Application to lift disqualification. Criteria to be considered.Court: UTAA
Judges: Hinchliffe UTJ
References:  UKUT 499 (AAC),
Application to lift disqualification. Criteria to be considered.Court: UTAA
Application for judicial review of the Respondent’s decision and supplementary decision refusing him leave and refusing to treat his representations as a fresh claimCourt: UTIAC
The First-tier Tribunal’s initiative of including summary reasons on decision notices is commended.
But consistency between summary reasons and those in any subsequent statement of reasons is required. Otherwise, the reasons will be inadequate.
A Tribunal gave inadequate reasons, amounting to an error of law, because its decision notice said it placed ‘particular reliance’ on a medical report that its subsequent statement of reasons rejected.
UTAA Employment and Support Allowance : Post 28311 Wca Activity 5: Manual Dexterity
Appeal with the permission of an Upper Tribunal Judge from a decision of the First-tier Tribunal. That decision dismissed the claimant’s appeal from a decision that the claimant’s existing award of incapacity credits and income support did not qualify for conversion into an award of employment and support allowance (ESA) because she did not have limited capability for work.
Substantive consideration of an application to judicially review the decision of the Secretary of State refusing the applicant’s claim for leave to remain in the United Kingdom in order to pursue an established private and family life under Article 8 of the ECHR.Court: UTIAC
The Respondent had granted the Applicant leave to remain for a period of 30 months. The leave was granted outside of the Immigration Rules. The Respondent imposed a condition on this leave prohibiting the Applicant from having recourse to public funds. The Respondent agreed to reconsider her decision to impose such a condition, upon receipt of a pre-action protocol letter threatening judicial review proceedings. However, the Respondent maintained her earlier decision. It is the lawfulness of the imposition of the condition on the Applicant’s leave that is at the centre of these judicial review proceedings.Court: UTIAC
Judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decision to set removal directions for the applicant’s removal to Nigeria following the refusal of the applicant’s application for leave to remain in the UK as a Tier 4 (General) Student Migrant under para 245ZX of the Immigration Rules (HC 395 as amended) and for a Biometric Residence Permit.Court: UTIAC
Lack of candour with the Traffic Commissioner; Operation for several years without a suitably qualified transport manager; Loss of Repute; Indefinite Disqualifications.Court: UTAA
UTIAC Leave that has been extended by virtue of section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971 is invalidated by section 10(8) of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 where a decision is made under section 10 to remove the person having such leave.Court: UTIAC
The case raises issues concerning: (i) the application of the Equality Act 2010 to judicial decisions; and (ii) the exercise of the tribunal’s power to reject an agreed submission on the decision that should be made.Court: UTAA
UTIAC The first question in every case concerning an alleged legitimate expectation is whether the public authority concerned made an unambiguous representation, promise or assurance devoid of any relevant qualification.Court: UTIAC
UTIAC Where a student chooses to study at another institution holding a different sponsor licence number from that of the institution where he/she was granted leave to remain to study, he/she is required to make a fresh application for leave to remain.Court: UTIAC
Information Rights : Freedom of Information – Right of Access
‘Suppose that both a public authority and a person who has requested information from that authority disagree with a decision notice served by the Information Commissioner under section 50 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, which I call FOIA. Is it necessary for them to make separate appeals or can the tribunal deal with the issues raised by one party on an appeal by the other? I have decided that although cross-appeals are permissible, they are not necessary.’
