Optrak Distribution Software Ltd v Revenue and Customs (Income Tax/Corporation Tax : Penalty): FTTTx 11 Jun 2015

PAYE. Penalty under Schedule 56 Finance Act 2009 for late payment. The Income Tax (Pay As You Earn) Regulations 2003 (S.I. 2003/2682). Whether appellant can choose to allocate to previous tax year the liability arising under regulations 68 and 69.
Held: No. Whether penalty should be cancelled for unfairness because HMRC did not notify penalties until after end of tax year.
Held: No, following Hok Limited [2012] UKUT 363 (TCC). Whether penalty should be cancelled for disproportionality or for being unduly onerous.
Held: No, following Hok Limited [2012] UKUT 363 (TCC). No reduction for special circumstances. No reasonable excuse on the facts.
[2015] UKFTT 279 (TC)
Bailii
Finance Act 2009 56
England and Wales

Updated: 12 October 2021; Ref: scu.549547

Wall v Revenue and Customs: FTTTx 29 Jan 2014

FTTTx Income tax – penalty for late payment – reasonable excuse – reliance on statements from HMRC that no penalties charged – disproportionality of penalty – held – no reasonable excuse for late payment – HMRC notification and systems for recording penalties matters of administrative law outside the remit of the Tribunal – HOK Ltd relied on – penalty not disproportionate in terms of the Human Rights Act – appeal dismissed.
Rachel Short TJ
[2014] UKFTT 139 (TC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 12 October 2021; Ref: scu.521760

Fessal v Revenue and Customs: FTTTx 17 Feb 2015

FTTTx Income tax – self-assessment – HMRC strike out application – barrister – move from cash to true and fair basis – time limit for overpayment relief – overpayment between two underpayment years – tax paid twice on same profits – revenue discretion – Application of European Convention on Human Rights and Human Rights Act – held – No jurisdiction to consider discretion applied by HMRC – High hurdle to rely on Human Rights legislation – Taxpayer and agents at fault – Out of time claim to tax repayment not ‘property’ for ECHR purposes -ECHR could not be relied on to extend time limits -Strike out allowed for overpayment year- ECHR claim against double taxation in earlier years -reasonable argument that disproportionate for HMRC to pursue tax already paid -application for strike out rejected for underpayment years.
[2015] UKFTT 80 (TC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 12 October 2021; Ref: scu.543214

Gough v Revenue and Customs: FTTTx 28 Jul 2021

Pensions saving lifetime allowance

INCOME TAX – Pensions saving lifetime allowance – Fixed protection 2012 – Additional contributions made after April 2012 – Application to strike out – Whether there is an appealable decision – Held no – If there were an appealable decision, does tribunal have jurisdiction – Held no – appeal struck out.
[2021] UKFTT 273 (TC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 12 October 2021; Ref: scu.666594

Brown and Another v Revenue and Customs: FTTTx 28 Jun 2012

FTTTX INCOME TAX – discovery assessment – section 29 TMA 1970 – whether officer could reasonably have been expected to be aware of understatement of income – information made available pursuant to section 29(6) – whether agent’s conduct negligent – appeal dismissed
Jonathan Cannan
[2012] UKFTT 425 (TC)
Bailii
Taxes Management Act 1970 29
England and Wales

Updated: 12 October 2021; Ref: scu.462781

Sutton v Revenue and Customs: FTTTx 6 Jan 2014

INCOME TAX- strike out -appeal facts identical to case appealed by husband – first-tier tribunal dismissed the husband’s appeal and both the first-tier tribunal and the upper tribunal dismissed the husband’s application to appeal the case to the upper tribunal- case dismissed.
[2014] UKFTT 44 (TC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 12 October 2021; Ref: scu.521750

Sheiling Properties Ltd v Revenue and Customs: CA 5 Oct 2021

Short but important issue about the scope of the statutory regime relating to accelerated payment notices introduced by the Finance Act 2014. The question, in brief, is whether the APN regime is prevented from applying to liabilities for pay as you earn income tax which are the subject of a determination made by the respondents under regulation 80 of the Income Tax (Pay As You Earn) Regulations 2003
Lord Justice Henderson
[2021] EWCA Civ 1425
Bailii
Income Tax (Pay As You Earn) Regulations 2003, Finance Act 2014
England and Wales

Updated: 12 October 2021; Ref: scu.668371

Audley v Revenue and Customs: FTTTx 1 Apr 2011

FTTTx Income tax – Schedule 13 Finance Act 1996 – loss claimed on disposal of a relevant discounted security – house and cash transferred to family trust and loan note issued to settlor – tax avoidance scheme – purposive interpretation of the legislation – realistic view of the transaction – transfer of assets to trustees was mostly a gift and not part of the amount paid in respect of the acquisition of the security – Appeal dismissed
[2011] UKFTT 219 (TC), [2011] SFTD 597
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 08 October 2021; Ref: scu.442960

Giuliani v Revenue and Customs (Income Tax – Paye – Application of The Income Tax (Paye) Regulations 2003 – Delivery of P45 / P46 To New Employer): FTTTx 28 Jun 2021

Application of the Income Tax (PAYE) Regulations 2003 – delivery of P45 / P46 to new employer – basic rate tax code incorrectly applied by employer on a change of employment – whether taxpayer is entitled to credit for tax treated as deducted – PAYE deductions that the employer should have made but did not- whether s.29 Taxes Management Act 1970 discovery assessments validly raised – carelessness in failing to declare employment or income from employment on tax returns — whether FTT has jurisdiction to consider PAYE deductions an appeal against a discovery assessment – whether s.8(5) of the TMA and Regulation 188 of the PAYE Regulations applies to s.29 TMA – appeal dismissed
[2021] UKFTT 239 (TC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 08 October 2021; Ref: scu.663757

Salazar v Revenue and Customs (Appeal from Penalty): FTTTx 7 Oct 2019

Appeal against penalty imposed under s98 Taxes Management Act 1970 for failure of a specified employment intermediary to file return under PAYE Regulations 84E and 84F – whether Appellant was a specified employment intermediary – No – whether there would have been a reasonable excuse- Yes, whether HMRC complied with formalities – No -appeal allowed.
[2019] UKFTT 614 (TC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 07 October 2021; Ref: scu.646874

