The court heard appeals against automatic life sentences imposed under the 1997 Act. It was contended that either the interpretation of section 2 of the 1997 Act was affected by section 3 of the 1998, or that section 2 is incompatible with a Convention right so that the appellants are entitled to a declaration of incompatibility.
Held: The challenges failed. Lord Woolf, gave fresh consideration to the construction of the statutory provisions in the light of the new circumstances.
The problem had arisen because of the restrictive approach formerly adopted to the interpretation of ‘exceptional circumstances’ in section 2. If exceptional circumstances are construed in a manner which accords with the policy of Parliament in passing section 2, the problem disappears: ‘Under section 2 it will be part of the responsibility of judges to assess the risk to the public that offenders constitute. In many cases the degree of risk that an offender constitutes will be established by his record, with or without the assistance of assessments made in reports which are available to the court. If a court needs further assistance, they can call for it. The courts have traditionally had to make a similar assessment when deciding whether a discretionary life sentence should be imposed. There should be no undue difficulty in making a similar assessment when considering whether the court is required to impose an automatic life sentence, although the task will not be straightforward, because of the lack of information as to the first serious offence which will sometimes exist because of the passage of time.
This does not mean that we are approaching the passing of an automatic life sentence as though it is no different from the imposition of a discretionary life sentence. Notwithstanding the interpretation resulting from the application of section 3(1) of the 1998 Act suggested, section 2 will still give effect to the intention of Parliament. It will do so, however, in a more just, less arbitrary and more proportionate manner. Section 2 will still mean that a judge is obliged to pass a life sentence in accordance with its terms unless, in all the circumstances, the offender poses no significant risk to the public. There is no such obligation in cases where section 2 does not apply. In addition, if the judge decides not to impose a life sentence under section 2, he will have to give reasons as required by section 2(3). Furthermore, the issue of dangerousness will have to be addressed in every case and a decision made as to whether or not to impose a life sentence.’
If in a individual case the facts showed that the statutory assumption that the public needed to be protected against the offender in the future was misplaced, then the position was exceptional. The norm is that those who commit two serious offences are a danger, or risk, to the public, but if in fact the offender on the evidence does not create an unacceptable risk to the public he is an exception to the norm. Offenders who do not constitute a significant risk to the public should not, said the court, receive an automatic life sentence
The Lord Woolf of Barnes LCJ, Steel, Richards JJ
[2000] EWCA Crim 96, [2000] Prison LR 283, [2001] 2 Cr App Rep (S) 10, [2001] 1 Cr App R 24, [2001] Crim LR 63, [2001] 1 WLR 253, [2001] 2 All ER 154, [2001] 1 Cr App Rep 372, [2000] Prison LR 283
Bailii
Crime (Sentences) Act 1997
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – S, Regina v CACD 25-Feb-2002
Appeal against sentence for rape, as the result of a reference by the Criminal Cases Review Commission. Life sentence imposed because of historic serious violence. The court was asked what were ‘exceptional circumstances’ so as to allow a non-life . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Criminal Sentencing, Human Rights
Leading Case
Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.263619