No Need for Direction on Circumstantial Evidence
M was charged with murdering Margaret Magee in her house. no one claimed to have seen the murder and the evidence was entirely circumstantial. When he was first tried, the jury failed to reach a verdict, but at a subsequent trial he was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment. His appeal to the court of criminal appeal was dismissed and he was granted leave to appeal to the House of Lords. The point of Law certified was: ‘whether at a criminal trial with the jury in which the case against the accused depends wholly or substantially on circumstantial evidence, it is the duty of the trial judge not only to tell the jury generally that they must be satisfied of the Guilt of the accused to beyond reasonable doubt, but also to give them a special Direction by telling them in Express terms that before they can find the accused guilty they must be satisfied not only that the circumstances are consistent with this having committed the crime but also that the facts proved are such as to be inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion.’
Held: There is no requirement, in cases in which the prosecution’s case is based on circumstantial evidence that the judge direct the jury to acquit unless they are sure of the facts proved are not only consistent with guilt but also inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion. The question for the jury is whether the facts as they find them to be drive them to the conclusion, so that they are sure, that the defendant is guilty.
There is no rule of law that requires the trial judge to give an explanation as to the difference between proof by direct evidence and proof by circumstances leading to a compelling inference of guilt, or any requirement to use any particular form of words. It depends upon the nature of the case and the evidence.
Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest said: ‘The particular form and style of a summing up, provided it contains what must on any view be certain essential elements, must depend not only upon the particular features of a particular case, but also upon the view formed by a judge as to the form and style that will be fair and reasonable and helpful. The solemn function of those concerned in a criminal trial is to clear the innocent and to convict the guilty. It is, however, not for the judge but for the jury to decide what evidence is to be accepted and what conclusion should be drawn from it. It is not to be assumed that members of a jury will abandon their reasoning powers and, having decided that they accept as true some particular piece of evidence, will not proceed further to consider whether the effect of that piece of evidence is to point to guilt or is neutral or is to point to innocence. Nor is it to be assumed that in the process of weighing up a great many separate pieces of evidence will forget the fundamental direction, if carefully given to them, that they must not convict unless they are satisfied that guilt has been proved and has been proved beyond all reasonable doubt.’
Lord Morris said: ‘in my view, the basic necessity before guilt of a criminal charge can be pronounced is that the jury are satisfied of guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. so this is a conception that a jury can readily understand and buy clear exposition can readily be made to understand. so also can a jury readily understand that from one piece of evidence which they accept various influences might be drawn. it requires no more than ordinary common sense or a jury to understand that if one suggested inference from an accepted piece of evidence leads to a conclusion of guilt and another suggested inference to a conclusion of innocence a jury could not on that piece of evidence alone be satisfied of guilt beyond all reasonable doubt unless they holy rejected and excluded the latter suggestion.
Judges:
Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest
Citations:
[1973] 1 WLR 276, [1973] 57 Cr App R 424, [1973] 1 All ER 503
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Kelly v Regina CACD 15-May-2015
Appeal against a conviction for murder brought upon one issue, namely whether a failure by the prosecution to make proper disclosure under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 rendered the trial of the appellant unfair and the verdict . .
Cited – Regina v Fergus CACD 29-Jun-1993
A judge should withdraw a case which was based on poor identification evidence, and the prosecution must be sure to disclose all identification evidence. ‘In a case dependent on visual identification, and particularly where that is the only . .
Cited – Yaryare and Others v Regina CACD 13-Oct-2020
Appeal from convictions of public order offences – challenges to use of identification evidence. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Criminal Practice, Crime
Updated: 08 May 2022; Ref: scu.546834