Richardson (Inspector of Taxes) v Delaney: ChD 11 Jun 2001

An employer decided to end the employee’s employment and negotiated payment of a lump sum. The payment was within the terms of his employment contract. It was accordingly not a payment made to him in respect of a breach of the contract and was a taxable emolument. A payment in lieu of notice made under a right given under the contract was not paid in breach of it.
Lloyd J
Times 11-Jul-2001, Gazette 09-Aug-2001
Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 148
England and Wales

Updated: 01 October 2021; Ref: scu.88774

Rigby v Jayatilaka (Inspector of Taxes): ChD 21 Mar 2000

A notice issued by an inspector was not an agreement with the taxpayer. The tax inspector’s calculation of the taxpayers liability upon receipt of the self assessment form could not be sufficient top prevent later amendments to the self-assessment returns. The assessment calculated by the inspector was treated under the Act as a calculation carried out on behalf of the taxpayer, and what was claimed was, in effect an agreement with himself.
Times 21-Mar-2000
Taxes Management Act 1970 9
England and Wales

Updated: 01 October 2021; Ref: scu.88786

Belgian State (Indemnite Pour Personnes Handicapees) (Income Tax – National Legislation – Tax Exemption for Disability Allowances – Judgment): ECJ 24 Oct 2019

Reference for a preliminary ruling – Free movement of workers – Equal treatment – Income tax – National legislation – Tax exemption for disability allowances – Allowances received in another Member State – Not included – Difference in treatment
C-35/19, [2019] EUECJ C-35/19
Bailii
European

Updated: 01 October 2021; Ref: scu.665321

Phillips v Revenue and Customs (Income Tax and NICS – Decision That Appellant Self-Employed During Period of Engagement): FTTTx 31 Mar 2021

INCOME TAX and NICs – decision that Appellant self-employed during period of engagement – whether relationship one of employment or self-employment – evidence supports conclusion that Appellant was self-employed – decision affirmed and appeal dismissed
[2021] UKFTT 91 (TC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 29 September 2021; Ref: scu.663669

Fuller v Revenue and Customs (Income Tax : High Income Child Benefit Charge (HICBC)): FTTTx 9 Apr 2020

INCOME TAX – High Income Child Benefit Charge (‘HICBC’) – penalties for failure to notify chargeability – potential lost revenue – was tax unpaid by reason of failure to notify – reasonable excuse, special circumstances.
[2020] UKFTT 189 (TC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 27 September 2021; Ref: scu.651576

Cabourne v Revenue and Customs (Income Tax/Corporation Tax : Penalty): FTTTx 29 Mar 2017

Penalty – Income Tax – Late payment penalty – Accelerated Payment – allocation of repayment credit against earlier payment notice agreed to by taxpayer – whether allocation against earlier notice rather than payment notice to which penalty related was reasonable excuse – no – whether special circumstances warranting penalty reduction – no – appeal dismissed
[2017] UKFTT 258 (TC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 27 September 2021; Ref: scu.581660

Poll v Revenue and Customs (Trading Losses – Sideways Loss Relief): FTTTx 7 May 2021

Carry back of losses – Sections 66, 72 and 74 Income Tax Act 2007 – Was the Appellant carrying on a trade on a commercial basis and with a reasonable expectation of profit – were closure notices issued outside any statutory time limit – Section 34 and Section 34A Taxes Management Act 1970 – Did HMRC delay unreasonably in issuing the closure notices
[2021] UKFTT 223 (TC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 27 September 2021; Ref: scu.663730

Messrs Elliot Balnakeil v Revenue and Customs (Partnership Return – Enquiry and Closure Notice): FTTTx 5 May 2021

Enquiry and closure notice – ss 33 and 34 of ITTOIA 2005 – deductibility of renovation costs to buildings -farmhouse listed building of historical significance – whether expenditure capital in nature – whether ‘wholly and exclusively’ for the purposes of the trade – the trade in question – the implications of the dissolution of partnership on the legal tests – appeal dismissed
[2021] UKFTT 193 (TC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 26 September 2021; Ref: scu.663728

Manthorpe Building Products Ltd v Revenue and Customs: FTTTx 25 Jan 2012

FTTTx Income Tax – Scheme to remunerate controlling directors so as to secure deductions for Corporation Tax purposes, whilst avoiding PAYE and National Insurance liabilities – Dividends paid from specially formed company – Hearing after the First-tier and Upper-tier Tribunal decisions in PA Holdings Ltd v. HMRC but prior to the decision of the Court of Appeal in that case – Decision delayed until after publication of Court of Appeal judgment – Appeals on both the PAYE and National Insurances issues dismissed
Nowlan TJ
[2012] UKFTT 82 (TC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 25 September 2021; Ref: scu.450814

Demon Internet Ltd v HM Inspector of Taxes: SCIT 7 Dec 2004

SCIT Payments for the release of share options chargeable under Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988, s. 135 – Application of PAYE Regulations – Whether obligation to deduct tax under existing law prior to its amendment by Finance Act 1998, s. 67 – Payments made after Budget announcement of change but prior to enactment of amending legislation – Whether obligation to deduct tax imposed retrospectively by s. 67 and SI 1998 No 1891 – Effect of budget resolution pending enactment of Finance Bill – Appeal allowed
[2004] UKSC SPC00449
Bailii
Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 135, Finance Act 1998 67
England and Wales

Updated: 25 September 2021; Ref: scu.221418

Hallen and Another v Revenue and Customs (Income Tax/Corporation Tax : Penalty): FTTTx 9 Jul 2020

INCOME TAX – penalties issued under Schedule 24 – in their personal tax returns for successive years the Appellants had claimed the expense of making significant contributions into an offshore remuneration trust but neither Appellant made such a payment or incurred a liability to contribute – whether there was a inaccuracy in a document which led to a loss of tax – yes – whether inaccuracy deliberate – yes – penalties confirmed
[2020] UKFTT 291 (TC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 20 September 2021; Ref: scu.652740

