The solicitor had successfully appealed against an order for a contribution to the other party’s legal costs, after his clerk had filed statements in court which he knew to be misleading. The solicitor’s appeal had been successful.
Held: The Court of Appeal’s decision was reversed. The plaintiff was not asking the court to exercise its disciplinary jurisdiction over officers of the court but, rather, its jurisdiction to order a legal practitioner to pay costs by reason of some misconduct, default or negligence in the course of proceedings, a jurisdiction which could be exercised where the solicitor was merely negligent, so that the solicitor could not ‘shelter himself behind a clerk, for whose actions within the scope of his authority he is liable’
A solicitor’s duty advising his client on discovery is to investigate the position carefully and to ensure so far as is possible that full and proper disclosure of all relevant documents is made. He has overall responsibility for the process and should not leave it all to his client. The House considered and set out the court’s powers to disallow an award of costs, or to award them to be paid by the solicitor personally: ‘The court’s jurisdiction to make a wasted costs order against a solicitor is founded on breach of the duty owed by the solicitor to the court to perform his duty as an officer of the court in promoting within his own sphere the cause of justice.’
and ‘The underlying principle is that the Court has a right and a duty to supervise the conduct of its solicitors, and visit with penalties any conduct of a solicitor which is of such a nature as to tend to defeat justice in the very cause in which he is engaged professionally, as was said by Abinger C.B. in Stephens v. Hill. (1) The matter complained of need not be criminal. It need not involve peculation or dishonesty. A mere mistake or error of judgment is not generally sufficient, but a gross neglect or inaccuracy in a matter which it is a solicitor’s duty to ascertain with accuracy may suffice. Thus, a solicitor may be held bound in certain events to satisfy himself that he has a retainer to act, or as to the accuracy of an affidavit which his client swears. It is impossible to enumerate the various contingencies which may call into operation the exercise of this jurisdiction. It need not involve personal obliquity. The term professional misconduct has often been used to describe the ground on which the Court acts. It would perhaps be more accurate to describe it as conduct which involves a failure on the part of a solicitor to fulfil his duty to the Court and to realize his duty to aid in promoting in his own sphere the cause of justice. This summary procedure may often be invoked to save the expense of an action. Thus it may in proper cases take the place of an action for negligence, or an action for breach of warranty of authority brought by the person named as defendant in the writ. The jurisdiction is not merely punitive but compensatory. The order is for payment of costs thrown away or lost because of the conduct complained of. It is frequently, as in this case, exercised in order to compensate the opposite party in the action.’
Viscount Maugham said: ‘My Lords, as I understand the judgment of Greer and Slesser L.JJ., those learned judges were of opinion that the jurisdiction of the Court to order a solicitor to pay the cost of proceedings is a punitive power resting on the personal misconduct of the solicitor and precisely similar to the power of striking a solicitor off the rolls or suspending him from practice . . The jurisdiction to strike off the rolls or to suspend a solicitor seems to me to be of a very different character. Apart from the statutory grounds it is of course true that a solicitor may be struck off the rolls or suspended on the ground of professional misconduct, words which have been properly defined as conduct which would reasonably be regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by solicitors of good repute and competency: in Re a Solicitor. Ex parte The Law Society (1912) 1 K.B. 302. Mere negligence even of a serious character, will not suffice.’ and ‘These cases did not depend on disgraceful or dishonourable conduct by the solicitor, but on mere negligence of a serious character, the result of which was to occasion useless costs to the other parties . . I think the authorities show that the jurisdiction may be exercised where the solicitor is merely negligent.’
Lord Wright said: ‘A solicitor was long ago held to be an officer of the Court on the Roll of which he was entered and as such to be subject to the discipline of that Court. The Court might strike him off or suspend him . . But alongside the jurisdiction to strike off the Roll or to suspend, there existed in the Court the jurisdiction to punish a solicitor or attorney by ordering him to pay costs, sometimes the costs of his own client, sometimes those of the opposite party, sometimes, it may be, of both. The ground of such an order was that the solicitor had been guilty of professional misconduct (as it is generally called) not, however, of so serious a character as to justify striking him off the Roll or suspending him.’
