Wyldecrest Parks (Management) Ltd v Beechwood Park Residents Association: UTLC 1 Feb 2018

PARK HOMES – WATER CHARGES – whether first-tier tribunal has jurisdiction to determine breach of Water Resale Order 2006 – estimated charges based on previous year resulting in overpayment recouped in subsequent year – whether in breach of Order – whether repayment to be ordered – appeal allowed

Citations:

[2018] UKUT 30 (LC)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Housing, Utilities, Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 29 May 2022; Ref: scu.623924

Bennett Properties v H and S Engineering: QBD 14 Oct 1998

The parties had been landlord and tenant and the lease was to be renewed for a second time. They negotiated and ageed terms for the next lease, including particularly a new rent, but the tenant did not execute the new lease. The landlord had properly served his section 25 notice, but the tenant had not served any counternotice. The lease expired. The tenant remained in possession paying rent demands including one apportioned between the changed rents, and two subsequent rent demands at the new rent. The tenant then served a notice expiring at the end of a quarter, but claimed that as a tenant holding over pending a new lease he was a mere tenant at will, and therefore not bound to give any notice. The landlord said that by acting as he had, a tenancy from year to year had been created, and that the notice was ineffective, and claimed rent until the next lawful date for termination of such a lease. The tenant counterclaimed for the landlord’s failure to repair the roof amounted to a derogation from the grant despite the absence of any repairing covenants in the leases.
Held: The landlord’s claim succeeded, and the counterclaim failed. It was not possible to use the covenants for quiet enjoyment and for non-derogation from the grant to create an obligation to repair.
Though a mere payment and acceptance of rent was insufficient to allow an inference of a contractual tenancy, where there was a holding over in the context of a statutory protection, the common law presumption of the creation of a tenancy from year to year still applied where rent was paid by reference to an annual payment and where the demand for, and payment and acceptance of rent could not be explained solely by reference to that statutory protection.

Judges:

Kershaw QC J

Citations:

Unreported, 14, October 1998

Statutes:

Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 25

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedCole v Kelly CA 1920
In the absence of a contrary intention a concurrent lease passes to the concurrent lessee the concurrent lessor’s accrued rights under the existing lease. The landlord has granted to the second lessee a pro tanto disposition of the reversionary . .
CitedLongrigg, Burrough Trounson v Smith CA 1979
The defendant dealer in antiques also lived in the property with his wife. He refused to leave after the expiry of the term, claiming a Rent Act tenancy. The lessors had accepted rent from the defendant undertenant who contended that thereby a new . .
CitedWestminster (Duke of) and others v Guild CA 30-Mar-1983
The landlord brought an action for non-payment of rent. The tenant sought to set off a failure by the landlord to repair the building of which his flat was part and which failure had caused him loss. The landlord said that it had no express duty to . .
CitedJavad v Aqil CA 15-May-1990
P in possession – tenancy at will Until Completion
A prospective tenant was allowed into possession and then made periodic payments of rent while negotiations proceeded on the terms of a lease to be granted to him. The negotiations broke down.
Held: The tenant’s appeal failed. It was inferred . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 29 May 2022; Ref: scu.352246

John Romans Park Homes Ltd v Hancock, Re Morn Gate Caravan Park: UTLC 27 Jul 2018

PARK HOMES – JURISDICTION – whether a mobile home park with planning permission and site licence for mixed seasonal and permanent use is a ‘protected site’ – s.1(1), Mobile Homes Act 1983 – s.1(2), Caravan Sites Act 1968 – appeals dismissed

Citations:

[2018] UKUT 249 (LC)

Links:

Bailii

Statutes:

Caravan Sites Act 1968 1(2), Mobile Homes Act 1983 1(1)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 28 May 2022; Ref: scu.621152

Klosterkotter-Dit-Rawe v Greyclyde Investments Ltd: UTLC 31 Aug 2018

LANDLORD AND TENANT – Service Charge – landlord’s application for interim service charges over six year period – whether certification a condition precedent to liability for interim service charge – appeal dismissed

Citations:

[2017] UKUT 289 (LC)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 28 May 2022; Ref: scu.622348

Urban Splash Work Ltd v Ridgway and Another: UTLC 1 Mar 2018

LANDLORD AND TENANT – Service Charges – Leaseholder’s application for determination of charges due in specified years – quantification of charges – whether liability to pay service charge conditional on certification – leaseholder’s liability to pay administration charges – leaseholder’s liability for costs of proceedings – sections 20C and 27A, Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 – appeal allowed in part and application remitted to FTT

Citations:

[2018] UKUT 32 (LC)

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 28 May 2022; Ref: scu.605654

Italica Holdings SA v Bayadea: 1985

Citations:

[1985] 1 EGLR 70

Statutes:

Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 23

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedBeanby Estates Ltd v Egg Stores (Stamford Hill) Ltd ChD 9-May-2003
The landlord had served a notice under the 1954 Act. The tenant served a counter notice, but the question was whether he was late, or out of time.
Held: The combination of the various provisions meant that the landlord’s notice had irrevocably . .
CitedC A Webber (Transport) Ltd v Railtrack plc CA 15-Jul-2003
A notice served under s25 of the 1954 Act, being sent by recorded delivery to the tenant at its place of abode, was irrebuttably deemed to have been served on the day it was posted. Section 23 of the 1927 Act operated to disapply section 7 of the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 28 May 2022; Ref: scu.182409

Regina (Westminster City Council) v British Waterways Board: HL 1985

The tenant occupied land next to a canal under a lease from the Defendants. The landlord opposed a renewal saying they wished to occupy the land themselves for the purposes of a marina. The tenant said the plan was unrealistic, because it would not get planning permission for the change of use (the tenant was also the planning authority).
Held: The test was objective. Would a reasonable man, looking at the situation from the outside think there was a reasonable prospect of planning permission being given. The tenant’s own occupation was not a legitimate planning objection, and the landlord had established a reasonable prospect of planning permission being granted. The House had to consider whether ‘the desirability of preserving an existing use of land may by itself afford a valid planning reason for refusing permission for a change of use’: ‘As it seems to me, the preservation of an existing use (which is temporarily suspended) cannot afford a ground to refuse permission for an otherwise acceptable change of use, unless it can be shown that the refusal may reasonably be expected to lead to a resumption of the suspended use. This raises questions as to the true scope, for planning purposes, of the established existing use of the premises to which I must shortly revert . . . ‘In a contest between the planning merits of two competing uses, to justify refusal of permission for use B on the sole ground that use A ought to be preserved, it must, in my view, be necessary at least to show a balance of probability that, if permission is refused for use B, the land in dispute will be effectively put to use A’.
Lord Bridge of Harwich said: ‘So long as the mixture of uses on the premises, which the judge held to be the relevant planning unit, remain substantially unchanged, there would be no material change of use. Those uses, as already indicated, included workshops, offices, stores, messing facilities and parking for a variety of vehicles both under cover and in the open. This is just such a mixture of uses as would be required by a wide variety of undertakings whose business was the operation of some kind of vehicular transport and who required a base from which to operate. Whether, in any particular case, the proposed use of the premises by such an undertaking would involve a material change of use would depend on the detailed nature of the proposal. But it would be of no relevance to the use of the premises to inquire for what purpose the vehicles parked there were to be used when they left their base.’
and ‘Before turning to the planning issues on which this appeal ultimately depends, it is necessary to dispose first of a question arising upon the construction of section 30(1)(g) of the Act of 1954. Since there has been no actual planning application by the respondents for permission to change the use of the premises and since we know that any such application would be refused by the appellants as local planning authority, what are the circumstances, necessarily hypothetical, in which the respondents’ prospects of success in such an appeal to the Secretary of State must be considered? More particularly, are the respondents’ prospects of success in such an appeal to be considered on the assumption that, when the Secretary of State has to decide the appeal, the respondents are entitled to possession of the premises and the appellants’ occupation has ceased? My Lords, it seems to me that an affirmative answer to that question is inescapable. A landlord opposing the grant of a new tenancy under section 30(1)(f) or (g) seeks to establish what he intends to do ‘on the termination of the current tenancy.’ If the only obstacle to his implementing an admittedly genuine intention is a suggested difficulty in obtaining a necessary planning permission, the plain language of the Act of 1954 requires that his prospect of success in overcoming that difficulty should be assessed on the footing that he is entitled to possession . . I hope I do Walton J no injustice, but I find it difficult to resist the conclusion that he approached the planning issue on the assumption of an uninterrupted occupation of the premises by the appellants (which the grant of a new tenancy would, of course, in practice ensure) and failed to appreciate that the Act of 1954 requires, for this purpose, a hypothetical resumption of possession by the respondents to be assumed . . if the notional planning appeal is considered on the assumption that the respondent landlords are entitled to resume possession, the continued use of the premises for the purpose for which they are presently used by the appellant tenants is by no means an inevitable consequence of the refusal of permission . . The Court of Appeal . . correctly approached the question of the respondents’ prospects of success in a notional planning appeal on the basis of an assumed entitlement to possession . . For my part, I find it difficult to see how [Westminster’s] argument can be sustained at all, once it is appreciated that the respondents’ prospects of success in a notional planning appeal must be considered on the assumption that they, not the appellants, are in possession.’

