The tenant under a long lease sought enfranchisement. The landlord denied that it was a ‘house’ reasonably so called within the 1967 Act. The building had been constructed as a house, but was now substantially used as offices. They could only be used under the lease as to 11.5% for residential purposes, the remainder of the premises being limited to commercial use.
Held: The landlord’s appeal succeeded. The propositions in Tandon are not a statutory text. The judge had paid insufficient attention to the peculiar, even exceptional circumstance of prescribed and predominant office use in compliance with the Lease. The judge’s decision that the building was a house reasonably so called has been shown to be wrong. The building was designed for living in, but, by reason of its prescribed and preponderant office use, it was impossible to say that, at the relevant date, the building could reasonably be called a house.
Mummery LJ, Smith LJ, Goldring LJ
[2008] EWCA Civ 1281, [2009] 1 WLR 1313, [2008] NPC 126, [2009] L and TR 11, [2009] 1 EGLR 47, [2009] 2 P and CR 10, [2009] 1 P and CR DG6, [2009] 2 EG 86
Bailii
Leasehold Reform Act 1967 2(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Lake v Bennett CA 1970
The building had been constructed in 1869. It was used as a house on three floors with a basement. The ground floor was later used as a shoe repairing shop and then as a betting shop with living accommodation still used for dwelling purposes in the . .
Cited – Tandon v Trustees of Spurgeons Homes HL 1982
Tenants sought enfranchisement of their properties, but 75% of building consisted of a shop, and only 25% was living accomodation.
Held: The tenants were entitled to buy the freehold. The question whether a building is a house ‘reasonably so . .
Cited – Boss Holdings Ltd v Grosvenor West End Properties and others HL 30-Jan-2008
The tenant sought to enfranchise the property under the 1967 Act. The freeholders replied that it was not a ‘house’ within the Act at the time of the notice. It had been built in the eighteenth century as a house, but the lower floors had been . .
Cited – Malekshad v Howard de Walden Estates Limited HL 5-Dec-2002
A house and an adjoining building had been first demised under one lease, then separated vertically. Two separate residential properties now existed.
Held: The vertical division meant that the two houses could not be enfranchised as one under . .
Cited by:
Limited – Day and Another v Hosebay Ltd; Lexgorge Ltd v Howard de Walden Estates Ltd etc CA 1-Jul-2010
Properties had been built as substantial single dwellings. Later they had been converted into separate dwellings and let accordingly. The tenants sought to acquire the freeholds under the 1967 Act. Though required by the lease to use the properties . .
Cited – Magnohard Ltd v Cadogan and Another CA 4-May-2012
The parties disputed whether a building was a house ‘reasonably so called’ within the 1987 Act. The instant building was designed or adapted for living in, and was divided horizontally into six flats or maisonettes, and included shops.
Held: . .
Adopted and extended – Day and Another v Hosebay Ltd SC 10-Oct-2012
The Court considered the provisions for leasehold enfranchisement now that the residence requirement had been removed by the 2002 Act, and in particular the extent to which, at all, it had allowed enfranchisement to be available to commercial . .
Cited – Day and Another v Hosebay Ltd SC 10-Oct-2012
The Court considered the provisions for leasehold enfranchisement now that the residence requirement had been removed by the 2002 Act, and in particular the extent to which, at all, it had allowed enfranchisement to be available to commercial . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Landlord and Tenant
Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.278209