The applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment in 1973 for committing a murder in the course of a robbery.
Held: The penalty for this offence at the time it was committed was life imprisonment and thus no issue under Art. 7 (art. 7) arises in this respect. The ‘penalty’ for purposes of Art. 7, para 1 (art. 7-1), must be considered to be that of life imprisonment. Nevertheless as a result of the change in parole policy the applicant would not become eligible for release on parole until he had served 20 years’ imprisonment. Although this may give rise to the result that his imprisonment is effectively harsher than if he had been eligible for release on parole at an earlier stage, such matters relate to the execution of the imprisonment as opposed to the ‘penalty’ which remains that of life imprisonment. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the ‘penalty’ imposed is a heavier one than that imposed by the trial judge. The Commission rejected the application as manifestly ill-founded.
Citations:
11653/85
Jurisdiction:
Human Rights
Cited by:
Cited – McFetrich, Regina (on the Application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department Admn 30-Jun-2003
The defendant had been convicted of murder in Scotland. He requested a transfer to an English prison. The trial judge recommended a tariff of eight years which was eventually set at 12 years by the respondent. That figure also exceeded the maximum . .
Cited – Sheldrake v Director of Public Prosecutions; Attorney General’s Reference No 4 of 2002 HL 14-Oct-2004
Appeals were brought complaining as to the apparent reversal of the burden of proof in road traffic cases and in cases under the Terrorism Acts. Was a legal or an evidential burden placed on a defendant?
Held: Lord Bingham of Cornhill said: . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Human Rights, Criminal Sentencing
Updated: 28 May 2022; Ref: scu.184130