The applicants were sentenced to life imprisonment. They complained of discriminatory treatment, in violation of article 14 taken in conjunction with article 5, because they were treated less favourably than other categories of convicted offenders (women, juveniles, and men over 65) who were exempt from life imprisonment: ‘Article 14 does not prohibit all differences in treatment, but only those differences based on an identifiable, objective or personal characteristic, or ‘status’, by which individuals or groups are distinguishable from one another. It lists specific grounds which constitute ‘status’ including, inter alia, sex, race and property. However, the list set out in article 14 is illustrative and not exhaustive, as is shown by the words ‘any ground such as’ (in French ‘notamment’) and the inclusion in the list of the phrase ‘any other status’ (in French ‘toute autre situation’). The words ‘other status’ have generally been given a wide meaning, and their interpretation has not been limited to characteristics which are personal in the sense that they are innate or inherent (see Clift , cited above, paras 56-58; Carson v United Kingdom [GC], no 42184/05, paras 61 and 70, ECHR 2010; and Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v Denmark , 7 December 1976, para 56, Series A no 23).’
60367/08, [2011] ECHR 1710
Bailii
European Convention on Human Rights
Human Rights
Cited by:
Cited – Stott, Regina (on The Application of) v Secretary of State for Justice SC 28-Nov-2018
The prisoner was subject to an extended determinate sentence (21 years plus 4) for 10 offences of rape. He complained that as such he would only be eligible for parole after serving two thirds of his sentence rather than one third, and said that . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 27 October 2021; Ref: scu.445760