Zaman v Revenue and Customs: FTTTx 22 Jan 2014

FTTTx Income Tax – did the Appellant work as a taxi driver – estimated assessments for 2006-2007, 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 based on unexplained cash deposits into his bank accounts – Appellant owned car and held license as Private Car driver – car travelled 27,000 miles in 15 month period -Appellant did not show that assessments excessive except that 2006-2007 assessment based on full year rather than part year – Respondents agreed to deduct amounts for fuel and insurance premiums – assessments confirmed in revised amounts and related penalties also confirmed – appeal dismissed subject to these adjustments
Powell TJ
[2014] UKFTT 124 (TC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 20 September 2021; Ref: scu.521768

Jones v Revenue and Customs: UTTC 21 Jul 2020

Income Tax – Employer Made Deductions From Redundancy Payment Without Providing Details of Breakdown – employee arguing deduction was for tax – whether FTT erred in law, in holding employee failed to overcome burden to displace discovery assessment given further evidence relating to deduction and in making an unsupported finding of fact – yes – appeal allowed.
[2020] UKUT 229 (TCC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 14 September 2021; Ref: scu.652822

Beak v Robson: HL 1942

The issue was whether a payment to an employee in return for a restrictive covenant escaped tax. The obligations flowing from the contract of service and the remuneration to be received by the Respondent in respect of that service were entirely separate from the restrictive covenant and the consideration given for it. The sum was not paid for anything done in performing the services in respect of which the respondent was chargeable under Schedule F. ‘The consideration which he has to give under the covenant is to be given not during the period of his employment, but after its termination. He is giving to the company for a sum of pounds 7,000 the benefit of a covenant which will only come into effect when the service is concluded.’ The payment to the employee escaped tax because the payment for the covenant was quite distinct from the payment for services under his contract for service.
Lord Simon
(1942) 25 TC 33, [1943] AC 352
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedCommissioners of Inland Revenue v Lactagol 1954
A company, at the relevant time director controlled, made a payment to its managing director in consideration for his undertaking not to compete with the company within five years of the date when he would leave its service.
Held: The . .
CitedVaughan-Neil v Inland Revenue Commissioners ChD 1979
All that is required for a severance payment to be taxable is that there is a ‘connection’ between the actual, prospective or past holding of the employment and the giving of the undertaking. . .
CitedRCI Europe Ltd v Kate Woods (HM Inspector of Taxes) ChD 16-Dec-2003
The company made payments to a former director in return for a severance agreement which restricted his future business activities.
Held: Despite the fact that all payments were made only after his employment had been terminated, they remained . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 05 September 2021; Ref: scu.190492

Red, White and Green Ltd v Revenue and Customs (Income Tax and National Insurance): FTTTx 21 Feb 2020

INCOME TAX AND NATIONAL INSURANCE – intermediaries legislation – IR35 – sections 48-61 ITEPA 2003 – personal service company – if the services were provided by the worker directly to the client, would there be a contract of employment – appeal dismissed in principle
[2020] UKFTT 109 (TC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 01 September 2021; Ref: scu.649188

Hochstrasser (HM Inspector of Taxes) v Mayes ; Jennings v Kinder (HM Inspector of Taxes): HL 20 Nov 1959

A company operated a housing scheme for married employees who made transferred from one part of a country to another. Under the scheme an employee might be offered a loan to assist in the purchase of a house and, provided the house was maintained in good repair, payment of the amount of the loss due to depreciation in its value in certain events, including, subject to an option to the company to buy the house at a valuation, its sale for less than the original purchase price in connected in consequence of the employees being transferred. M and J each entered into agreements under the scheme, of wish they had not known when they joined the company. Having sold their houses at a loss on transfer, they received payments from the company, and were assessed thereon to Income Tax under schedule E.
On appeal, it was contended for the Crown that the payments were profits from an employment, or alternatively, in J’s case, chargeable by virtue of section 160 Income Tax Act 1952. The General Commissioners held in M’s case that the payment was not assessable; other General Commissioners held in J’s case that the payment was a profit from his employment.
Held: (1) In the House of Lords in M’s case and in the court of Appeal in J’s case, that the payments were not profits accruing by virtue of an office or employment; (2) in the Chancery Division that the payment in J’s case was not made in respect to expenses within the meaning of section 160.
With reference to a charge to tax under Schedule E the Act on profits or gains from employment, or emoluments, Lord Radcliffe said: ‘For my part, I think that [the meaning of the statutory words] is adequately conveyed by saying that, while it is not sufficient to render a payment assessable that an employee would not have received it unless he had been an employee, it is assessable if it is paid to him in return for acting as or being an employee.’ The placing of a gloss on statutory words may be useful as illustrating the idea which the words express.
Lord Radcliffe
[1959] UKHL TC – 38 – 673, [1959] TR 355, [1960] 2 WLR 63, [1959] 3 All ER 817, (1959) 38 ATC 360, [1960] AC 376
Bailii
Income Tax Act 1952 156(2)
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedShop Direct Group v Revenue and Customs SC 17-Feb-2016
The Court considered the interpretation of the sections which applied corporation tax to post-cessation receipts. Companies had received from the Inland Revenue substantial repayments of VAT together with interest. There had been reorganisations of . .
CitedRFC 2012 Plc (Formerly The Rangers Football Club Plc) v Advocate General for Scotland SC 5-Jul-2017
The Court was asked whether an employee’s remuneration is taxable as his or her emoluments or earnings when it is paid to a third party in circumstances in which the employee had no prior entitlement to receive it himself or herself.
Held: The . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 30 August 2021; Ref: scu.559977