The Appellant appealed by letter under Section 28 of the Data Protection Act 1998 from the reliance by the Second Respondent on a certificate of the First Respondent that certain of the personal data requested by the Appellant was exempt for the purpose of safeguarding national security in accordance with the terms of that certificate.Court: UTAA
The claimant made a claim for bereavement benefit on 22 May 2013 following the death of the deceased on 11 March 2012. She appealed through her representative against the decision that she was not entitled to bereavement benefit because the marriage between the deceased and the claimant on 7 January 1986 (in Sairi in the Kotli District of Azad Kashmir and which had resulted in the birth of three children) could not be accepted as valid for social security purposes and accordingly bereavement benefit was not payable to herCourt: UTAA
UTAA War Pensions and Armed Forces Compensation : War Pensions – Entitlement
(1) These appeals were heard over 10 days and involved the consideration of a large amount of documents, authorities and arguments. They relate to claims made under Article 41 of the Naval Military and Air Forces etc (Disablement and Death) Service Pensions Order 2006 (the SPO) based on the impact on the claimants of the British atomic tests carried out in the 1950s and early 1960s
(2) Although the reasons for my decision that follow are lengthy their kernel can be stated shortly and I hope that such a statement will assist the reader to follow them.
(3) At the heart of the appeals are the issues whether the FTT applied the test set by Article 41(5) of the SPO correctly and further or alternatively adequately explained how they had done so.
(4) That test (the Article 41(5) test) is:
Where, upon reliable evidence, a reasonable doubt exists whether the conditions set out in paragraph (1) are fulfilled, the benefit of that reasonable doubt shall be given to the claimant.
(5) In short I conclude that:
i. this test places an onus on the claimant to establish by evidence that is not fanciful or worthless (and so reliable) possibilities that he asserts found the existence of that doubt,
ii. the decision maker must carry forward:
(a) such possibilities, and
(b) matters about which he has no reasonable doubt,
and so the ingredients of the claimant’s case into the judgmental or weighing exercise of deciding whether the Article 41(5) test is satisfied,
iii. that judgmental exercise involves an evaluation of the respective cases of the parties by reference to all of the competing evidence and argument and thus on that basis:
(a) the relative strengths and weakness of those cases,
(b) their ingredients and so the possibilities they advance, and the matters they rely on (including those about which they assert the decision maker can have no reasonable doubt),
iv. that judgmental exercise may come into play at the first stage of the process as an evaluation of the evidence and arguments advanced by the Respondent may at that stage be taken into account in determining what is or is not a possibility to be carried forward or what matters the decision maker has no reasonable doubt about, and
v. this is not a rigid approach but importantly it is based on the identification and evaluation of possibilities and effective certainties and it is not based on findings of fact made on the balance of probabilities that are thereafter treated as established facts (or effective certainties) or an approach based on which expert evidence is preferred.
(6) I conclude that the FTT erred in law by not applying that approach because they did not so identify possibilities but applied an approach to the ingredients of the claimants’ cases that was based on findings made applying the normal civil standard of proof (balance of probabilities) or a similar standard for example by preferring the evidence of one expert to another as opposed to determining whether the evidence they so rejected raised a possibility that needed to be carried forward in the decision making process.
(7) If contrary to my view the FTT did not so err in law I conclude that on a generous reading of their decision they have erred in law by failing to adequately explain how they reached their decisions on a proper application of the Article 41(5) test.
UTAA Conduct of pre-decision interviews
(i) A decision that a marriage is a marriage of convenience for the purposes of regulation 2(1) of the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006 is a matter of some moment. Fairness requires that the affected person must be alerted to the essential elements of the case against him.
(ii) In addition, those involved must be alert to the question of whether, in an unusual or exceptional case, anything further is required in the interests of fairness. There may be difficult, borderline cases in which fairness will require identification of the third party. These do not admit of general guidance or resolution and will have to be addressed on a case by case basis, guided by the overarching requirement of fairness and balancing all interests in play.
The making of the decision on the application
(iii) The Secretary of State’s decision making process includes a process whereby comments, or opinions, of an interviewing officer are conveyed to the decision maker. In the generality of cases, this practice will not contaminate the fairness of the decision making process. The duty of the decision maker is to approach and consider all of the materials with an open mind and with circumspection. The due discharge of this duty, coupled with the statutory right of appeal, will provide the subject with adequate protection.
