EAT Sex Discrimination : Marital Status: A was married to the Chief Executive of R1 (H). She had for some time worked for R1 as a contractor. It was R1’s case that the Chairman told H that from the end of 2009 he should not employ any member of his family in the business, because of concerns about perceived conflicts of interest and nepotism. A became an employee of the company at the beginning of 2010 (and her and H’s daughter also became an employee in late 2009). She was dismissed on the ground that her employment was in breach of the instruction to H (her daughter also being dismissed on similar grounds). Her claim of discrimination on the ground that she was married, under section 3 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, was struck out by an Employment Judge on the basis that it had no reasonable prospect of success.
HELD, dismissing A’s appeal:
(1) Less favourable treatment on the basis that the complainant is married to a particular person falls within section 3, but only if the ground for the treatment is, specifically, that they are married, rather than only that they are in a close relationship which happens to take the form of marriage – Skyrail Oceanic Ltd v Coleman [1980] ICR 596 and Chief Constable of Bedfordshire v Graham [2002] IRLR 239 followed – Aspects of the reasoning in Dunn v Institute of Cemetery and Crematorium Management (UKEAT/0531/10) doubted.
(2) On the facts of the instant case the Judge was right to find that there was no realistic prospect of A establishing that the ground of her treatment was marriage-specific in the relevant sense.
Judges:
Underhill P
Citations:
[2011] UKEAT 0302 – 11 – 1303
Links:
Statutes:
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Employment
Updated: 06 October 2022; Ref: scu.452341