Income Tax Special Commissioners v Pemsel: HL 20 Jul 1891

Charitable Purposes used with technical meaning

The House was asked whether, in a taxing statute applying to the whole of the United Kingdom and allowing for deductions from and allowances against the income of land vested in trustees for charitable purposes, the words ‘charitable purposes’ should be understood according to their meaning in English law, or whether they should be given a meaning which was common to the law of England, Scotland and Ireland.
Held: (majority: Lords Watson, Herschell, Macnaghten, and Morris; Halsbury LC and Lord Bramwell dissenting) The deduction should be allowed.
The House defined what is meant at law by a charity. Lord Macnaghten said: ”Charity’ in its legal sense comprises four principal divisions: trusts for the relief of poverty; trusts for the advancement of education; trusts for the advancement of religion; and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community, not falling under any of the preceding heads. The trusts last referred to are not the less charitable in the eye of the law, because incidentally they benefit the rich as well as the poor, as indeed, every charity that deserves the name must do either directly or indirectly.’
Lord MacNaghten contrasted the systems of administrative law in England and Scotland: ‘By expounding the Act by analogy, and if you will apply your usual penetration to this point, you will find that there is often no other possible way of making a consistent sensible construction upon statutes conceived in general words, which are to have their operation upon the respective laws of two countries, the rules and forms whereof are different. These general views will probably always be taken from the language or style of one of these countries more than from the other, and not correspond equally with the genius or terms of both laws. You must then, as in other sciences, reason by analogy, or leave at least one-half of the statute without effect.’ It was argued that, although the words ‘charity’ and ‘charitable’ had a definite legal meaning in England, they could not be applied in the same way in Scotland unless they had a definite legal meaning there too: ‘That was not Lord Hardwicke’s view. He seems to have thought reflected light better than none.’ The words ‘ charity ‘ and ‘ charitable ‘ in the Income Tax Act, 1842 must be construed in their technical meaning according to English law.
The House discussed also the interpretation of statutes having effect both in England and Wales and in Scotland: ‘But in some cases certainly . . the statute proclaims its origin and speaks the language of the English lawyer, with some Scottish legal phrases thrown in rather casually. How are you to approach the construction of such statutes? We are not, I think, without a guide. It seems to me that there is much good sense in what Lord Hardwicke said in his well known letter to an eminent Scottish judge ‘you must’ he says ‘as in other sciences reason by analogy’ – that is, as I understand it, you must take the meaning of legal expressions from the law of the country to which they properly belong, and in any case arising in the sister country you must apply the statute in an analogous or corresponding sense so as to make the operation and effect of the statute the same in both countries. Thus you get what Lord Hardwicke calls ‘consistent, sensible construction”.
Lord Macnaghten discussed the development of the law of charity, saying of the 1601 Statute: ‘The object of that statute was merely to provide new machinery for the reformation of abuses in regard to charities. But by a singular construction it was held to authorize certain gifts to charity which otherwise would have been void. And it contained in the preamble a list of charities so varied and comprehensive that it became the practice of the Court to refer to it as a sort of index or chart. At the same time it has never been forgotten that the ‘objects there enumerated,’ as Lord Chancellor Cranworth observes, ‘are not to be taken as the only objects of charity but are given as instances’.’ and ‘I have dwelt for a moment on this point, because it seems to me that there is a disposition to treat the technical meaning of the term ‘charity’ rather as the idiom of a particular Court than as the language of the law of England. And yet of all words in the English language bearing a popular as well as a legal signification I am not sure that there is one which more unmistakably has a technical meaning in the strictest sense of the term, that is a meaning clear and distinct, peculiar to the law as understood and administered in this country, and not depending upon or coterminous with the popular or vulgar use of the word.’
Lord Macnaghten, Lord Watson, Lord Morris, Lord Herschell
[1891] AC 531, [1891] UKHL 1, [1891] UKHL TC – 3 – 53, (1891) 3 TC 53
Bailii, Bailii
Statute of Charitable Uses 1601
Scotland
Cited by:
CitedReclaiming Motion In Petition of Scott Davidson for Judicial Review of A Decision To Continue To Detain the Prisoner In Inhuman and Degrading Prison C SCS 18-Dec-2001
A prisoner sought an order for his removal from a prison found to have a regime which breached his human rights. The Crown replied that an order could not be made under s21 of the 1947 Act.
Held: The prisoner had followed through his rights to . .
CitedDavidson v Scottish Ministers HL 15-Dec-2005
The complainant a prisoner sought an order that he should not be kept in conditions found to be inhumane. He had been detained in Barlinnie priosn. The Crown replied that a mandatory order was not available against the Scottish Ministers.
CitedInland Revenue Commissioners v Glasgow Police Athletic Association HL 9-Mar-1953
The House was asked whether the taxpayer association was established for ‘Charitable purposes only’ so as to benefit from tax exemptions. The association promoted sporting activities among members of the Glasgow police.
Held: Though the . .
CitedGuild v Inland Revenue Commissioners HL 6-May-1992
The will left land for a sports centre to a local authority which no longer existed. If the gift was charitable, the gift would be applied cy pres, but if not it would fail and pass to the family and be subect to Inheritance Tax.
Held: A gift . .
CitedO’Brien v Department for Constitutional Affairs CA 19-Dec-2008
The claimant was a part time recorder. He claimed to be entitled to a judicial pension.
Held: The Employment Appeal Tribunal was wrong to find an error of law in the decision of the Employment Tribunal to extend time; but the court declined to . .
CitedHelena Partnerships Ltd v HM Revenue and Customs CA 9-May-2012
helena_hmrcCA2012
The company had undertaken substantial building works and sought associated tax relief. The court was asked whether, following a change in the company’s memorandum and articles of association, the company, a registered social landlord, remained a . .
CitedIncorporated Council of Law Reporting For England And Wales v Attorney-General And Others CA 14-Oct-1971
The Council sought charitable status for its activities of reporting the law. The Revenue appealed against the decision by Foster J that the Council ought to be registered as a charity.
Held: The appeal failed. The company should have . .
ExplainedIn re Macduff; Macduff v Macduff CA 1896
Lindley LJ qualified the judgment of Lord Macnaghten in Pemsel: ‘Now Sir Samuel Romilly did not mean, and I am certain Lord Macnaghten did not mean, to say that every object of public general utility must necessarily be a charity. Some may be, and . .
CitedNational Anti-Vivisection League v Inland Revenue Commissioners HL 2-Jul-1947
The main object of the Society was political viz, the repeal of the Cruelty to Animals Act 1876, and for that reason the Society was not established for charitable purposes only and was not entitled to exemption from tax. An organisation whose aims . .
CitedLehtimaki and Others v Cooper SC 29-Jul-2020
Charitable Company- Directors’ Status and Duties
A married couple set up a charitable foundation to assist children in developing countries. When the marriage failed an attempt was made to establish a second foundation with funds from the first, as part of W leaving the Trust. Court approval was . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 24 August 2021; Ref: scu.220235

