Claim for damages arising from alleged want of care of child in the womb, leading to a stillbirth. The claimant father suffered psychiatric damage after being told of the death of his wife’s baby in utero as a result of negligent treatment by clinicians working for the defendant hospital. He argued that Taylor v A. Novo could not preclude a claim ‘in a case where the first manifestation of the injuries sustained by the primary victim occurs in front of (or within sight or hearing of) the secondary victim (or where he comes across the primary victim in the immediate aftermath of this injury) but is separated in time from the act or omission constituting negligence’. In a clinical negligence case where the first manifestation of the negligent act or omission was a shocking event seen, heard or otherwise directly experienced by the secondary victim, a claim would lie. It was argued that it could be seen from the reference to Walters that the Court of Appeal in Taylor v A. Novo had not intended to state any new principle.
Held: The argument failed.
Michael Kent QC, expressed ‘difficulty’ with the proposition because of Lord Dyson’s approval of Auld J’s observation in Taylor v Somerset and his observation that Peter Gibson LJ’s remarks in Walters were obiter. The term ‘external event’ was ‘explained by the context of these claims which is that they are all made by those who are not directly participating in the events which have been engulfed the primary victims and which are in that sense external to the claimant’. It was ‘arguably going too far’ to argue, as the defendant had, that Lord Wilberforce’s reference to the ‘fact and consequence of the negligence’ meant that the negligence must itself be synchronous with the sustaining of shock by the secondary victim. It was ‘a little unlikely’ that the Court of Appeal in Walters had overlooked the fact that the fit was a result of the earlier negligent treatment, so that the cause of action had already accrued prior to the start of the relevant ‘event’. Ultimately, however, it was not necessary to resolve any of these points, because the claimant learned of the death after it had happened and witnessed no shocking event. This was fatal to the claim:
Judges:
Michael Kent QC
Citations:
[2014] EWHC 4053 (QB), [2016] PIQR P3
Links:
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Liverpool Women’s Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v Ronayne CA 17-Jun-2015
The respondent was an experienced ambulance driver. His wife underwent emergency treatment at the appellant’s hospital. He had claimed as a secondary victim for the distress he suffered witnessing her suffering.
Held: The hospital’s appeal . .
Cited – Paul and Another v The Royal Wolverhampton NHS Trust QBD 4-Jun-2020
Nervous shock – liability to third parties
The claimants witnessed the death of their father from a heart attack. They said that the defendant’s negligent treatment allowed the attack to take place. Difficult point of law about the circumstances in which a defendant who owes a duty of care . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Professional Negligence, Personal Injury
Updated: 30 November 2022; Ref: scu.539569