EAT RACE DISCRIMINATION:
Inferring Discrimination and the Burden of Proof
Although the stated belief of the employer may amount to the reason for dismissal in terms of section 98 of the Employment Rights Act, a combination of the different statutory wording in terms of direct race discrimination (here section 1 of the Race Relations Act) and the application of the reverse burden of proof may lead in some cases, the instant case being possibly an example, to a finding that the reason for dismissal, e.g. misconduct was also less favourable treatment for the purposes of anti-discrimination legislation; Chamberlain v Emokpae [2005] ICR 931 distinguished.
Appellate jurisdiction/reasons/Burns-Barke
But the ET appeared to have relied only on the difference of nationality and the difference of treatment to reverse the burden of proof and did not deal at all with a subsequent case of dismissal of an Italian national in similar circumstances. Accordingly, it being too late for the Burns Barke procedure, case remitted for further consideration as to whether the factual material, apart from the difference of nationality and the fact that others had not been dismissed, led to a reversal of the burden of proof and where the later dismissal fitted into that analysis.
Citations:
[2010] UKEAT 0205 – 10 – 1410
Links:
Employment, Discrimination
Updated: 31 August 2022; Ref: scu.427298