Lord Moulton said that the danger of departing from the ordinary meaning of unambiguous provisions is that ‘it may degrade into mere judicial criticism of the propriety of the acts of the Legislature’.
Lord Haldane LC after stating that speculation on the motives of the Legislature was a topic which Judges cannot profitably or properly enter upon, said:-‘Their province is the very different one of construing the language in which the Legislature has finally expressed its conclusions, and if they undertake the other province which belongs to those who, in making the laws, have to endeavour to interpret the desire of the country, they are in danger of going astray in a labyrinth to the character of which they have no sufficient guide. In endeavouring to place the proper interpretation on the sections of the statute before this House sitting in its judicial capacity. I propose, therefore, to exclude consideration of everything excepting the state of the law as it was when the statute was passed, and the light to be got by reading it as a whole, before attempting to construe any particular section. Subject to this consideration. I think that the only safe course is to read the language of the statute in what seems to be its natural sense.’
Lord Macnaghten said: ‘a judicial tribunal has nothing to do with the policy of any Act which it may be called upon to interpret. That may be a matter for private judgment. The duty of the Court, and its only duty, is to expound the language of the Act in accordance with the settled rules of construction.’ and
‘Now it is ‘the universal rule’, as Lord Wensleydale observed in Grey v Pearson, that in construing statutes, as in construing all other written instruments ‘ the grammatical and ordinary sense of the word is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further’. Acts of Parliament are, of course, to be construed acording to the intent of the Parliament’ which passes them. That is ‘the only rule’ said Tindal CJ, delivering the opinion of the judges who advised this House, in the Sussex Peerage Case. But his Lordship was careful to add this note of warning: If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such case, best declare the intention of the lawgiver’. Nowadays, when it is a rare thing to find a preamble in any public general statute, the field of inquiry is even narrower than it was in former times. In the absence of a preamble there can, I think, be only two cases in which it is permissible to depart from the ordinary and natural sense of the words of an enactment. It must be shewn either that the words taken in their natural sense lead to some absurdity or that there is some other clause in the body of the Act inconsistent with, or repugnant to, the enactment in question construed in the ordinary sense of the language in which it is expressed.’
Judges:
Lord Haldane LC, Lord Moulton, Lord MacNaghten
Citations:
[1912] UKHL 3, [1913] AC 107, [1912] UKHL 649
Links:
Statutes:
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Grey v Pearson HL 9-Mar-1957
The House was required to interpret a will where a benefit was to pass only if someone was to die ‘and not have children.’
Held: ‘It is ‘the universal rule’, that in construing statutes, as well as in construing all other written instruments . .
Cited – The Sussex Peerage Case 1844
Statements against penal interest are outside the common law exception of statements against interest. The oral confession of a deceased person was considered.
The court considered principles of statutory interpretation: ‘Acts should be . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Employment, Torts – Other
Updated: 13 July 2022; Ref: scu.265975