An order had been made by a minister that the council of a local authority be dissolved. The council did not seek to challenge the order, but the appellant, the mayor, brought proceedings in his individual capacity to challenge the minister’s decision.
Held: He did not have the necessary standing. Lord Upjohn: ‘Apart altogether from authority their Lordships would be of the opinion that this was a case where the Minister’s order was voidable and not a nullity. Though the council should have been given the opportunity of being heard in its defence, if it deliberately chooses not to complain and takes no step to protest against its dissolution, there seems no reason why any other person should have the right to interfere. [Referring to Ridge v Baldwin] . . their Lordships can see no reason why any other person, such, for example, as a ratepayer of Brighton should have any right to contend that Mr. Ridge was still the Chief Constable of Brighton. As a matter of ordinary common sense, with all respect to other opinions that have been expressed, if a person in the position of Mr. Ridge had not felt sufficiently aggrieved to take any action by reason of the failure to afford him his strict right to put forward a defence, the order of the watch committee should stand and no one else should have any right to complain.’ and ‘Their Lordships therefore are clearly of opinion that the order of the Minister on May 29, 1966, was voidable and not a nullity. Being voidable it was voidable only at the instance of the person against whom the order was made, that is the council. But the council have not complained. The appellant was no doubt mayor at the time of its dissolution but that does not give him any right to complain independently of the council. He must show that he is representing the councilor suing on its behalf or that by reason of certain circumstances, such, for example, as that the council could not use its seal because it is in the possession of the Municipal Commissioner, or for .other reasons it has been impracticable for the members of the council to meet to pass the necessary resolutions, the council cannot be the plaintiff. Had that been shown then there are well-known procedures whereby the plaintiff can sue on behalf of himself and the other corporators making the council a defendant and on pleading and proving the necessary facts may be able to establish in the action that he is entitled to assert the rights of the council. That, however, is not suggested in this case. The appellant sets up the case that as mayor he is entitled to complain but as such he plainly is not. If the council is dissolved, the office of mayor is dissolved with it and he has no independent right of complaint; because he holds no office that is independent of the council. If the mayor were to be heard individually he could only deal with complaints against the council with which ex hypothesi the council itself did not wish to deal. So, accordingly, it seems to their Lordships that on this short ground the appellant cannot maintain this action.’
Lord Upjohn
[1967] 2 AC 337
Commonwealth
Citing:
Cited – Ridge v Baldwin (No 1) HL 14-Mar-1963
No Condemnation Without Opportunity For Defence
Ridge, a Chief Constable, had been wrongfully dismissed because he was not given the opportunity of presenting his defence. He had been acquitted of the charges brought against him, but the judge at trial had made adverse comments about his . .
Cited by:
Cited – Grierson, Regina (on the Application Of) v Atlantic Broadcasting Ltd and others Admn 26-Aug-2005
The claimant sought leave to challenge the decision of the Radio Licensing Authority to grant a radio station licence to the defendant.
Held: As a minority shareholder in one of the competing companies, he did not have sufficient standing to . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 08 October 2021; Ref: scu.229780