Camille and Henry Dreyfus Foundation Inc v Inland Revenue Commissioners: CA 1954

The Court considered whether it had jurisdiction to make an order with respect to a company registered in New York for objects which were charitable according to the laws of England.
Held: The Revenue’s appeal against a finding that the objects would be charitable under English law failed. However, the Special Commissioners had also decided that, in order to obtain the privilege of exemption under the sedtion of the 1918 Act, the body claiming the privilege must be one established under and in accordance with the laws of the United Kingdom. The foundation, being a foreign corporation and not subject to the jurisdiction, was debarred from claiming the benefit of the exemption. The foundation’s own appeal against this point failed.
Jenkins LJ said: ‘I have already expressed the view that ‘trust’ in an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament means a trust taking effect and enforceable under the law of the United Kingdom. It follows that, in my opinion, a ‘trust established for charitable purposes only’, must here mean a trust taking effect and enforceable under the law of the United Kingdom and creating an obligation enforceable in the courts of the United Kingdom to apply its funds for the purposes which are, according to the law of the United Kingdom, exclusively charitable. I can attribute no different meaning to the phrase ‘established for charitable purposes only’ when applied to a body of persons. So applied, I think it is only satisfied by a body of persons which is under the law of the United Kingdom subject to an obligation enforceable in our courts to apply its funds for purposes which are according to that law exclusively charitable. Accordingly, I would hold that the foundation is not ‘established for charitable purposes only’ within the meaning of section 37(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act 1918.’ Lord Evershed: ‘To my mind, the words ‘charities’ or ‘charitable institutions’ in an ordinary context in an English Act of Parliament or any English document must (prima facie at least) mean institutions regulated by, and subject to the jurisdiction of, the laws or the courts of the United Kingdom and constituted for the carrying out of objects or purposes which, in the courts of the United Kingdom and nowhere else, would be held to be ‘charitable’. In my judgment the two aspects or characteristics are almost inseparable. The law relating to charities or charitable trusts is a peculiar and highly complex part of our legal system. An Act of Parliament which uses the words ‘charity’ or ‘charitable’ must be intending to refer to that special and characteristic, if not in some respects artificial, part of our law.’ and ‘I am considering what, as a matter of ordinary language and common sense, is intended (in the absence of a special context) by the phrase, in an English Act of Parliament or other document, ‘body of persons established for charitable purposes only.’ In my judgment, applying the test I have formulated, once it is conceded that ‘for charitable purposes only’ means ‘for purposes which are what the laws of the United Kingdom define as charitable and hold to fall within the special and somewhat artificial significance of that word,’ then it seems to me, prima facie, that a body cannot be ‘established’ for such purposes, unless it is so constituted or regulated as to be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts which can alone define and regulate those purposes.’
Sir Raymond Evershed MR explained that it would be awkward and artificial to consider a body of persons established under the law of a foreign country as falling within the scope of the legislation and that, administrative difficulties aside, there was ‘an inherent incompatibility’ in the conception of a corporation regulated according to the laws of a foreign country and carrying on the whole of its activities in that country being able to show that it was ‘established for charitable purposes only’: ‘I am considering what, as a matter of ordinary language and common sense, is intended (in the absence of a special context) by the phrase, in an English Act of Parliament or other document, ‘body of persons established for charitable purposes only.’ In my judgment, applying the test I have formulated, once it is conceded that ‘for charitable purposes only’ means ‘for purposes which are what the laws of the United Kingdom define as charitable and hold to fall within the special and somewhat artificial significance of that word,’ then it seems to me, prima facie, that a body cannot be ‘established’ for such purposes unless it is so constituted or regulated as to be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts which can alone define and regulate those purposes.’
Sir Raymond Evershed MR discussed the use within the section of the word ‘any’ before ‘body of persons’, saying: ‘Still more significant to my mind is the circumstance that the formula ‘any body of persons or trust established for charitable purposes only’ is followed by the alternative ‘or which, according to the rules or regulations established by Act of Parliament, charter, decree, deed of trust or will are applicable to charitable purposes only.’ It is, in my judgment, reasonably clear that the alternative was added in order to cover those cases in which only a part of the income is, by virtue of the Act of Parliament or other instrument named, applicable to charitable purposes, in contradistinction to those bodies of persons or trusts which are exclusively established for such purposes.
In my view, however, the alternatives are true alternatives; the distinction, that is to say, is between institutions, in other respects alike, whose income is either, on the one hand, wholly applicable to the purposes named, or, on the other hand, is, as to the relevant part only, so applicable. And since, in my judgment, it cannot be in doubt that by ‘Act of Parliament’ is meant an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament, so it follows, in my view, that by ‘charter, decree, deed of trust or will’ is meant an instrument of the kind specified subject to, and taking effect according to, the laws of the United Kingdom. The alternative formula must therefore be regarded as wholly limited by reference to our local law; and, if this is so, then, as it seems to me, the earlier phrase ‘any body of persons or trust established, etc.’ must be regarded as equally so limited.
In my judgment, therefore, the bodies of persons mentioned in the paragraph cannot comprehend foreign institutions such as the foundation. I have earlier stated my view that the essential word is ‘established.’ In my judgment, whatever might be the true significance of the four words ‘any body of persons’ taken in isolation, those words in the context of paragraph (b) of section 37(1) of the Act of 1918, and particularly when immediately followed by the words ‘or trust established for charitable purposes only,’ must be limited to bodies of persons so constituted and regulated as to be (in reference to the income in question) subject to the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom courts.’
Hodson LJ considered that, in context, the phrase ‘any body of persons or trust established for charitable purposes only’ must be a body of persons constituted under the law of the United Kingdom. He also found support for his conclusions in the practical difficulties involved in the contrary view. He thought the Commissioners would be set a difficult task if they had to apply the law of any part of the world in order to ascertain the purposes for which a particular body of persons was established before determining whether those purposes were charitable within the meaning of United Kingdom law.
Jenkins LJ, Hodson LJ, Lord Evershed MR
[1954] 1 Ch 672
Income Tax Act 1918 37(1)(b)
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal fromCamille and Henry Dreyfus Foundation Inc v Inland Revenue Commissioners HL 1956
The company was a foreign corporation constituted according to the laws of the state of New York for objects which were exclusively charitable according to the law of the United Kingdom.
Held: The term ‘charity’ does not include an institution . .
CitedGaudiya Mission and others v Brahmachary CA 30-Jul-1997
The High Court had found the plaintiff to be a charity, and ordered the Attorney-General to be joined in. The A-G appealed that order saying that the plaintiff was not a charity within the 1993 Act. The charity sought to spread the Vaishnava . .
CitedRoutier and Another v Revenue and Customs ChD 18-Sep-2014
Executors appealed against rejection of their claim that a gift in the will qualified for relief against Inheritance Tax as being a charitable gift. The Trusts concerned assets in Jersey.
Held: The appeal failed: ‘The expression ‘held on trust . .
CitedRoutier and Another v Revenue and Customs CA 16-Sep-2016
Executors appealed against a decision that a residual gift in a will was not charitable and that it was therefore subject to Inheritance Tax arguing that the section if construed in this way was an unlawful restriction on the free movement of . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 24 August 2021; Ref: scu.200677

