The applicant sought judicial review of the respondent’s grant of planning permission for a development which would affect her. The authority objected that the application was made after three months after their decision, and so leave should not be granted, and also that her application for leave having been refused, there was no jurisdiction in the House to hear the appeal.
Held: The local authority wished to calculate time from the time when they resolved to refer the application to the secretary of state and to grant permission subject to conditions. The appellant had forewarned the authority of her intention to object. The effective decision was not made until the secretary of state himself made a decision. Public law should look to substance not form. Until the grant was actually made, changes might yet be made, and the appellant should not properly be challenging it. The applicant had not delayed unduly. A renewed application to the Court of Appeal under Order 59, rule 14(3) of the Rules of the Supreme Court was a true appeal with a procedure adapted to its ex parte nature. There was nothing in the rules to prevent the present application. There is some doubt that the requirement to challenge a decision by judicial review within three months meets with the requirements of the Convention or European law.
Lord Slynn of Hadley, Lord Steyn, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Millett and Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers
Times 24-May-2002, Gazette 04-Jul-2002, [2002] UKHL 23, [2002] 1 WLR 1593, [2002] 3 All ER 97
House of Lords, Bailii
Civil Procedure Rules 54.5(1), European Convention on Human Rights
England and Wales
Citing:
Doubted – In re Poh HL 1983
The applicant had unsuccessfully applied to the Divisional Court for leave to apply for judicial review and renewed his application, equally unsuccessfully, to the Court of Appeal. He then petitioned for leave to appeal to the House of Lords.
Cited – Kemper Reinsurance Company v The Minister of Finance and others PC 5-May-1998
(Bermuda) An appeal Court did have jurisdiction to hear an appeal against the discharge of leave to apply for certiorari order, since this was outside scope of the rule in Lane v Esdaille.
Lord Hoffmann said: ‘Nevertheless, the limited nature . .
Cited – Lane v Esdaile HL 5-May-1891
The court considered the extent of the House’s jurisdiction as an appellate court. Section 3 of the 1876 Act provided that an appeal should lie to the House of Lords from ‘any order or judgment of . . Her Majesty’s Court of Appeal in England’. The . .
Cited by:
Cited – Garden and Leisure Group Ltd, Regina (on the Application Of) v North Somerset Council and Another Admn 4-Jul-2003
The claimant garden centre sought to challenge a relaxation on planning restrictions over a competing centre.
Held: The section 106 agreemnent was to be looked at to see what purpose was served by the original conditions. Section 106A(6) does . .
Cited – Younger Homes (Northern) Ltd v First Secretary of State and Another Admn 26-Nov-2003
The claimant sought to quash a planning decision on the basis that a screening decision had not been made.
Held: Though the procedures within the authority could have been bettered, there was no formal requirement for a screening option to . .
Cited – Richardson and Orme v North Yorkshire County Council CA 19-Dec-2003
The claimants appealed against an order dismissing their application for a judicial review of the respondent’s grant of planning permission. They contended that a councillor with an interest in the matter had wrongfully not been excluded from the . .
Cited – Derbyshire Waste Ltd v Blewett and Another CA 11-Nov-2004
Glapswell Colliery had closed. The owners sought to use it for waste disposal by landfill. The objector had obtained judicial review of the permission granted.
Held: The intention of the Landfill Directive was to discourage its use other than . .
Cited – The British Beer and Pub Association and others v Canterbury City Council Admn 24-Jun-2005
The council had required of applicants for liquor licenses more detailed information than was required by the statute. The Association challenged their policy.
Held: One aim of the legislation is to allow licensing authorities to provide a . .
Cited – Finn-Kelcey v Milton Keynes Council and MK Windfarm Ltd CA 10-Oct-2008
Judicial Review must be timely
The appellant challenged the grant of permission for a wind farm on neighbouring land. His application for judicial review had been rejected for delay and on the merits.
Held: The court repeated the requirement that an application must be both . .
Cited – Alexander, Farrelly and Others, Re Judicial Review QBNI 5-Mar-2009
Each claimant said that they had been wrongfully arrested, the arresting police officers having either failed to ask whether the arrest was necessary (Farrelly), or mistakenly concluding so.
Held: The Order now contained in regulation . .
Cited – Walsall Metropolitan Borough Council v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government CA 6-Feb-2013
The Council sought permission to appeal against the setting aside of two enforcement notices, leave having been refused by the Administrative court. The court now considered whether it had jusridiction, and whether the rule in Lane v Esdaile was to . .
Cited – Champion, Regina (on The Application of) v North Norfolk District Council and Another SC 22-Jul-2015
‘The appeal concerns a proposed development by Crisp Maltings Group Ltd (‘CMGL’) at their Great Ryburgh plant in Norfolk, in the area of the North Norfolk District Council (‘the council’). It was opposed by the appellant, Mr Matthew Champion, a . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Planning, Civil Procedure Rules, Judicial Review, Human Rights
Leading Case
Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.171257