‘The underlying principle is that the court has a right and a duty to supervise the conduct of its solicitors, and visit with penalties any conduct of a solicitor which is of such a nature as to tend to defeat justice in the very cause in which he is engaged professionally as was said by Abinger C.B. in Stevens v. Hill [(1842) 10 M.and W. 28]. The matter complained of need not be criminal. It need not involve peculation or dishonesty. A mere mistake or error of judgment is not generally sufficient, but a gross neglect or inaccuracy in a matter which it is a solicitor’s duty to ascertain with accuracy may suffice. Thus, a solicitor may be held bound in certain events to satisfy himself that he has a retainer to act, or as to the accuracy of an affidavit which his client swears. It is impossible to enumerate the various contingencies which may call into operation the exercise of this jurisdiction. It need not involve personal obliquity. The term ‘professional misconduct’ has often been used to describe the ground on which the Court acts. It would perhaps be more accurate to describe it as conduct which involves a failure on the part of a solicitor to fulfil his duty to the Court and to realize his duty to aid in promoting in his own sphere the cause of justice. This summary procedure may often be invoked to save the expense of an action Thus, it may, in proper cases, take the place of an action for negligence, or an action for breach of warranty of authority brought by the person named as defendant in the writ. The jurisdiction is not merely punitive, but compensatory. The order is for payment of costs thrown away or lost because of the conduct complained of. It is frequently, as in this case, exercised in order to compensate the opposite party in the action.’
Lord Wright went on to say that the jurisdiction applied for the costs of either party, and was as to behaviour which was professional misconduct falling short of what might lead to a striking off, and: ‘The underlying principle is that the Court has a right and a duty to supervise the conduct of its solicitors and visit with penalties any conduct of a solicitor which is of such a nature as to tend to defeat justice in the very cause in which he is engaged professionally, as was said by Abinger CB in Stephens v Hill (1842) 10 M and W 28. The matter complained of need not be criminal. It need not involve peculation or dishonesty. A mere mistake or error of judgment is not generally sufficient, but a gross neglect or inaccuracy in a matter which it is a solicitor’s duty to ascertain with accuracy may suffice. Thus, a solicitor may be held bound in certain events to satisfy himself that he has a retainer to act, or as to the accuracy of an Affidavit which his client swears. It is impossible to enumerate the various contingencies which may call into operation the exercise of this jurisdiction. It need not involve a personal obliquity. The term professional misconduct has often been used to describe the ground on which the Court acts. It would perhaps be more accurate to describe it as conduct which involves a failure on the part of a solicitor to fulfil his duty to the Court and to realise his duty too. The summary procedure may often be invoked to save the expense of an action. Thus it may in proper cases take the place of an action for negligence or an action for breach of warranty of authority brought by the person named as Defendant in the writ. The jurisdiction is not merely punitive but compensatory. The order is for payment of costs thrown away or lost because of the conduct complained of. It is frequently, as in this case, exercised in order to compensate the opposite party to the action.’
and ‘The summary jurisdiction thus involved a discretion both as to procedure and as to substantive relief ‘
Lord Atkin said: ‘From time immemorial judges have exercised over solicitors . . a disciplinary jurisdiction in cases of misconduct . . If the Court is deceived or the litigant is improperly delayed or put to unnecessary expense, the solicitor on the record will be held responsible and will be admonished or visited with such pecuniary penalty as the Court thinks necessary in the circumstances of the case . . What is the duty of the solicitor? He is at the early stage of the proceedings engaged in putting before the court on the oath of his client information which may afford evidence at the trial. Obviously he must explain to his client what is the meaning of relevance: and equally obviously he must not necessarily be satisfied by the statement of his client that he has no documents or no more than he chooses to disclose. If he has reasonable ground for supposing that there are others, he must investigate the matter; but he need not go beyond taking reasonable steps to ascertain the truth.’
As to the awarding of costs against a solicitor, he considered this to be a disciplinary jurisdiction arising by the solicitor’s failure in its duty to the court itself, and not a form of summary jurisdiction in contract or tort in awarding compensation. As to the standard of misconduct: ‘by misconduct is meant something which would reasonably be regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by solicitors of good repute; for example wilfully misleading the Court in the conduct of a case.’
Viscount Maugham, Lord Wright and Lord Porter
[1940] AC 282, [1939] 4 All ER 484, (1939) 56 TLR 177, (1939) 162 LT 113, (1939) 109 LJKB 105
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – Myers v Rothfield CA 1938
The solicitor had left the conduct of proceedings largely to his managing clerk. The trial judge held that the solicitor had not been guilty of professional misconduct in allowing the defences to be delivered, but that he had been guilty of such . .
Cited by:
Cited – Ridehalgh v Horsefield; Allen v Unigate Dairies Ltd CA 26-Jan-1994
Guidance for Wasted Costs Orders
Guidance was given on the circumstances required for the making of wasted costs orders against legal advisers. A judge invited to make an order arising out of an advocate’s conduct of court proceedings must make full allowance for the fact that an . .