(iv) However, the document enshrining the interviewer’s comments – Form ICV.4605 – must be disclosed as a matter of course. An appellant’s right to a fair hearing dictates this course. If, exceptionally, some legitimate concern about disclosure, for example, the protection of a third party, should arise, this should be proactively brought to the attention of the Tribunal, for a ruling and directions. In this way the principle of independent judicial adjudication will provide adequate safeguards for the appellant. This will also enable mechanisms such as redaction, which in practice one would expect to arise with extreme rarity, to be considered.
UTIAC LEGAL GUIDANCE
(i) The operation of the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber Guidance Note no. 2 of 2011, ‘Reporting Decisions of the Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber’ and, particularly,  thereof, does not render the process of composition of country guidance decisions procedurally unfair.
(ii) As a general principle, where attendance of an appellant is a prerequisite to the vindication of the person’s right to a fair hearing, the appellant must be present.
(i) The country guidance issues addressed in this determination are not identical to those engaged with by the Tribunal in AMM and others (conflict; humanitarian crisis; returnees; FGM) Somalia CG  UKUT 445 (IAC). Therefore, where country guidance has been given by the Tribunal in AMM in respect of issues not addressed in this determination then the guidance provided by AMM shall continue to have effect.
(ii) Generally, a person who is ‘an ordinary civilian’ (i.e. not associated with the security forces; any aspect of government or official administration or any NGO or international organisation) on returning to Mogadishu after a period of absence will face no real risk of persecution or risk of harm such as to require protection under Article 3 of the ECHR or Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive. In particular, he will not be at real risk simply on account of having lived in a European location for a period of time of being viewed with suspicion either by the authorities as a possible supporter of Al Shabaab or by Al Shabaab as an apostate or someone whose Islamic integrity has been compromised by living in a Western country.
(iii) There has been durable change in the sense that the Al Shabaab withdrawal from Mogadishu is complete and there is no real prospect of a re-established presence within the city. That was not the case at the time of the country guidance given by the Tribunal in AMM.
(iv) The level of civilian casualties, excluding non-military casualties that clearly fall within Al Shabaab target groups such as politicians, police officers, government officials and those associated with NGOs and international organisations, cannot be precisely established by the statistical evidence which is incomplete and unreliable. However, it is established by the evidence considered as a whole that there has been a reduction in the level of civilian casualties since 2011, largely due to the cessation of confrontational warfare within the city and Al Shabaab’s resort to asymmetrical warfare on carefully selected targets. The present level of casualties does not amount to a sufficient risk to ordinary civilians such as to represent an Article 15(c) risk.
(v) It is open to an ordinary citizen of Mogadishu to reduce further still his personal exposure to the risk of ‘collateral damage’ in being caught up in an Al Shabaab attack that was not targeted at him by avoiding areas and establishments that are clearly identifiable as likely Al Shabaab targets, and it is not unreasonable for him to do so.
(vi) There is no real risk of forced recruitment to Al Shabaab for civilian citizens of Mogadishu, including for recent returnees from the West.
(vii) A person returning to Mogadishu after a period of absence will look to his nuclear family, if he has one living in the city, for assistance in re-establishing himself and securing a livelihood. Although a returnee may also seek assistance from his clan members who are not close relatives, such help is only likely to be forthcoming for majority clan members, as minority clans may have little to offer.
(viii) The significance of clan membership in Mogadishu has changed. Clans now provide, potentially, social support mechanisms and assist with access to livelihoods, performing less of a protection function than previously. There are no clan militias in Mogadishu, no clan violence, and no clan based discriminatory treatment, even for minority clan members.
