The Court was asked whether the accused had put forward sufficient evidence on a charge of dangerous driving to justify the justices adjudging that he should be acquitted, there having been no dispute that at the time when his car collided with another one he was at the driving wheel. At the trial the accused had contended that he became unconscious as a result of being overcome by an unidentified illness.
Held: The prosecutor’s appeal succeeded. The court discussed the defence of insanity.
Devlin J said: ‘For the purposes of the criminal law there are two categories of mental irresponsibility, one where the disorder is due to disease and the other where it is not. The distinction is not an arbitrary one. If disease is not the cause, if there is some temporary loss of consciousness arising accidentally, it is reasonable to hope that it will not be repeated and that it is safe to let an acquitted man go entirely free. But if disease is present, the same thing may happen again and therefore, since 1800, the law has provided that persons acquitted on this ground should be subject to restraint.’
However: ‘It would be quite unreasonable to allow the defence to submit at the end of the prosecution’s case that the Crown had not proved affirmatively and beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was at the time of the crime sober, or not sleep walking or not in a trance or black out.’
Goddard CJ did not equate unconsciousness due to a sudden illness, which must entail the malfunctioning of the mental processes of the sufferer, with disease of the mind. Where the driving or apparent driving is deprived of its voluntary character by, for example, automatism or unconsciousness, the offence is not committed: ‘I agree that there may be cases where the circumstances are such that the accused could not really be said to be driving at all. Suppose he had a stroke or an epileptic fit, both instances of what may properly be called acts of God; he might well be in the driver’s seat even with his hands on the wheel, but in such a state of unconsciousness that he could not be said to be driving’.
Judges:
Goddard CJ, Devlin, Pearson JJ
Citations:
[1958] 1 All ER 193, (1958) 42 Cr App R 51, [1958] 2 WLR 76, [1958] 1 QB 277, 122 JP 134
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Kay v Butterworth KBD 1945
The defendant had been charged only with driving to the danger of the public and with driving without due care and attention. He was acquitted by the justices and the prosecutor appealed.
Held: He should have been convicted of both offences . .
Cited by:
Cited – Regina v Quick CACD 18-Apr-1973
The defendant appealed against his conviction for assault. He had pleaded guilty after a ruling by the judge as to the meaning of the phrase ‘a defect of reason, from disease of the mind’ within the meaning of the M’Naughten Rules. More particularly . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Crime, Road Traffic
Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.218809