An equitable charge is created when property is expressly or constructively made liable to the discharge of a debt or some other obligation, and the charge confers on the chargee a right of realisation by judicial process such as a sale order. Buckley LJ said: ‘An equitable charge may, it is said, take the form either of an equitable mortgage or of an equitable charge not by way of mortgage. An equitable mortgage is created when the legal owner of the property constituting the security enters into some instrument or does some act which, though insufficient to confer a legal estate or title in the subject matter upon the mortgagee, nevertheless demonstrates a binding intention to create a security in favour of the mortgagee, or in other words evidences a contract to do so: see Fisher and Lightwood’s Law of Mortgage, 9th ed. (1977), p. 13. An equitable charge which is not an equitable mortgage is said to be created when property is expressly or constructively made liable, or specially appropriated, to the discharge of a debt or some other obligation, and confers on the chargee a right of realisation by judicial process, that is to say, by the appointment of a receiver or an order for sale: see Fisher and Lightwood, p. 14’
He also said: ‘It follows that whether a particular transaction gives rise to an equitable charge of this nature must depend upon the intention of the parties ascertained from what they have done in the then existing circumstances. The intention may be expressed or it may be inferred. If the debtor undertakes to segregate a particular fund or asset and to pay the debt out of that fund or asset, the inference may be drawn, in the absence of any contra indication, that the parties’ intention is that the creditor should have such a proprietary interest in the segregated fund or asset as will enable him to realise out of it the amount owed to him by the debtor: compare In re Nanwa Gold Mines Ltd [1955] 1 W.L.R. 1080 and contrast Moseley v. Cressey’s Co. (1865) L.R. 1 Eq. 405 where there was no obligation to segregate the deposits. But notwithstanding that the matter depends upon the intention of the parties, if upon the true construction of the relevant documents in the light of any admissible evidence as to surrounding circumstances the parties have entered into a transaction the legal effect of which is to give rise to an equitable charge in favour of one of them over property of the other, the fact that they may not have realised this consequence will not mean that there is no charge. They must be presumed to intend the consequence of their acts.’
Buckley LJ
[1982] AC 584, [1981] 2 All ER 449, [1981] 2 WLR 893
England and Wales
Citing:
Adopted – Palmer v Carey PC 1926
A lender financed a trader in goods, on the basis the proceeds of sale of the goods be paid into an account in the name of the lender, and that the lender recoup himself on a monthly basis in respect of sums advanced, with the balance being released . .
Appeal from – Swiss Bank Corporation v Lloyds Bank Ltd 1979
A subjective test was applied as to whether the court could find an intention to interfere with contractual relations. . .
Cited by:
Cited – Edwards, Drummond Smith v Flightline Limited CA 5-Feb-2003
The applicant company obtained an injunction against another company. That freezing injunction was discharged upon the payment of a sum into the names of the respective parties’ solicitors. The company went into liquidation, and the claimant . .
Cited – Oldham and others v Georgina Kyrris and Another CA 4-Nov-2003
The claimant sought to bring a claim against the administrators of a partnership alleging a duty of care to creditors.
Held: Such an administrator owed no greater duty to creditors than would a director. That duty was no different whether the . .
Cited – Jerome v Kelly (HM Inspector of Taxes) CA 20-Dec-2002
The taxpayer had contracted for the disposal of land in three tranches. The later sales were by a Bahamian company to whom the land was assigned subject to the contract.
Held: The later sales were under the original contract. That contract . .
Cited – Ernst Kastner v Marc Jason, Davis Sherman, Brigitte Sherman CA 2-Dec-2004
The parties had agreed that their dispute should be resolved before the Jewish Beth Din according to Jewish substantive and procedural law. K was granted an interim freezing order. The defendant sold the asset, and K sought to assert a charge.
Cited – Gotham v Doodes CA 25-Jul-2006
gotham_doodesCA2008
The former bankrupt resisted sale of his property by the trustee, saying that enforcement was barred by limitation. He and his wife bought the property in early 1988, and he was made bankrupt in October 1988. He was dischaged from bankruptcy in . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 04 August 2021; Ref: scu.179797