(ix) If it is accepted that a person facing a return to Mogadishu after a period of absence has no nuclear family or close relatives in the city to assist him in re-establishing himself on return, there will need to be a careful assessment of all of the circumstances. These considerations will include, but are not limited to:
ICO The complainant made requests to Lancashire Fire and Rescue Service for copies of communications relating to its handling of a complaint he submitted against the Chair of Lancashire Combined Fire Authority. He also requested details of all expenses the Chair had claimed over a period of nine years. The public authority refused the requests as vexatious and applied section 14(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the ‘Act’). The Commissioner’s decision is that the public authority was entitled to rely upon section 14(1) and he requires no further action to be taken. Information Tribunal appeal number EA/2011/0158 dismissed.
Section of Act/EIR & Finding: FOI 14 – Complaint Not upheld
ECJ Judgment – Public service – Referral to the Court after annulment – Staff EIB – Annual assessment – Internal Regulations – Appeals procedure – Right to be heard – Failure by the Appeals Committee – Illegality of the decision of the Appeals Committee – Prejudice – No need to approve the claims for compensationCourt: ECJ
The applicant alleged, in particular, that his expulsion to Iran would violate Article 3 and Article 13 read in conjunction with Article 3 of the Convention.Court: ECHR
ECJ Judgment – Reference for a preliminary ruling – Customs union and Common Customs Tariff – Importation free of customs duties – Animals specially prepared for laboratory use – Public establishment or an authorised private establishment – Importer whose customers are such establishments – Packing materials or packing containers – Cages used for transportation of animalsCourt: ECJ
ECJ Judgment – Public service contracts – Tender procedure – Provision of IT services related to document management system and a corporate Intranet portal – Rejection of a tender – Obligation to state reasons – Equal treatment – Transparency – Proportionality – Non-contractual liabilityCourt: ECFI
ECJ Judgment – Public service – Officials – Remuneration – Family allowances – Rule against overlapping national and statutory allocations – Perception by the spouse of an official national family allowances – No official statement of change in his personal circumstances in his administration – Disciplinary proceedings – Disciplinary action – Lowering level – Proportionality – Statement of reasons – Mitigating circumstances – Lack of diligence of the administrationCourt: ECJ
ECJ Judgment – Failure to fulfill obligations – Directive 91/676/EEC – Protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources – Definition of inadequate or polluted waters may be – inadequate designation of vulnerable zones – Programmes of Action – incomplete measuresCourt: ECJ
ECJ Judgment – Reference for a preliminary ruling – Customs union – Tariff classification – Common Customs Tariff – Combined Nomenclature – Headings 8541 and 8543 – Modules for short-range data transmission and reception – Subheadings 8543 89 95 and 8543 90 80 – Definition of parts of electrical machinery and apparatusCourt: ECJ
ECJ Judgment – Access to documents – Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 – Article 4(2), third indent – Final audit reports carried out on the ECDC by the Commission’s Internal Audit Service – Refusal of access – Obligation to state reasons – Obligation to undertake a concrete, individual examination – Overriding public interestCourt: ECFI
Judgment – Appeal – Community trade mark – Regulation (EC) No 40/94 – Article 8(1)(b) – Article 8(5) – Word mark GOLDEN BALLS – Opposition by the proprietor of the earlier Community word mark BALLON D’OR – Relevant public – Similarity of the signs – Likelihood of confusionCourt: ECJ
The analogy between public rights of navigation and public rights of way over land is not complete.Date: 01-Jan-1901
ECJ Judgment – Public service – Officials – Action for damages – offending behavior – harassment from superiors – Occupational disease – Allowance granted under Article 73 of the Statute does not allow for all the damage suffered – Request for additional compensationCourt: ECJ
ECJ Judgment – Community trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for the Community word mark FUNNY BANDS – Earlier national trade name FUNNY BANDS – Earlier national Internet domain name ‘www.funny-bands.com’ – Relative ground for refusal – Article 8(4) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 – Use of a sign in the course of trade of more than mere local significance – Article 76(2) of Regulation No 207/2009 – Rejection of the oppositionCourt: ECFI
ECJ Judgment – Community trade mark – Opposition proceedings – Application for Community word mark Viscotech – national and international word marks earlier VISCOPLEX – Proof of the territorial scope and validity of an earlier international brand – Rule 19, paragraph 2, and Rule 20 paragraph 1 of Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 – Relative ground for refusal – No likelihood of confusion – Article 8, paragraph 1 b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009Court: ECFI
When looking at a statement to see if a warranty was given: ‘In determining whether it was so intended, a decisive test is whether the vendor assumes to assert a fact of which the buyer is ignorant, or merely states an opinion or judgment upon a matter of which the vendor has no special knowledge, and on which the buyer may be expected also to have an opinion and to exercise his judgment.’
