The court was asked to answer a question on the assumed premise that a woman had been murdered by her son and had died intestate. The question for decision was whether the forfeiture rule prevented the son from benefiting under the intestacy provisions of the 1925 Act.
Held: Clauson J said that the forfeiture rule applied: ‘The question, however, which I have to decide is whether the principle grounded on public policy which prevents a sane murderer from benefiting under the will of his victim applies with equal force to the case of the victim dying intestate so as to preclude the murderer (or his personal representative) from claiming, under the provisions of s 46 of the Act, the property in respect of which his victim died intestate.
In my judgment the principle of public policy which precludes a murderer from claiming a benefit conferred on him by his victim’s will precludes him from claiming a benefit conferred on him, in a case of his victim’s intestacy, by statute. The principle (to quote the language of Fry LJ) must be so far regarded in the construction of Acts of Parliament that general words which might include cases obnoxious to the principle must be read and construed as subject to it. This view of the law is adopted by Fry LJ in Cleaver’s case [1892] 1 QB 147, 156 and by Farwell J in In re Pitts [1931] 1 Ch 546, 550, and must in my judgment prevail over the view taken by Joyce J in In re Houghton [1915] 2 Ch 173, 177; and whether or not the opinions so expressed are binding on me, I agree with them and adopt them as my own.’
A person cannot bring an action based on his own wrong. As to the doctrine of judicial precedent ‘we fill in the gaps.’
Judges:
Denning J, Clauson J
Citations:
[1935] Ch 89
Statutes:
Administration of Estates Act 1925
Constitutional, Wills and Probate
Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.226975