A solicitor delivered his bill. The first part for pounds 2 19s 8d related to attending the defendant and consulting as to slanderous reports; there were then charges for ‘Letter before action’, ‘Instructions to sue’, ‘Writ of summons’, and ‘Attending settling’. There was otherwise nothing to show whether the suit of Gillard v Ransom had been pending in court. The second part of the bill related to conducting the defence of a case at the Middlesex Quarter Sessions and the third part for conducting a prosecution there. The fourth part of the bill was headed ‘Yourself and Mrs Heydeman’. It contained charges for taking the opinion of counsel on the construction of an agreement, various charges for collecting evidence and making enquiries at Hatton Garden, Tottenham Court Road, and other places well known to be in Middlesex, but which were not stated on the face of the bill to be there; for ‘Instructions to sue in an action on the case’; for ‘Writ’ and ‘Service’; for attending in court when on motion by counsel ‘A rule was made to refer all matters in dispute’; and for attending the reference. The amount of this head of the bill was pounds 122. 8s. 10d. Except insofar as might be inferred from the items quoted there was nothing to show whether the cause of Gillard v Heydeman had been pending in any, or which, of the superior courts. The defendant said the first and last parts of the bill were insufficient, in not showing what courts the business there charged for was transacted; and therefore that the bill, being one entire bill, was not sufficient as to any part. For the plaintiff it was contended that the bill was sufficient for the whole; or, if not, that it was divisible and good pro tanto.
Held: ‘No requisites for the bill are particularised: there is no requirement that the court should be specified: and the section further declares that the plaintiff is not bound in the first instance, in proving a compliance with the Act, to prove the contents of the bill delivered; but it is presumed sufficient unless the defendant proves that it is not such a bill as constitutes ‘a bona fide compliance with this Act.’ The defendant here does not prove that any further information was practically wanted for taxation, or suggest that the name of the court in which the two writs of summons were issued would have been of any use to him: nor does he contend that the Act has not in this case been bona fide complied with, unless the arbitrary rule be deduced from the cases above mentioned, that the name of the court as to every item is indispensable, can be maintained. Now this rule, as applied to the existing statute, appears to have originated in a mistake: it was first introduced by judges applying the provisions of stat. 2 G. 2, c 23, s.23; and then there was good reason for it; for the jurisdiction to tax under that statute is given to the court in which the greater part of the business was done; and it was therefore indispensable for the parties and for the taxing officer to be able to assign each item to its appropriate court, before the taxation could be entered upon: moreover at that time the scale of charges in the different courts was different; so that the name of the court was also wanted in order to estimate the amount of charges. But, under the existing statute, if there is any item in any court of law, jurisdiction is given to all the superior courts indifferently; so that in respect of jurisdiction the name of the court is entirely immaterial: and so likewise it is for estimating the amount due, as the scale of charges in all the superior courts is now uniform. The judges, who instituted the rule in relation to the existing statute, adopted it from cases under the former statute, without adverting to the important changes in the law which the legislature had made; and thereby, as we think, contravened the intention of the legislature. If this reasoning is correct, it follows that the rule, which so originated, has been maintained without any useful purpose.’ and ‘This has been followed by a very salutary judgment in Cozens v Graham (16 Jurist, 952), where a bill was held valid although the court in which the business was done was not mentioned or described, it being clear that the defendant, knowing the court, did not want the information and only made the objection to evade payment of a debt.
This judgment appears to us to give effect to the true meaning of the statute; the defendant who undertakes to prove that the bill is not a bona fide compliance with the Act cannot found an objection upon want of information in the bill, if it appears that he is already in possession of that information. It seems to us probable that the legislature changed the law relating to attorneys’ bills from having perceived that a clerical error or accidental oversight is often worked the forfeiture of the remuneration due for many years of professional services; and therefore meant, while it secured the client a right to reasonable information respecting the bill before an action should be brought upon it, at the same time to give the attorney security that the delivery of a bill intended to give and giving all requisite information should be a compliance with the Act, unless the client could show that information which was really wanted had been withheld. Upon this principle, and according to these cases, we decide against the objection raised by the present defendant. We consider that the doubt, whether the writs of summons and other proceedings, apparently such as belong to the courts at Westminster were issued here or in the borough court of some municipal corporation, emanated from the ingenuity of the advocate without having had any existence in the mind of the defendant: and a client has no ground of objection to a bill who is in possession of all the information that can be reasonably wanted for consulting on taxation.’
Judges:
Lord Campbell CJ
Citations:
(1852) 1 E and B 26, [1852] EngR 942, (1852) 1 El and Bl 26, (1852) 118 ER 346
Links:
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Citing:
Cited – Ivimey v Marks 1-May-1847
A solicitor’s charge for an item in an action, without specifying in what court the action is brought, rendered the bill bad, the reason being that the client ought to be enabled by the bill to obtain advice as to taxation without the need of . .
Cited by:
Cited – Ralph Hume Garry (a Firm) v Gwillim CA 22-Oct-2002
The appellant sought to have struck out the claimant’s action to recover their costs having represented him. He said that the detail in the bill was so deficient as not to comply with the requirements of the Act.
Held: Though the detail given . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Legal Professions
Updated: 05 December 2022; Ref: scu.181190