The plaintiff had ridden on the back of a kind of tractor in a quarry and in defiance of his employer’s instructions, risking being thrown off and injured. Another vehicle ran into the back of the first vehicle, injuring the plaintiff. He contended that his damages should not be reduced because although it was foreseeable that he might be thrown off the first vehicle, it was not foreseeable that he would be injured by another vehicle running into him.
Held: A party is guilty of contributory negligence if he ought reasonably to have foreseen that, if he did not act as a reasonable prudent man, he might be hurt himself.
Denning LJ: ‘Just as actionable negligence requires the foreseeability of harm to others, so contributory negligence requires the foreseeability of harm to oneself. A person is guilty of contributory negligence if he ought reasonably to have foreseen that, if he did not act as a reasonable, prudent man, he might be hurt himself; and in his reckonings he must take into account the possibility of others being careless.’ and
‘Although contributory negligence does not depend on a duty of care, it does depend on foreseeability. Just as actionable negligence requires the foreseeability of harm to others, so contributory negligence requires the foreseeability of harm to oneself. A person is guilty of contributory negligence if he ought reasonably to have foreseen that, if he did not act as a reasonable, prudent man, he might be hurt himself; and in his reckonings he must take into account the possibility of others being careless.
Once negligence is proved, then no matter whether it is actionable negligence or contributory negligence, the person who is guilty of it must bear his proper share of responsibility for the consequences. The consequences do not depend on foreseeability, but on causation. The question in every case is: What faults were there which caused the damage? Was his fault one of them? ‘
Singleton LJ: ‘The plaintiff, in riding on the traxcavator, was disobeying the orders of his employers. In so doing he was exposing himself to danger. It may well be that the chief danger was that he might fall off, or be thrown off, or that he might become entangled in some part of the machine on which he was riding; but those were not the only risks to which he subjected himself. He had put himself in a dangerous position which, in fact, exposed him to the particular danger which came upon him. He ought not to have been there. The fact that he was in that particular position meant that he exposed himself, or some part of his body, to another risk, the risk that some driver following might not be able to pull up in time – it may be because that driver was certainly at fault. That is the view which the trial judge took of this case, and I do not see that that is a wrong view. It is not so much a question of Was the plaintiff’s conduct the cause of the accident? as Did it contribute to the accident? on the assumption that it was something of a kind which a reasonably careful man so placed would not have done. If he unreasonably, or improperly, exposed himself to this particular risk, I do not think that he ought to be allowed to say that it was not a cause operating to produce the damage, even though one may think that the prohibition against riding on the vehicle was not made with that particular risk in mind’
Denning LJ, Singleton LJ
[1952] 2 QB 608, [1952] EWCA Civ 2, [1952] 1 TLR 1377
Bailii
Law reform (Contributory Neglience) Act 1945 1
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Davies v Swan Motor Co (Swansea) Ltd CA 1949
A plaintiff brought an action for damages for personal injury against the drivers of two cars.
Held: There are two aspects to apportioning responsibility between a plaintiff and defendant in an action for negligence, the respective causative . .
Cited – In re Polemis and Furness, Withy and Co CA 1921
A wrongdoer was liable for all the direct consequences of his negligent act, even though those consequences could not reasonably have been anticipated. ‘Once the act is negligent, the fact that its exact operation was not foreseen is immaterial.’ . .
Cited – Caswell v Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries HL 1939
An action was brought for injuries caused by a breach of statutory of duty.
Held: A breach of statutory duty is regarded as ‘akin to negligence’.
Lord Atkin said that a common sense rather than a philosophical or scientific approach to . .
Cited by:
Cited – Badger v The Ministry of Defence QBD 16-Dec-2005
The widow of the deceased sought damages after his exposure to asbestos whilst working for the defendant. He had contracted lung cancer. The defendant argued that the deceased had continued to smoke knowing of the risks, and that he had made a . .
Approved – O’Connell v Jackson CA 7-Jul-1971
Motorcyclist negligent without helmet
The plaintiff sought damages after an accident. The defendant car driver had negligently moved forward into the path of the plaintiff motor cyclist who was injured. The defendant argued that the plaintiff, a motorcyclist, was contributorily . .
Adopted – O’Connell v Jackson CA 7-Jul-1971
Motorcyclist negligent without helmet
The plaintiff sought damages after an accident. The defendant car driver had negligently moved forward into the path of the plaintiff motor cyclist who was injured. The defendant argued that the plaintiff, a motorcyclist, was contributorily . .
Cited – St George v The Home Office CA 8-Oct-2008
The claimant was taken into prison. He was known to be subject to epilepsy, with high risks on withdrawal from drugs, but was allocated a high bunk. He had a seizure and fell, suffering head injuries. He sought damages in negligence. The defendant . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Negligence
Leading Case
Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.189982