Judges:

Lord Bridge of Harwich

Citations:

[1985] 1 AC 476, [1984] 3 WLR 1047

Statutes:

Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 30(1)(g)

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

CitedClyde and Co v Secretary of State for the Environment CA 1977
Planning permission had been granted for an office block, together with 8 flats as part of the same building. The building was largely erected, with the residential part incomplete. There was an application to change the existing permitted use of . .
ApprovedGregson v Cyril Lord Ltd CA 1962
A landlord opposing the grant of a new tenancy on the basis that he wished to conduct his own business from the premises, need not show that everything is in place to conduct the new business, but must be able to show that most obstacles to starting . .

Cited by:

AppliedSussex Investments Limited v The Secretary Of State For The Environment, Spelthorne Borough Council Admn 28-Oct-1996
The plaintiff requested that an enforcement notice should be quashed. Two earlier decision notices had already been quashed. At issue was a houseboat constructed on a floating wooden raft. There was an existing use certificate for a houseboat. Was . .
CitedLondon Residuary Body v Lambeth London Borough Council HL 1990
Planning battles had raged over the use of the former GLC County Hall. The question was whether it was desirable and appropriate to retain use of part of the building for London Government offices and centred on the ‘competing needs’ test.
CitedBloomsbury Health Authority v Secretary of State for the Environment 27-Jul-1992
Application was made for planning permission to use a redundant hospital building in Covent Garden for primarily office use. Policies of the local planning authority sought not only to restrain office use, but also to seek residential accommodation . .
CitedJackson Projects Limited v Secretary of State for Environment v Ipswich Borough Council Admn 9-Dec-1997
Application was made for a change of use for premises to Class B1 purposes. The draft local plan sought residential use of the premises. A lawful development certificate existed for Class B8 purposes. The applicant submitted at the Inquiry that, in . .
CitedChristchurch Borough Council v Secretary of State for the Environment CA 16-Dec-1993
The council appealed against the inspector’s decision to grant permission to a construction company to build houses on land. The land had formerly been used as a school playing field and was now surplus to requirements. The Council wished to put the . .
CitedFowles v Heathrow Airport Ltd ChD 15-Feb-2008
The landlord had opposed the tenant’s application to renew his tenancy, and the tenant also claimed title to additional land by adverse possession. The tenant asserted various business uses, some of which the landlord denied. The landlord went into . .
CitedHumber Oil Terminals Trustee Ltd v Associated British Ports CA 10-May-2012
The tenant appealed against a finding that the landlord was entitled to resist renewal of its lease under the 1954 Act challenging the stated intention of the landlord to occupy the premises for its own business purposes. It said that the proposed . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant, Planning

Updated: 28 May 2022; Ref: scu.182964

Ashworth Frazer Ltd v Gloucester City Council: CA 3 Feb 2000

A landlord could not refuse to consent to an assignment because of a belief, even if reasonably based, that the intended use by the prospective assignee would be a breach of covenant under the lease. That did not mean that a landlord could not after giving consent, later insist fully on compliance with the covenant by the incoming tenant. Three principles govern refusing consent are: is the reason unconnected with the relationship of landlord and tenant, if not the court asks whether it is reasonable in the particular circumstances, and last, it is for the landlord to establish that his refusal is reasonable.

Citations:

Times 03-Feb-2000

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Citing:

Appeal fromAshworth Frazer Ltd v Gloucester City Council ChD 1-Apr-1999
It might be correct for a landlord to refuse consent to assignment where its objection to the proposed user was that it was generally undesirable, and there need be shown no necessary implication that the use would not be allowed by the lease. . .
ExplainedInternational Drilling Fluids v Louisville Investments (Uxbridge) Ltd CA 20-Nov-1985
Consent to Assignment Unreasonably Withheld
The landlord had refused a proposed assignment of office premises from a tenant who had occupied the premises as its permanent offices, to a tenant who proposed to use the premises as serviced offices – that is, for short-term rent to others. The . .
CitedHoulder Brothers and Co Ltd v Gibbs CA 1925
The landlord owned two adjoining commercial properties. The tenant of one proposed to assign the lease to the tenant of the adjoining property. The landlord refused consent on the ground that if the assignment went ahead, it was likely that the . .
CitedPimms Ltd v Tallow Chandlers Company CA 1964
The landlord had refused its consent to an assignment of the remaining term of a lease to a development company, which desired to acquire the lease because of its nuisance value, and to use its interest as a basis for inducing the landlord to enter . .
CitedBickel v Duke of Westminster CA 1977
The freeholder had refused consent to an assignment of the head lease of a house to a lady who, if she had become tenant under the head lease for five years, would have been entitled to buy the freehold from the Estate. The existing tenant was a . .
CitedBates v Donaldson CA 1896
The landlord had refused consent to an assignment of the lease to a respectable and responsible prospective tenant, for the reason that the landlord wished to place commercial pressure on the existing tenant to surrender the lease to the landlord. . .
CitedViscount Tredegar v Harwood HL 1929
Landlord’s reserved right to approve insurer
A covenant in the lease required the lessee to insure the premises with a nominated insurer or another insurer approved by the lessor. The lessor refused to approve a responsible and reputable insurer because of his wish that all tenants insure with . .
See AlsoAshworth Frazer Ltd v Gloucester City Council CA 20-Jan-1997
. .
BindingKillick v Second Covent Garden Property Co Ltd CA 1973
The belief of the landlord, however reasonable, that the proposed assignee intended to use the demised premises for a purpose which would give rise to a breach of the user covenant was not of itself a ground for withholding consent to assignment. . .

