Morgan Stanley appealed against summary judgment given against it in respect of the application of the terms of a standard form assignment of a Loan agreement.
Held: The words ‘which are expressed to accrue by reference to the lapse of time’, in condition 11.9(a), echo the introductory condition 11.1, which provides that the interest and fees ‘which are expressed to accrue by reference to time elapsed’ are based on the rates contained in the credit agreement (in this case, the facility agreement). Like the judge, Longmore LJ considered that the payment premium was an amount which was ‘expressed to accrue by reference to time elapsed’, since it was an ‘additional amount . . which together with [other sums] equates to an internal rate of return equal to the Loan IRR calculated . . from the date of disbursement up to the date of payment or prepayment’.
Judges:
Longmore, Rimer, Tomlinson LJJ
Citations:
[2013] EWCA Civ 473, [2013] 1 CLC 879
Links:
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Citing:
At First Instance – Tael One Partners Ltd v Morgan Stanley and Co International Plc ComC 9-Jul-2012
Each party sought summary judgment.
Held: Popplewell J granted Tael’s application and dismissed Morgan Stanley’s. The payment premium was similar to interest and performed an analogous function. The cost of the borrowing was more than the . .
Cited by:
Appeal from – Tael One Partners Ltd v Morgan Stanley and Co International Plc SC 11-Mar-2015
This appeal raises a question of contractual interpretation. Its significance lies in the fact that the contractual condition in question forms part of the Loan Market Association standard terms and conditions for par trade transactions which are a . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Contract, Financial Services
Updated: 05 December 2022; Ref: scu.491841