Sheiling Properties Ltd v Revenue and Customs:: UTTC 8 Jun 2020

INCOME TAX – penalty for non-payment of accelerated payment notice – is tax demanded under a Regulation 80 PAYE determination ‘disputed tax’ within APN provisions – yes – did taxpayer have a reasonable excuse for non-payment of penalty – no – circumstances in which belief that APN was procedurally invalid could constitute reasonable excuse – appeal dismissed.
[2020] UKUT 175 (TCC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 22 August 2021; Ref: scu.652565

The Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Limited (Appeal No 64 of 2000): PC 4 Dec 2001

(New Zealand) The insurance company was taxed on the interest it charged to policyholders on late payments of life insurance and investment premiums. The Act had now been superceded. The Commissioner now appealed a dismissal of the charge. The debt was calculated as the arrears plus compounded interest. The Commissioner argued that the arrangement was by way of a loan advanced to the policyholder to pay the premium upon which interest was charged. The legislation divided insurance company income into investment income which was taxable, and premium income which wasn’t.
Held: There was no proper reason for distinguishing interest on late premiums from the premiums themselves, and the interest was not taxable.
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead Lord Browne-Wilkinson Lord Steyn Lord Hoffmann Sir Kenneth Keith
Appeal No 64 of 2000, [2001] UKPC 54, [2002] BTC 9, [2002] STC 13, [2001] STI 1770
PC, PC, Bailii
Income Tax Act 1976 204 (New Zealand)
England and Wales

Updated: 21 August 2021; Ref: scu.167069

O’Neil, O’Neil, McDougall, and McDougall v Commissioner of Inland Revenue: PC 10 Apr 2001

PC (New Zealand) An accountant arranged a scheme which purported to return the applicants’ entire income without deduction of tax as a return of capital. The revenue sought to treat it as tax avoidance.
Held: This was a paradigm of the kind of scheme sought to be prevented by the Act. Appeal dismissed.
[2001] UKPC 17
PC, Bailii
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedMacNiven (Inspector of Taxes) v Westmoreland Investments Ltd HL 15-Feb-2001
The fact that a payment of interest was made only to create a tax advantage did not prevent its being properly claimed. Interest was paid for the purposes of setting it against tax, when the debt was discharged. A company with substantial losses had . .
CitedChallenge Corporation Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue PC 1987
(New Zealand) . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 19 August 2021; Ref: scu.163285

Revenue and Customs v Professional Game Match Officials Ltd (Paye and National Insurance Contributions – Whether Level 1 National Group Football Referees Are Employees of Pgmol): UTTC 6 May 2020

PAYE AND NATIONAL INSURANCE CONTRIBUTIONS – whether Level 1 National Group football referees are employees of PGMOL – whether the FTT erred in concluding that insufficient mutuality of obligation existed under the overarching contacts and individual match contracts – no – whether the FTT erred in concluding that insufficient control existed under individual match contracts – appeal dismissed
[2020] UKUT 147 (TCC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 18 August 2021; Ref: scu.652555

Carthy v Revenue and Customs (Income Tax : High Income Child Benefit Charge (HICBC) : Hearings In Private): FTTTx 9 Apr 2020

INCOME TAX – High Income Child Benefit Charge (‘HICBC’) – penalties for failure to notify chargeability – potential lost revenue – was tax unpaid by reason of failure to notify – reasonable excuse, special circumstances.
[2020] UKFTT 188 (TC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 16 August 2021; Ref: scu.651567

The Commissioner of Inland Revenue v New Zealand Forest Research Institute Limited: PC 12 Jun 2000

PC New Zealand – The taxpayer company agreed to acquire the assets and undertaking of a business. As a part of the consideration for the acquisition of the business, it agreed to take over certain liabilities, including certain of the vendor’s contractual obligations to its employees. These included their vested or contingent entitlements to paid leave, attributable to their service with the vendor. The question is whether the subsequent payment of these sums was deductible for the purposes of calculating the company’s profits assessable to income tax.
[2000] UKPC 22, [2000] 1 WLR 1755
Bailii, PC, PC
England and Wales

Updated: 12 August 2021; Ref: scu.163235

Contract Services (Millenium) Ltd v Revenue and Customs (NICs : Whether or Not Fuel Was Either Not Used for Private Use): FTTTx 1 Apr 2020

NICs – whether or not fuel was either not used for private use or if it was the whole of the expense was made good – yes as regards one employee – no as regards the remainder of the relevant employees – penalties – whether or not the appellant was careless – yes – appeals allowed in part
[2020] UKFTT 175 (TC)
Bailii
Income Tax (Earning and Pensions) Act 2003
England and Wales

Updated: 07 August 2021; Ref: scu.651570

Madden v Revenue and Customs (Income Tax/Corporation Tax : Assessment/Self-Assessment): FTTTx 26 Jul 2018