A statement purporting to be a contractual promise in a collateral contract must be promissory in nature or effect rather than representational: ‘In determining whether it was so intended, a decisive test is whether the vendor assumes to assert a fact of which the buyer is ignorant, or merely states an opinion or judgment upon a matter of which the vendor has no special knowledge, and on which the buyer may be expected also to have an opinion and to exercise his judgment.’
UTIAC (i) There appears to be a practice, relatively entrenched, whereby an AOS which contains a concession, with or without an accompanying draft consent order, incorporates a claim for costs, liquidated or otherwise. In most cases, the claim for costs has no justification.
(ii) There may be cases, likely to be small in number, where an AOS which embodies a concession on behalf of the Secretary of State, with or without an accompanying draft consent order, justifiably and reasonably incorporates a claim for costs. In such cases, good practice dictates that the AOS should state, briefly, the justification for such claim.
(iii) Where a draft consent order is tabled, both parties should proactively take all necessary and appropriate steps designed to achieve consensual resolution within a period of (at most) three weeks.
(iv) Where consensual resolution is not achieved within the timescale recommended above, this should operate as a bilateral incentive to redouble efforts to do so.
(v) In every case possessing the factor of an unexecuted draft consent order, it is essential to provide the Upper Tribunal with each party’s explanation, brief and focussed, for non-execution. This explanation should be provided by both parties, in writing:
(a) Within four weeks of the date of the AOS or, if different, the date of receipt of the draft consent order.
(b) Where a case is listed, not later than five clear working days in advance of the listing date.
(c) In cases where there is any material alteration or evolution in the terms of the explanation, not later than two clear days in advance of the listing date.
(vi) It is recognised that, exceptionally, there may be cases in which for good and sustainable reasons a consent order cannot be reasonably executed until a very late stage indeed, postdating the periods and landmarks noted above. However, the experience of the Upper Tribunal to date is that consent orders are very frequently not executed and presented to the Tribunal for approval until the last moment, frequently late on the day before the scheduled hearing and that no good reason is proffered for the parties’ failure to do so at an earlier stage. This practice is unacceptable.
(vii) The practice whereby executed consent orders materialise during the period of 48 hours prior to the listing date is unsatisfactory and unacceptable in the great majority of cases. The Upper Tribunal recognises that there may be a small number of cases where, exceptionally, this is unavoidable.
(viii) In matters of this kind, parties and their representatives are strongly encouraged to communicate electronically with the Tribunal and, further, to seek confirmation that important communications and/or attachments have been received.
(ix) In determining issues of costs, Upper Tribunal Judges will take into account the extent to which the recommendations and exhortations tabulated above have been observed and will scrutinise closely every explanation and justification proffered for non-compliance.
Application for care order with a view to adoption.Court: FD
ICO The complainant requested information relating to details of all correspondence between NHS Wakefield District Primary Care Trust, NHS Yorkshire and Humber Strategic Health Authority and the Department for Health concerning plans to build a specialist surgical centre at Dewsbury and District Hospital. The PCT refused the request citing section 36(2)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Act. The Commissioner finds that that the exemption under section 36(2)(b)(ii) was engaged and that the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighed the public interest in favour of disclosing the information. The Commissioner did however record a procedural breach of the Act in relation to the PCT’s handling of this request. Information Tribunal appeal number EA/2011/0166 dismissed.
