judges: Watkins LJ, Kilner Brown and Russell JJ
Statutes: Criminal Law Act 1967 4(1)
References: [1982] 1 All ER 587,
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Filed under Criminal Evidence

Din -v- Carrington Viyella Ltd; EAT 1982

The court considered what actions could found a claim for racial discrimination: ‘What has to be enquired into is the reason why a particular course was adopted: the question is was it on racial grounds?’ The court deprecated any consideration of motive: ‘It will be discriminatory even though the motive lying behind it did not necessarily involve a prejudice of a racial kind.’

Court: EAT
Date: 01-Jan-1982
Judges: Browne-Wilkinson P
References: [1982] IRLR 281, [1982] ICR 256
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Filed under Discrimination

R & T Thew Ltd -v- Reeves; CA 1982

A costs order had been drawn up incorrectly, and corrected without reference to the parties: ‘All the cases show that when a slip is corrected in this way, the correction dates back to the date when the document originally took effect . . unless anything has happened in the meantime to make it inexpedient or unjust to do so.’

Court: CA
Date: 01-Jan-1982
Judges: Lord Denning MR
References: [1982] QB 172,
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Filed under Litigation Practice

Preston Borough Council -v- Fairclough; CA 1982

The landlord sought to argue that the tenant had surrendered his tenancy.
Held: ‘The bare fact that a tenant leaves premises at a time when he owes rent is certainly insufficient to enable a court to draw the inference that there has been a surrender.’ and ‘If it could be shown that a tenant had left owing a very substantial sum of money and had been absent for a substantial time, then an application by the landlord under Order 24 might well be sufficient for a court to regard the tenancy as surrendered by operation of law . .’

Court: CA
Date: 01-Jan-1982
Judges: Griffiths LJ
References: (1982) 8 HLR 70,
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Filed under Landlord and Tenant

Re GKN Bolts & Nuts Ltd etc Works Sports and Social Club; 1982

The court considered the status of associate members of a club, who obtained that status merely by signing a vistors book.
Held: The rules did not make such associate members members properly.

Date: 01-Jan-1982
References: [1982] 1 WLR,
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Filed under Company, Trusts

Donselaar -v- Donselaar; 1982

(Court of Appeal – New Zealand) The plaintiff sued for exemplary damages for assault and battery alleged to have caused physical injury, indignity, mental suffering, disgrace and humiliation. The defendant had been charged with assault in a Magistrate’s Court but the charge had been dismissed. The defendant did not rely upon the fact that he had already been prosecuted. Instead, he submitted that all claims for damages for personal injury were excluded by the terms of the Accident Compensation Act 1972.
Held: The Act excluded only claims for compensatory damages.

Date: 01-Jan-1982
References: [1982] 1 NZLR 97,
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Filed under Commonwealth, Damages

Verrall -v- Hackney London Borough Council; CA 1982

There is nothing sufficient in the rating list to identify separate parts of a property.

Court: CA
Date: 01-Jan-1982
Judges: May LJ
References: [1983] RA 331, [1982] 1 QB 445

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Filed under Rating

Ajodha -v- The State; PC 1982

Lord Bridge of Harwich asked: ‘. . when the prosecution proposes to tender in evidence a written statement of confession signed by the accused and the accused denies that he is the author of the statement but admits that the signature or signatures on the document are his and claims that they were obtained from him by threat or inducement, does this raise a question of law for decision by the judge as to the admissibility of the statement?’
Held: ‘(1) In the normal situation which arises at the vast majority of trials where the admissibility of a confession statement is to be challenged, defending counsel will notify prosecuting counsel that an objection to admissibility is to be raised, prosecuting counsel will not mention the statement in his opening to the jury, and at the appropriate time the judge will conduct a trial on the voir dire to decide on the admissibility of the statement; this will normally be in the absence of the jury, but only at the request or with the consent of the defence: Reg v. Anderson (1929) 21 Cr.App.R. 178. (2) Though the case for the defence raises an issue as to the voluntariness of a statement in accordance with the principles indicated earlier in this judgment, defending counsel may for tactical reasons prefer that the evidence bearing on that issue be heard before the jury, with a single cross-examination of the witnesses on both sides, even though this means that the jury hear the impugned statement whether admissible or not. If the defence adopts this tactic, it will be open to defending counsel to submit at the close of the evidence that, if the judge doubts the voluntariness of the statement, he should direct the jury to disregard it, or, if the statement is essential to sustain the prosecution case, direct an acquittal. Even in the absence of such a submission, if the judge himself forms the view that the voluntariness of the statement is in doubt, he should take the like action proprio motu. (3) It may sometimes happen that the accused himself will raise for the first time when giving evidence an issue as to the voluntariness of a statement already put in evidence by the prosecution. Here it will be a matter in the discretion of the trial judge whether to require relevant prosecution witnesses to be recalled for further cross-examination. If he does so, the issue of voluntariness should be dealt with in the same manner as indicated in paragraph (2) above.’