INCOME TAX – Self Assessment – tax fraud – COP9 investigation procedure – closure notices and discovery assessments – extension of time-limits to 20 years – ss. 9A, 28A, 29, 36, 50 of TMA – penalty determinations and assessments – s 95 TMA; Sch 24 FA 2007; Sch 55 FA 2009 – onus of proof as regards competence and time limit issues – onus of proof concerning quantum – whether assessments stand good; yes – penalty determinations and assessments – whether ‘negligent’ and ‘deliberate’; yes – whether penalty reduction for disclosure sufficient; yes – appeal dismissed
[2018] UKFTT 414 (TC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 01 August 2021; Ref: scu.621416

Vestey v Inland Revenue Commissioners: HL 1979

Taxes are imposed upon subjects by Parliament. A citizen cannot be taxed unless he is designated in clear terms by a taxing Act as a taxpayer and the amount of his liability is clearly defined. A proposition that whether a subject is to be taxed or not, or, if he is, the amount of his liability, is to be decided (even though within a limit) by an administrative body represents a radical departure from constitutional principle. It may be that the revenue could persuade Parliament to enact such a proposition in such terms that the courts would have to give effect to it: but, unless it has done so, the courts, acting on constitutional principles, not only should not, but cannot, validate it. When Parliament imposes a tax, it is the duty of the commissioners to assess and levy it upon and from those who are liable by law. Of course they may, indeed should, act with administrative commonsense. To expend a large amount of taxpayer’s money in collecting, or attempting to collect, small sums would be an exercise in futility: and no one is going to complain if they bring humanity to bear in hard cases. I accept also that they cannot, in the absence of clear power, tax any given income more than once. But all of this falls far short of saying that so long as they do not exceed a maximum they can decide that beneficiary A is to bear so much tax and no more, or that beneficiary B is to bear no tax. This would be taxation by self-asserted administrative discretion and not by law. The fact in the present case is that Parliament has laid down no basis on which tax can be apportioned where there are numerous discretionary beneficiaries. The Commissioners had no power to mitigate the gross injustice that would result from the strict application of the section, as interpreted by them. The devices resorted to by the Commissioners were unconstitutional.
HL Income tax – Avoidance of tax – Transfer of assets – Income payable to trustees of settlement resident abroad – Income accumulated and invested – Income from such investments also accumulated and invested in two funds – Investments including shares in wholly-owned overseas companies – Capital sums paid out of each fund to discretionary beneficiaries (other than the transferors) ordinarily resident in the U.K. – Capital sum paid to mother of infant beneficiary – Whether infant ‘received’ or ‘entitled to receive’ such capital sum – Whether each of such beneficiaries had ‘power to enjoy’ income of (a) the trustees, (b) the overseas companies – Whether such income deemed to be income of each of such beneficiaries in years prior to, including, and subsequent to, year of receipt – Power of Board of Inland Revenue to apportion such income between selected beneficiaries – Income Tax Act 1952, s 412 (1), (2), (4), (5) and (6) – Finance Act 1969, s 33 – Inland Revenue Regulation Act 1890, s 1 – Taxes Management Act 1970, s 1.
Lord Wilberforce, Lord Dilhorne, Lord Salmon, Lord Edmund-Davies, Lord Edmund-Davies
[1980] AC 1148, (1979) 54 Tax Cas 503, [1979] 3 WLR 915, [1979] UKHL TC – 54 – 503
Bailii
Taxes Management Act 1970 1, Inland Revenue Regulation Act 1890 1, Finance Act 1969 33, Income Tax Act 1952 412(1)
England and Wales
Citing:
CitedAbsolom v Talbot 1943
Scott LJ said: ‘No judicial countenance can or ought to be given in matters of taxation to any system of extra-legal concessions.’ . .
Appeal fromVestey v Inland Revenue Commissioners (No 2) ChD 1979
The Commissioners of Inland Revenue do not have, any more than does any other emanation of the Crown, any power to suspend or dispense with laws. ‘It is at this point that there arises what Mr Potter, for the taxpayers, has denominated as a serious . .
Appeal fromVestey v Inland Revenue Commissioners ChD 1979
The case concerned section 478, which had monstrous and unintended results, if applied in accordance with its natural meaning. The Commissioners did not seek to apply the section in a manner which produced such results. The court held: ‘One should . .
CitedPractice Statement (Judicial Precedent) HL 1966
The House gave guidance how it would treat an invitation to depart from a previous decision of the House. Such a course was possible, but the direction was not an ‘open sesame’ for a differently constituted committee to prefer their views to those . .

Cited by:
CitedScottish Widows Plc v Revenue and Customs SC 6-Jul-2011
The taxpayer insurance company had transferred sums from accounts designated as Capital Reserves. The Revenue said that these were properly part of the profit and loss accounts for the respective tax years, and chargeable receipts.
Held: The . .
CitedProject Blue Ltd v Revenue and Customs SC 13-Jun-2018
The purchaser of land created a sub-sale and leaseback with bank so as to fund the purchase in a manner which would comply with Islamic finance principles. The Court was now asked whether purchaser or the bank were liable for stamp duty land tax on . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 28 July 2021; Ref: scu.184331

J P Whitter (Waterwell Engineers) Ltd v Revenue and Customs: FTTTx 18 Oct 2012

FTTTxp INCOME TAX – construction industry scheme – cancellation of gross payment status – s66 Finance Act 2004 – HMRC discretion – whether properly exercised – Failure to take into account effect of cancellation on appellant – Barnes v Hilton Main Construction considered and distinguished – appeal allowed
Cannan TJ
[2012] UKFTT 639 (TC)
Bailii
Income Tax (Construction Industry Scheme) Regulations 2005, Finance Act 2004
England and Wales
Cited by:
AppliedJohn Kerr Roofing Contractors v The Commissioners for Revenue and Customs FTTTx 20-Feb-2013
FTTTX INCOME TAX – Construction Industry Scheme – Appeal against cancellation of registration for gross payment – ‘Compliance test’ – Whether there was a reasonable excuse on the facts – No – Failure to take . .
At FTTTxRevenue and Customs v J P Whitter (Water Well Engineers) Ltd UTTC 13-Jul-2015
UTTC INCOME TAX – construction industry scheme – cancellation of gross payment status – s 66 Finance Act 2004 – HMRC discretion – scope of – whether properly exercised – failure to take into account effect of . .
At FTTTxJ P Whitter (Waterwell Engineers) Ltd v HM Revenue and Customs CA 24-Nov-2016
Important point of principle concerning the power of HMRC, to cancel the registration of a taxpayer for gross payment under the legislation which governs the Construction Industry Scheme. . .
At FTTTxJP Whitter (Water Well Engineers) Ltd v Revenue and Customs SC 13-Jun-2018
The taxpayers registration under the Construction Industry Scheme had been withdrawn. The Court was now asked whether HMRC are obliged, or at least entitled, to take into account the impact on the taxpayer’s business of the cancellation of its . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 27 July 2021; Ref: scu.466215

