Tenants sought enfranchisement of their properties, but 75% of building consisted of a shop, and only 25% was living accomodation.
Held: The tenants were entitled to buy the freehold. The question whether a building is a house ‘reasonably so called’ is one of law. The House made two particular points of general application on the interpretation of the phrase ‘Which may reasonably be called a house’ in the 1967 Act.
Lord Roskill said: ‘Small corner shops and terrace shops combined with living accommodation are to be found in almost every town and village in England and Wales. Parliament plainly intended that a tenant who occupied such premises as his residence should have the benefit of the Act if the building could reasonably be called a ‘house’. It is imperative, if the law is to be evenly and justly administered, that there should be not only uniformity of principle in the approach of the courts to the question but also a broad consistency in the conclusions reached. The question must not, save within narrow limits, be treated by the courts as a question of fact: for the variations of judicial response could well be such as to give rise to unacceptable, indeed unjust, differences between one case and another. This could lead to the statute being applied to two practically identical buildings one way by one judge and another by another – an echo of equity and the length of the Chancellor’s foot. For this reason, the Court of Appeal’s decision in Lake v Bennett [1970] 1 QB 663 was welcome as stating a principle and confirming the question of fact to a narrow area. I deduce from it the following propositions of law: (1) as long as a building of mixed use can reasonably be called a house, it is within the statutory meaning of ‘house’, even though it may also reasonably be called something else; (2) it is a question of law whether it is reasonable to call a building a ‘house’; (3) if the building is designed or adapted for living in, by which as is plain from section 1(1) of the Act of 1967, is meant designed or adapted for occupation as a residence, only exceptional circumstances, which I find hard to envisage, would justify a judge in holding that it could not reasonably be called a house. They would have to be such that nobody could reasonably call the building a house.’
Judges:
Lord Roskill, Lord Wilberforce and Lord Fraser
Citations:
[1982] AC 755
Statutes:
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Citing:
Approved – Lake v Bennett CA 1970
The building had been constructed in 1869. It was used as a house on three floors with a basement. The ground floor was later used as a shoe repairing shop and then as a betting shop with living accommodation still used for dwelling purposes in the . .
Cited by:
Cited – Collins v Howard De Walden Estates Limited CA 16-Apr-2003
The tenant sought the right to purchase the freehold reversion. Her landlord resisted saying that the properties were excluded from enfranchisement being divided vertically.
Held: The cases are fact dependent, and earlier precedents must be . .
Distinguished – Malekshad v Howard de Walden Estates Limited HL 5-Dec-2002
A house and an adjoining building had been first demised under one lease, then separated vertically. Two separate residential properties now existed.
Held: The vertical division meant that the two houses could not be enfranchised as one under . .
Cited – Malekshad v Howard De Walden Estates Limited CA 23-May-2001
The applicant sought the leasehold enfranchisement of two leasehold properties. They were contained in separate leases, but the property had been treated as one for some time. A part of one property extended under part of the other. The claim was . .
Cited – Boss Holdings Ltd and Another v Grosvenor West End Properties Ltd CA 21-Mar-2006
The tenant served a notice of its desire to purchase the freehold. The landlord objected that the property was no longer a house as required under the Act, having become dilapidated and unoccupied.
Held: The nature of the occupancy was to be . .
Cited – Boss Holdings Ltd v Grosvenor West End Properties and others HL 30-Jan-2008
The tenant sought to enfranchise the property under the 1967 Act. The freeholders replied that it was not a ‘house’ within the Act at the time of the notice. It had been built in the eighteenth century as a house, but the lower floors had been . .
Cited – Grosvenor Estates Ltd v Prospect Estates Ltd CA 21-Nov-2008
The tenant under a long lease sought enfranchisement. The landlord denied that it was a ‘house’ reasonably so called within the 1967 Act. The building had been constructed as a house, but was now substantially used as offices. They could only be . .
Cited – Day and Another v Hosebay Ltd; Lexgorge Ltd v Howard de Walden Estates Ltd etc CA 1-Jul-2010
Properties had been built as substantial single dwellings. Later they had been converted into separate dwellings and let accordingly. The tenants sought to acquire the freeholds under the 1967 Act. Though required by the lease to use the properties . .
Cited – Magnohard Ltd v Cadogan and Another CA 4-May-2012
The parties disputed whether a building was a house ‘reasonably so called’ within the 1987 Act. The instant building was designed or adapted for living in, and was divided horizontally into six flats or maisonettes, and included shops.
Held: . .
Cited – Day and Another v Hosebay Ltd SC 10-Oct-2012
The Court considered the provisions for leasehold enfranchisement now that the residence requirement had been removed by the 2002 Act, and in particular the extent to which, at all, it had allowed enfranchisement to be available to commercial . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Landlord and Tenant
Updated: 24 April 2022; Ref: scu.181881