Court: PC
Date: 01-Jan-1982
Judges: Lord Bridge of Harwich
References: [1982] AC 204,
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Filed under Commonwealth, Crime

Re Overmark Smith Warden Ltd; ChD 1982

An ordinary creditor’s cause of action for non-payment of a contract debt is barred after the expiration of 6 years from the date of the accrual of his cause of action. He is then no longer a creditor of the company and is neither entitled to present a winding up petition nor to prove for the statute barred debt in the liquidation.

Court: ChD
Date: 01-Jan-1982
Judges: Slade J
Statutes: Companies Act 1948 257(1), Limitation Act 1939 2(1)(a)
References: [1982] 1 WLR 1195,
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Filed under Insolvency, Limitation

Regina -v- Foreign Secretary ex parte Indian Association of Alberta; CA 1982

The court traced the transformation of the doctrine of the indivisibility of the crown to the modern docrtrine of divisibility. May LJ: ‘Although at one time it was correct to describe the Crown as one and indivisible, with the development of the Commonwealth this is no longer so. Although there is only one person who is the Sovereign within the British Commonwealth, it is now a truism that in matters of law and government the Queen of the United Kingdom, for example, is entirely independent and distinct from the Queen of Canada. Further, the Crown is a constitutional monarchy and thus when one speaks today, and as was frequently done in the course of the argument on this application, of the Crown ‘in right of Canada’ or of some other territory within the Commonwealth, this is only a short way of referring to the Crown acting through and on the advice of Her Ministers in Canada or in that other territory within the Commonwealth.’

Court: CA
Date: 01-Jan-1982
Judges: May LJ
References: [1982] QB 892, [1982] 2 All ER 118, [1982] 2 WLR 641
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Filed under Constitutional

Ellerine Bros -v- Klinger; CA 1982

The court was asked whether there was a dispute sufficient to allow a stay of court proceedings to allow an arbitration to proceed.
Held: If letters were written making some request or demand and the defendant did not reply, there was a dispute. It was not necessary, for a dispute to arise, that the defendants should write back and say ‘I don’t agree’.

Court: CA
Date: 01-Jan-1982
Judges: Templeman LJ
References: [1982] 1WLR 1375,
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Filed under Arbitration

Clegg -v- Fraser; 1982

The court considered at what level a point of law would justify reference from an arbitration to the High Court.

Date: 01-Jan-1982
References: [1982] 2 EGLR 7,
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Filed under Arbitration

Croke -v- Wiseman; CA 1982

The court considered the calculation of damages for loss of future earnings for a young child.