Barnes (HMIT) v Hilton Main Construction: ChD 15 Apr 2005

The revenue had refused to renew the respondent’s certificate, and now itself appealed against the contractor’ success on appeal to the General Commissioners.
Lewison J
[2005] EWHC 1355 (Ch), [2005] STC 1532
Bailii
Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 565
England and Wales
Cited by:
CitedJP Whitter (Water Well Engineers) Ltd v Revenue and Customs SC 13-Jun-2018
The taxpayers registration under the Construction Industry Scheme had been withdrawn. The Court was now asked whether HMRC are obliged, or at least entitled, to take into account the impact on the taxpayer’s business of the cancellation of its . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 27 July 2021; Ref: scu.403329

J P Whitter (Waterwell Engineers) Ltd v HM Revenue and Customs: CA 24 Nov 2016

Important point of principle concerning the power of HMRC, to cancel the registration of a taxpayer for gross payment under the legislation which governs the Construction Industry Scheme.
Jackson, Christopher Clarke, Henderson LJJ
[2016] EWCA Civ 1160, [2016] WLR(D) 630, [2016] STI 3058, [2016] BTC 45, [2017] STC 149
Bailii, WLRD
Finance Act 2004, Income Tax (Construction Industry Scheme) Regulations 2005
England and Wales
Citing:
At FTTTxJ P Whitter (Waterwell Engineers) Ltd v Revenue and Customs FTTTx 18-Oct-2012
FTTTxp INCOME TAX – construction industry scheme – cancellation of gross payment status – s66 Finance Act 2004 – HMRC discretion – whether properly exercised – Failure to take into account effect of cancellation . .
At UTTCRevenue and Customs v J P Whitter (Water Well Engineers) Ltd UTTC 13-Jul-2015
UTTC INCOME TAX – construction industry scheme – cancellation of gross payment status – s 66 Finance Act 2004 – HMRC discretion – scope of – whether properly exercised – failure to take into account effect of . .

Cited by:
At CAJP Whitter (Water Well Engineers) Ltd v Revenue and Customs SC 13-Jun-2018
The taxpayers registration under the Construction Industry Scheme had been withdrawn. The Court was now asked whether HMRC are obliged, or at least entitled, to take into account the impact on the taxpayer’s business of the cancellation of its . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 27 July 2021; Ref: scu.571935

Revenue and Customs v J P Whitter (Water Well Engineers) Ltd: UTTC 13 Jul 2015

UTTC INCOME TAX – construction industry scheme – cancellation of gross payment status – s 66 Finance Act 2004 – HMRC discretion – scope of – whether properly exercised – failure to take into account effect of cancellation on appellant – appeal allowed
[2015] UKUT 392 (TCC), [2015] BTC 524, [2016] STC 204, [2015] STI 2555
Bailii
Finance Act 2004, Income Tax (Construction Industry Scheme) Regulations 2005
England and Wales
Citing:
At FTTTxJ P Whitter (Waterwell Engineers) Ltd v Revenue and Customs FTTTx 18-Oct-2012
FTTTxp INCOME TAX – construction industry scheme – cancellation of gross payment status – s66 Finance Act 2004 – HMRC discretion – whether properly exercised – Failure to take into account effect of cancellation . .

Cited by:
At UTTCJ P Whitter (Waterwell Engineers) Ltd v HM Revenue and Customs CA 24-Nov-2016
Important point of principle concerning the power of HMRC, to cancel the registration of a taxpayer for gross payment under the legislation which governs the Construction Industry Scheme. . .
At UTTCJP Whitter (Water Well Engineers) Ltd v Revenue and Customs SC 13-Jun-2018
The taxpayers registration under the Construction Industry Scheme had been withdrawn. The Court was now asked whether HMRC are obliged, or at least entitled, to take into account the impact on the taxpayer’s business of the cancellation of its . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 27 July 2021; Ref: scu.553192

Calcutta Jute Mills Co Ltd v Nicholson: 1876

(Court of Exchequer) The residence of a company for tax purposes is decided by where the ‘central management and control’ is.
[1876] 1 TC 83
England and Wales
Cited by:
AdoptedDe Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Howe, Surveyor of Taxes HL 1905
The appellant Company was registered in the Cape Colony and it’s business was mining for diamonds in mines which it possessed in South Africa, and selling the diamonds there under annual contracts to a syndicate for delivery there. The Head Office . .
CitedWood v Holden (Inspector of Taxes) ChD 8-Apr-2005
The parties had entered into complex share transactions for the sale of their trading business, and sought to avoid liability for capital gains tax.
Held: Gains on disposals between members of a non-resident group of companies were exempt. The . .

Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Updated: 25 July 2021; Ref: scu.224772

Geedi v Revenue and Customs (Income Tax/Corporation Tax : Penalty): FTTTx 28 Feb 2019

Income tax – fixed and daily penalties for late filing of self-assessment return – appellant not previously self-employed and erroneously understood the company for which she worked would deal with return – whether reasonable excuse – no – appeal dismissed
[2019] UKFTT 150 (TC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 24 July 2021; Ref: scu.635699

Sobitan v Revenue and Customs (Income Tax/Corporation Tax : Penalty): FTTTx 29 Aug 2018

INCOME TAX – surcharges and penalties for the late payment of income tax – whether the Respondents have satisfied the burden of establishing that they notified the Appellant of the relevant surcharges and penalties in the appropriate form and that, in the case of some of the surcharges and penalties, there was no extant time to pay arrangement in place in respect of the relevant underlying tax liability – no – appeal upheld
[2018] UKFTT 524 (TC)
Bailii
England and Wales

Updated: 24 July 2021; Ref: scu.632278