Section of Act/EIR & Finding: FOI 17 – Complaint Upheld, FOI 36 – Complaint Not upheld
FTTTX Value added tax – whether assessment made to best judgement – s 73(1) VATA 1994 – retail scheme – application of direct calculation scheme 1 – use of mark-ups to determine expected selling prices – adjustment of expected selling prices to take account of wastage and loss of stock – time limit for making assessment – s 77(1)(a) VATA 1994 – assessment made to best judgement but reduced by application of three year ‘capping’ rule – appeal dismissedCourt: FTTTx
(Trinidad and Tobago) The claimant sought judicial review of a decision to appoint someone else to be Vice-Principal of the college at which she worked.Court: PC
New ZealandCourt: PC
One cannot deceive a machine, since it does not have a mind. This may not be the case for the purposes of the Theft Acts.Date: 01-Jan-1973
ICO The complainant asked Humberside Police to provide him with any plans it held of the new Divisional Headquarters and Custody Suite on Clough Road, Hull. Humberside Police refused the request on the basis of section 21 of the Act because the relevant information was available on Hull City Council’s Planning portal. The complainant asked for an internal review of this decision because the portal did not provide him with access to the internal floor plans of the new custody suite. Humberside Police refused to provide him with these floor plans on the basis of sections 31(1)(a) to (c) of the Act. The complainant subsequently contacted the Commissioner in order to complain about the decision to withhold this information. The Commissioner has considered the circumstances of this case and has concluded that all of the requested information constitutes environmental information as defined by the EIR and therefore the request should have been dealt with under that access regime rather than under the Act. The Commissioner therefore requires Humberside Police to consider whether the internal floor plan of the new custody suite should be disclosed under the EIR, and if not, to issue a refusal notice compliant with regulation 14 of the EIR.
Section of Act/EIR & Finding: EIR 2.1 – Complaint Upheld
ICO The complainant requested information regarding specific types of speed camera. The Home Office provided the majority of the requested information and it confirmed that it did not hold information relating to two of the types of speed camera specified by the complainant. The Commissioner initially investigated whether or not the remaining requested information was held by the Home Office and whether section 12(2) of the Act had been correctly applied. During the Commissioner’s investigation the Home Office performed further searches and was able to confirm that it did not hold the remaining requested information. The Commissioner accepts that the searches most likely to find the requested information were performed and therefore, on the balance of probabilities, the requested information is not held by the Home Office.
Section of Act/EIR & Finding: FOI 1 – Complaint Not upheld
ICO The complainant asked the Charity Commission for all its documents relating to the Global Warming Policy Foundation. The Charity Commission provided some documents but withheld a bank statement which showed the name of an individual who had donated money to the GWPF. It argued that this information was exempt from disclosure under section 40(2) and section 41(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000. The Commissioner finds that the Charity Commission was correct to apply section 40(2) to this bank statement and has not considered its application of section 41(1). Information Tribunal appeal number EA/2011/0177 dismissed.
Section of Act/EIR & Finding: FOI 40 – Complaint Not upheld
IPO The application relates to an arrhythmia model animal that enables an evaluation of the QT interval prolongation by a drug. The QT interval is the time period which elapses between the Q wave and the T wave in the electrical cycle of the heart. Some drugs can prolonging the electrocardiogram QT interval and induce proarrhythmia, such as the fatal ventricular arrhythmia called Torsades de pointes (TdP).
The applicant has produced a monkey model, specifically a cynomolgus monkey model, of proarrhythmia in which the atrioventricular node of the heart has been preablated. Unlike previous model animals (e.g. dogs), this monkey model recovers from any arrhythmia which may develop following administration of the drug being tested, such that the same model animal can be used repeatedly.