Court: CA
Date: 01-Jan-1982
Judges: Griffiths L
References: [1982] 1 WLR 71,
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Filed under Damages

Legione -v- Hateley; 1982

(High Court of Australia) Purchasers of land were put on notice that unless they paid the price by 10th August the contract of sale would be rescinded. On 9th August the purchasers’ solicitor telephoned the vendor’s solicitors and spoke to the secretary of the partner in the firm who was handling the matter asking for a week’s extension of time. The secretary said, ‘I think that’ll be alright, but I’ll have to get instructions’. The question was whether that conversation could give rise to an estoppel.
Held: (Mason J. and Dean J) ‘Plainly that statement could not be treated as an agreement or representation that the vendors would extend the time for settlement until 17th August 1979. Nor can that statement properly be seen as containing any representation that, pending communication of instructions, the purchasers could, with impunity, disregard the time allowed for settlement by the notice of rescission. To the contrary, Miss Williams’ statement that she thought it would be alright but would have to get instructions intimated that she was not in a position to agree to what was, on a fair interpretation of Mr Gardiner’s account of the conversation, being put to her as a fait accompli.’ (Gibbs CJ and Murphy J) ‘But when Miss Williams said she thought it would be alright, and that she would have to get instructions, she must have meant, and the purchasers’ solicitors were entitled to believe, that the position was being left in abeyance until the instructions were received.’

Date: 01-Jan-1982
Judges: Mason J and Dean J, Gibbs CJ and Murphy J
References: [1982-1983] 152 CLR 406,
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Filed under Commonwealth, Legal Professions

Camm -v- Camm; CA 1982

Ancillary relief was claimed in the face of the terms of a separation agreement.
Held: If asked to look at an ancillary relief settlement agreed between the parties, the court could do so where the original provision was inadequate. Here, the wife was not to be to her agreement, which she had entered into under great pressure and which had failed to make adequate provision for her needs.
Sir Roger Ormrod said: ‘It has been stressed all through those same cases that the court must attach considerable importance, the amount of importance varying from case to case, to the fact that there was an agreement, because the court, naturally, will not lightly permit parties who have made a contractual agreement between themselves, even if it is not legally enforceable, to depart from that contractual agreement unless some good reason is shown.’

Court: CA
Date: 01-Jan-1982
Judges: Sir Roger Ormrod
References: (1982) 4 FLR 577, [1983] 4 FLR 577
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Filed under Family

Wycombe Health Authority -v- Barnett; CA 1982

A student tenant left the property for a few days. Whilst she was away, the pipes froze, cracked, and then burst. The landlord complained that he had neither turned off the water, nor lagged the pipes.
Held: The tenant had no such obligation at common law, and nor had the landlord an obligation to lag the pipes under section 32. The exact duty on a tenant to behave in a tenant-like manner in colder climes varied according to the prevailing circumstances, including the length of absence and expected weather.

Court: CA
Date: 01-Jan-1982
Statutes: Housing Act 1961 32
References: (1982) 264 EG 619, (1982) 5 HLR 84
Cases Cited:
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Filed under Housing, Landlord and Tenant

Regina -v- Secretary of State for the Environment ex p Brent London Borough Council; QBD 1982

The court considered a refusal by the minister to hear further representations from local authorities with regard to their rate support grants: ‘it would of course have been unrealistic not to accept that it is certainly probably that, if the representations had been listened to by the Secretary of State, he would have nevertheless have adhered to his policy. However, we are not satisfied that such a result must inevitably have followed . . It would in our view be wrong for this court to speculate as to how the Secretary of State would have exercised his discretion if he had heard the representations . . we are not prepared to hold that it would have been a useless formality for the Secretary of State to have listened to the representations . .’.

Court: QBD
Date: 01-Jan-1982
Judges: Ackner LJ
References: [1982] 1 QB 593,
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Filed under Administrative

Dillon -v- The Public Trustee of New Zealand and Others; PC 8-Apr-1941

New Zealand

Court: PC
Date: 08-Apr-1941
Links: Bailii,
References: [1941] UKPC 11,

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Filed under Commonwealth

Regina -v- Knightsbridge Crown Court ex parte International Sporting Club (London) Ltd and Another; QBD 1981

The applicant’s gaming licence had been cancelled by the Gaming Licensing Committee on the grounds that it was not a fit and proper person to hold a gaming licence. The applicant entered a notice of appeal and before the hearing of the appeal radically restructured itself. Before the Crown Court the applicant contended that despite past mis-conduct the applicant was now reformed.
Held: A professional judge has a clear general duty to give reasons for his decision.
Griffiths LJ said: ‘We would have expected the judge’s judgment to have followed this basic outline: first a consideration of and decisions upon whether it had been shown that the companies were not fit and proper persons to hold a licence . . or that while the licences had been in force the relevant premises had been used for an unlawful purpose . . ; and secondly, assuming findings against the companies on either or both of these grounds, whether the Court should exercise its discretion to cancel the licences.’

