The claimant had been tried for murder, but had undergone two retrials. On the second he said there was a rule of law that a defendant should not be tried a third time after two juries had failed to agree a conviction. He refused to take any part and was convicted.
Held: Whatever part the defendant played in slowing down proceedings, the authorities had a responsibility themselves to expedite a trial. The reasonableness of the length of proceedings was to be viewed in the context of each case. In this case there had been a substantial an unexplained delay in hearing the appeal, and a shorter delay before the third trial. While there were no unusually long periods of inactivity, the circumstances of a third trial demanded a particular need for speed. The applicant’s human rights had been infringed.
Citations:
Times 22-Nov-2004, 505/02
Jurisdiction:
Human Rights
Citing:
See Also – Regina v Henworth CACD 30-Jan-2001
There is no rule of law to say that a third trial taken as far as a jury decision was an abuse of process. Dicta that that was the case were obiter. The question of whether there was oppression was to be decided on the facts of each case. . .
Cited by:
See Also – Regina v Henworth CACD 30-Jan-2001
There is no rule of law to say that a third trial taken as far as a jury decision was an abuse of process. Dicta that that was the case were obiter. The question of whether there was oppression was to be decided on the facts of each case. . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Human Rights, Criminal Practice
Updated: 30 April 2022; Ref: scu.219861