The fact that there may have been a possibility of collusion is not sufficient to stop the admission of similar fact evidence by way of corroboration. ‘ . . the function of the trial judge is not to decide as an intellectual process whether the evidence satisfies prescribed conditions, but to strike as a matter of individual judgment, in the light of his experience and common sense, a balance between the probative value of the similar fact evidence and its potentially damaging effect.’ It is eventually for the jury to decide on the possibility of collusion in similar fact evidence in sex abuse cases.
Judges:
Lord Mustill
Citations:
Gazette 21-Jun-1995, Independent 26-May-1995, Times 25-May-1995, [1995] 1 AC 596, [1995] 2 WLR 737, [1995] CLY 938
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – Regina v H (Evidence: Corroboration); Regina v Hepburn CACD 2-Mar-1994
The defendant appealed his conviction for indecent assault on his daughter and stepdaughter. The prosecution relied upon the allegatins as similar fact evidence. The complainants denied collaboration and concoction.
Held: The jury should . .
Cited by:
Cited – O’Brien v Chief Constable of the South Wales Police CA 23-Jul-2003
The claimant sought damages for malicious prosecution, and sought to adduce similar fact evidence. The defendant appealed an order admitting the evidence.
Held: Comparisons between admission of similar fact evidence in civil and criminal . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Evidence, Crime
Updated: 15 May 2022; Ref: scu.86783