The Hearing Officer identified the ‘skilled person’ as being a team including, a cardiologist, a pharmacologist with expertise in the cardiotoxic side-effects of drugs, and a veterinary surgeon. After considering the common general knowledge of the skilled team, the Hearing Officer considered the inventive concept to be the use of a cynomolgus monkey model of proarrhythmia in which the atrioventricular node has been preablated in order to evaluate the QT interval prolongation by a drug and not, as argued by the applicant, the use of an animal model of proarrhythmia for evaluating drug-induced long QT syndrome, which animal recovers from arrhythmia, as proposed by the applicant.
The Hearing Officer held that the claimed invention was obvious in light of the common general knowledge of the skilled team and the prior art disclosures involving surgical ablation of the atrioventricular (AV) node in dogs to produce similar models and that elevated levels of atrial natriuretic peptide (ANP) or cerebral natriuretic peptide (CNP) are associated with AV block. The obvious course of action of producing a cynomolgus monkey model of proarrhythmia in an analogous manner to that already used in dogs
ICO The complainant requested a series of specifications about Project Canvas. The BBC explained that the Act applied to relevant recorded information and applied section 22(1) [information intended for future publication] to the recorded information that it held. It upheld its position within its internal review. During the course of the Commissioner’s investigation the information was published and the complainant confirmed that he had received it. He confirmed that he wanted the Commissioner to focus on whether section 22(1) was appropriately applied to the information that has now been provided. The Commissioner has carefully considered this case. He finds that section 22(1) was applied appropriately by the BBC. ,br />Section of Act/EIR & Finding: FOI 22 – Complaint Not upheldCourt: ICO
Practice and Procedure – Striking-out/dismissal
A issued proceedings in the ET before she resigned or (as the case may be) was constructively dismissed. She withdrew those proceedings which were then dismissed under rule 25(4). She issued fresh proceedings alleging constructive unfair dismissal relying largely – but not entirely – on matters raised in her first proceedings. The ET held the second proceedings should be dismissed on the basis of issue estoppel. The basis of her first claim was never made clear but it certainly was no unfairly dismissed.
Held: the rule in Henderson v Henderson was a broad equitable rule to be applied with a view to fairness and A was not estopped from pursuing her claim for unfair dismissal.
ICO The complainant made six requests to Surrey County Council (‘the Council’) for information that focussed on a potential working relationship between two named individuals. Two of those requests were for the complainant’s own personal data and were considered under the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA). The remaining four were considered by the Commissioner under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (the Act). The Council responded to the questions, but did not explain whether it held relevant recorded information in relation to them all. The Commissioner finds that there is no relevant recorded information for three of those requests, but finds that there was relevant recorded information held for one of them. The Council has now provided the complainant with the recorded information for the outstanding element. The Commissioner is now satisfied that on the balance of probabilities no further relevant recorded information is held by the Council. Information Tribunal appeal number EA/2011/0169 part allowed.
Section of Act/EIR & Finding: FOI 10 – Complaint Upheld
The claimant tripped as she walked along a pathway across the estate on which she lived. There was a sign to the effect that the path was for ‘Residents Only’. Hshe sued for persoanla injury on the basis that despite the sign, the pathway was a public footpath.
Held: The Council’s appeal succeeded. Despite a possible use for over 20 years, the sign was sufficient to negate any intention to designate the path as a public highway and it was not such.
The council appealed against a finding of the Deputy Adjudicator of the Land Registry refusing to alter the filed plan of the defendant’s title. Christopher Nugee QC approved the statement of the deputy adjudicator Mr Michael Mark described a change on the filed plan as producing ‘another general boundary in a more accurate position than the current general boundary’.Court: ChD
The claimant engineers sought payment of their unpaid fees arising out of work done on behalf of the defendants in connection with the development of a site in Redhill. The fee claim had been compromised, but was subject to Bellway’s counterclaim arising out of the alleged negligence of UM in relation to the removal of spoil from the site.Court: TCC