Prisoners challenged their detention within Close Supervision Centres, saying that fairness required they be told the reasons and be given the opportunity to make representations against the decision.
Held: Fairness did not require an opportunity to make representations to be given.
Turner J said: ‘In my judgment, the three cases of Wilson, Doody and Duggan . . make clear that the common law power to imply standards of procedural fairness into decision making processes, is a flexible one and will ordinarily only be exercised in cases in which the rights of an individual are under threat. In the further case of Lloyd . . it was not the liberty of the individual which was immediately at risk but the risk that a financial penalty might be imposed. In the prison cases referred to above, the problem which confronted the courts was how to identify and categorise the circumstances which had to exist before the common law was prepared to intervene. All three cases concerned the possible delay to release dates. Standards of procedural fairness were held to require that where the consequence of the decision would adversely affect release dates, so that the liberty of the individual was at risk, as by delay in release, an opportunity to be heard must be accorded to the individual who should also know what was the nature of the case against him so that he could make informed representation against it. It is not hard, now, to understand how the courts arrived at the conclusion that where either the liberty of the individual was at stake, or his financial position was involved, concepts of procedural fairness demanded that he was able to make informed representations why a course of action, which might impact on either aspect of a person’s rights, should not be adopted. As a result it is not difficult to recognise that in cases, where the liberty or the financial interests of an individual is likely to be adversely affected, the common law, in the field of public law at least, will ensure that the individual concerned will have the opportunity of being heard. The problem in this case comes down to the question whether or not the applicants can show that allocation to a CSC does indeed impinge on their right to freedom in the sense already indicated.
It was, in my judgment, correctly submitted that the mere fact of allocation does not adversely impact on the prospects of parole. In truth, as the respondent submitted, it was the prisoner’s conduct before and not as the result of allocation which was likely to be a factor which would affect the prospect of release on parole. It was pointed out that if the effect of allocation to a CSC was beneficial, in accordance with one of its stated purposes, then prospects of release were enhanced rather than damaged as the result of allocation. This observation is consistent with that part of the decision in Bowen which will be found at p22G-23C of the transcript. That this can be expected to be the position is confirmed in the affidavit of Mr Wheatley, paragraph 23.
In conclusion, I hold that allocation of a prisoner to a CSC does not so affect his personal rights that the common law will intervene by requiring that he should have been given by standards of procedural fairness the opportunity to make representations against his allocation.’
Turner J
[1999] EWHC Admin 123
Bailii
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Secretary of State for the Home Department v SP CA 21-Dec-2004
The applcant, a girl aged 17 was in a young offender institution. She complained that she had been removed to segregation without first giving her chance to be heard. The respondent argued that there were sufficient post decision safeguards to . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Prisons, Administrative
Updated: 18 December 2021; Ref: scu.139387