Cited by:

Appeal fromAshworth Frazer Limited v Gloucester City Council HL 8-Nov-2001
A lease contained a covenant against assignment without the Landlord’s consent, such consent not to be unreasonably withheld. The tenant asserted, pace Killick, that the landlord could not refuse consent on the grounds that the proposed tenant might . .
CitedSargeant, and Sargeant v Macepark (Whittlebury) Limited ChD 8-Jun-2004
The landlord granted the tenant a licence to make alterations to the property, but imposed conditions on the use to be made of the resulting premises. The tenant objected.
Held: The landlord was entitled when granting consent to take into . .
CitedLymington Marina Ltd v MacNamara and others CA 2-Mar-2007
A share in a marina had been inherited by one brother whose application to grant successive sub-lcences of it to the other two was rejected by the marina, who said that this was not permitted. The marina appealed a finding that it had to make its . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant

Updated: 28 May 2022; Ref: scu.180315

Cobstone Investments Limited v Maxim: CA 1985

The court considered the meaning of ‘adjoining occupiers’ The tenant suggested that the word ‘ adjoining’ should be read literally so that the premises must be contiguous in the sense of physically joining, or being co-terminous with the holding of the tenant whose conduct was complained of. It was submitted that adjoining did not mean neighbouring.
Held: The submissions failed. Dunn LJ (with whom Wood J agreed) accepted as an accurate statement of the law a passage in the 10th Edition of Megarry on the Rent Acts: ‘The word ‘adjoining’ has been construed as meaning ‘contiguous’ so that the occupants of a second floor flat have been held not to be ‘adjoining occupiers’ to the ground floor flat beneath them. But this seems too strict a view; for one meaning of the word is ‘neighbouring’ and all that context seems to require is that the premises of the adjoining occupier should be near enough to be affected by the tenant’s conduct on the demised premises’ Wood J added that: ‘In my judgment the meaning of the word ‘adjoining’ is not restricted to the meaning of ‘contiguous’. Each case must depend on the facts as found by the judge trying the action. It is a question of degree. There may be other ways of approaching the issue, but it may be useful to consider it in this way; namely whether the relevant premises are sufficiently close or related, so that the behaviour or conduct of the tenant of the one affects the access to, or occupation or enjoyment of the other by its occupier.’

Judges:

Dunn LJ, Wood J

Citations:

[1984] QB 140, [1984] 2 All ER 635, [1984] 3 WLR 606

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Cited by:

CitedNorthampton Borough Council v Lovatt and Another CA 11-Nov-1997
The local authority had obtained a possession order against the defendant tenants because of the behaviour of the tenants’ children as ‘conduct which is a nuisance or annoyance to neighbours’ The question on appeal was whether behaviour which . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.

Landlord and Tenant, Housing

Updated: 28 May 2022; Ref: scu.183138

Cavaier v Pope: HL 22 Jun 1906

James Cavalier leased a house upon a weekly tenancy, and under a verbal agreement, from William Pope. He occupied the house along with his wife. They repeatedly drew the attention of Pope’s agent to the defective state of the kitchen floor, and the agent promised James Cavalier that the necessary repairs would be executed if he would stay on as tenant of the house. The repairs were not executed, and Cavalier’s wife met with an accident owing to a chair upon which she was standing going through the kitchen floor.
Cavalier and his wife brought an action against Pope, their claim being for damages for breach of contract resulting in personal injury to the wife and expense to the husband. The jury in answer to questions put to them by the learned Judge found that the agent knew that the floor was defective and promised to repair it, and that in doing so he was acting within the scope of his authority. They returned a verdict for the plaintiffs and assessed the damages in the case of the wife at pounds 75 and in the case of the husband at pounds 25.
The defendant appealed against the judgment in favour of the wife, and the Court of Appeal sustained the appeal.
The plaintiff, Cavalier’s wife, appealed to the House of Lords.
Held that she had no cause of action against the landlord in respect of the injuries sustained by her.

Judges:

Lord Chancellor (Loreburn), Lords Macnaghten, James of Hereford, Robertson, and Atkinson

Citations:

[1906] UKHL 605

Links:

Bailii

Jurisdiction:

England and Wales

Landlord and Tenant, Personal Injury

Updated: 26 May 2022; Ref: scu.625464