Court: QBD
Date: 01-Jan-1981
Judges: Griffiths LJ
References: [1982] 1 QB 304, [1981] 3 All ER 417
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Filed under Litigation Practice

LB (Plastics) Ltd -v- Swish Products Ltd; 1979

The plaintiff alleged breach of copyright by the defendants in copying drawings of plastic drawers.
Held: The use by an alleged copyist of odd or unusual detail found in the original is often a tell-tale of copying
Lord Wilberforce said that the beginning of the necessary proof of copying normally lies in the establishment of similarity combined with proof of access to the plaintiff’s productions
Whitford J said: ‘no originality of thought is needed to sustain a claim to copyright. Under copyright ideas are not protected, only the skill and labour needed to give any given idea some particular material form, for it is the form in which the work is presented that is protected by copyright. A piece need only be original in the sense that it is all the author’s own work.’ a drawing of a three dimensional prototype, not itself produced from the drawing and not being a work of artistic craftsmanship, would qualify as an original work.

Date: 01-Jan-1979
Judges: Lord Wilberforce, Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone
References: [1979] RPC 551,
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Filed under Intellectual Property

Astley -v- Frances Weldon; CCP 27-Jan-1801

By articles of agreement between the Plaintiff arid Defendant it was agreed on the part of the former that he should pay the latter so much per week to perform at his theatres, with her travelling expences of removing from one theatre to another except extra baggage ; and on the part of the defendant, that she should perform at the theatres such things as she should be required by the Plaintiff, and attend at the theatre beyond the usual hours on any emergency and at rehearsals or be subject to such fines as are established at the theatres, and be at the theatre half an hour before the performances begin, and abide by the regulations of the theatres and pay all fines ; and it was agreed by both parties ‘either of tbem neglecting to perform that agreemeut should pay to the other 200l. Assumpsit upon this agreement stating several breaches, and concluding to the Plaintiff’s damage of 200l. Held that the sum mentioned in the agreement was in the nature of a penalty, not of liquidated damages.

Court: CCP
Date: 27-Jan-1801
Links: Commonlii,
References: [1801] EngR 108, (1801) 2 Bos & Pul 346, (1801) 126 ER 1318
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Filed under Contract, Equity

IA248682011 (Unreported); AIT 16-Jul-2012

Court: AIT
Date: 16-Jul-2012
Links: Bailii,
References: [2012] UKAITUR IA248682011),

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Filed under Immigration

AA107982011 (Unreported); AIT 16-Jul-2012

Court: AIT
Date: 16-Jul-2012
Links: Bailii,
References: [2012] UKAITUR AA107982011),

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Filed under Immigration

VA123662011 (Unreported); AIT 16-Jul-2012

Court: AIT
Date: 16-Jul-2012
Links: Bailii,
References: [2012] UKAITUR VA123662011),

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Filed under Immigration

IA068782012 (Unreported); AIT 16-Jul-2012

Court: AIT
Date: 16-Jul-2012
Links: Bailii,
References: [2012] UKAITUR IA068782012),

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Filed under Immigration

VA403142011 (Unreported); AIT 16-Jul-2012

Court: AIT
Date: 16-Jul-2012
Links: Bailii,
References: [2012] UKAITUR VA403142011),

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Filed under Immigration

VA431392011 (Unreported); AIT 16-Jul-2012

Court: AIT
Date: 16-Jul-2012
Links: Bailii,
References: [2012] UKAITUR VA431392011),

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Filed under Immigration

AA147132009 (Unreported); AIT 16-Jul-2012

Court: AIT
Date: 16-Jul-2012
Links: Bailii,
References: [2012] UKAITUR AA147132009,

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Filed under Immigration