Cited – Hedrich and Another v Standard Bank London Ltd and Another CA 30-Jul-2008
Wall LJ said: ‘A cigarette packet carries the warning that smoking can kill you. Solicitors’ standard terms of business should carry a warning that litigation can cost you. For litigation is an inherently risky business: there are no certain . .
Cited – Nelson v Nelson CA 6-Dec-1996
A solicitor appealed against an order requiring him to contribute to the costs of Mareva injunction applied for on behalf of his bankrupt client.
Held: Solicitors were not liable in costs personally for starting proceedings on behalf of a . .
Cited – Ulster Bank Ltd v Fisher and Fisher ChNI 21-Dec-1998
. .
Cited – Medcalf v Mardell, Weatherill and Another HL 27-Jun-2002
The appellants were barristers against whom wasted costs orders had been made. They appealed. They had made allegations of fraud in pleadings, but without being able to provide evidence to support the allegation. This was itself a breach of the Bar . .
Cited – Dempsey v Johnstone CA 30-Jul-2003
The solicitors appealed against a wasted costs order. . .
Cited – Harley v McDonald; Glasgow Harley (A Firm) v McDonald PC 10-Apr-2001
(New Zealand) A solicitor’s duty to the court was not breached merely because he had, on his client’s instructions, pursued a case which was hopeless. It was also inapposite to penalize him for work undertaken before the court had warned him of the . .
Cited – Al-Kandari v J R Brown and Co CA 1988
A solicitor had undertaken to look after certain passports, but failed to do so. The husband had twice previously kidnapped his children whose custody was an issue before the court. Once the husband regained the passports, he again fled with the . .
Cited – Taylor and Taylor v Ribby Hall Leisure Limited and North West Leisure Holdings Limited CA 6-Aug-1997
In supervisory proceedings against lawyers, claims of abuse of process are to be pursued at the substantive hearing and not by way of pre-emptive applications. Delay in bringing an application to enforce a solicitor’s undertaking can be relevant to . .
Cited – Wagstaff v Colls and Another CA 2-Apr-2003
The action had been stayed by an order on agreed terms. The claimant sought a wasted costs order against the defendants’ solicitors on the ground that they had witheld certain facts during the litigation. The defendants argued that they should first . .
Cited – Sprecher Grier Halberstam Llp and Another v Walsh CA 3-Dec-2008
Ward LJ said: ‘a man cannot be deceived if he knows the truth’ . .
Cited – In re P (a Barrister) (Wasted Costs Order) CACD 23-Jul-2001
The procedure for making a wasted costs order was primarily compensatory, for costs wasted, rather than punitive for malpractice. The procedure is summary, and more in line with applications for costs made under the Civil Procedure Rules rule 44.3, . .
Cited – Phillips, Harland (Suing As Administrators of the Estate of Christo Michailidis), Papadimitriou v Symes (A Bankrupt) Robin Symes Limited (In Administrative Receivership) Jean-Louis Domercq ChD 20-Oct-2004
Dr Zamar had given expert evidence in the principal proceedings. It was now said that that evidence had not been given in the proper way, and a remedy was now sought. . .
Cited – Axa Sun Life Services Plc v Cannon and Another QBD 30-Oct-2007
. .
Cited – Mitchells Solicitors v Funkwerk Information Technologies York Ltd EAT 8-Apr-2008
EAT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Costs
After the Claimant’s discrimination claim failed the Respondents sought an order for costs against her or a wasted costs order against her solicitors for pursuing a hopeless . .
Cited – Angel Solicitors v Jenkins O’Dowd and Barth ChD 19-Jan-2009
Actions were brought to enforce undertakings given by solicitors to redeem mortgages on the sale of properties, and as to redemption figures provided by lenders who then refused to release the properties. The solicitors had replied to standard form . .
Cited – Geoffrey Silver and Drake v Baines (trading as Wetherfield Baines and Baines) (a firm) CA 1971
The court’s summary jurisdiction over solicitors is extraordinary, and therefore should only be exercised sparingly (i) if justice requires this procedure to be adopted, as opposed to some other procedure.
There is a recognised jurisdiction to . .
Cited – Coll v Floreat Merchant Banking Ltd and Others QBD 3-Jun-2014
The court was asked whether it was possible to bring contempt proceedings against a solicitor for the breach of an undertaking other than one given to the court. The parties had been employee and employer. On the breakdown of that relationship, the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Legal Professions, Costs
Leading Case
Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.279003