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Surrey Heath Borough Council (Local Government): ICO 29 Jul 2020

The complainant requested from Surrey Heath Borough Council (‘SHBC’) information relating to a planning application. SHBC initially cited regulation 12(5)(f) (interests of the person who provided the information) to withhold the requested information. It subsequently revised its position, saying that it did not hold the requested information. The Commissioner’s decision is that, on the balance of probabilities, SHBC does not hold the requested information. The Commissioner requires no steps as a result of this decision.
EIR 12(4)(a): Complaint not upheld
References: [2020] UKICO FER0910707
Links: Bailii
Jurisdiction: England and Wales

Last Update: 21 September 2020; Ref: scu.653795

Haci Demirkaya v Secretary of State for Home Department: CA 23 Jun 1999

Whether an asylum applicant had a well founded fear of persecution if he returned home, is always a question of fact and degree, and could not be made a question of law. Even so where there was a clear risk of repeated rather than single beatings if the applicant returned, it was likely that the fear would be well founded. The tribunal had accepted the applicant’s account of his torture, but referred to it as being arrested and released, making no reference to being beaten, starved, slashed with a bayonet, made to lie in iced water, being hung out of a window through broken glass until he lost consciousness. This amounted to persecution.
References: Times 29-Jun-1999, [1999] EWCA Civ 1654
Links: Bailii
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case cites:

  • Cited – Regina v The Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Another ex parte Rajendrakumar CA 11-Oct-1995 ([1996] Imm AR 97, , [1995] EWCA Civ 16)
    The three Tamil applicants had left the area of Sri Lanka controlled by the Tamil Tigers and gone to live in Colombo. It was asserted that in Colombo they had a well-founded fear of persecution because they were young male Tamils and were therefore . .
  • Cited – Kagema v Secretary of State for Home Department CA 15-Aug-1996 (, [1996] EWCA Civ 582, 1997 Imm AR 137)
    The word ‘persecution’ must be given its ordinary and natural meaning when considering an application for asylum based on a fear of persecution.
    Aldous LJ said: ‘Mr Ashford-Thom, who appeared for the Secretary of State, submitted that the word . .
  • Cited – Brutus v Cozens HL 19-Jul-1972 ([1973] AC 854, , [1972] UKHL 6, HL/PO/JU/4/3/1219)
    The House was asked whether the conduct of the defendant at a tennis match at Wimbledon amounted to using ‘insulting words or behaviour’ whereby a breach of the peace was likely to be occasioned contrary to section 5. He went onto court 2, blew a . .
  • Cited – Lavarevic v Secretary of State for the Home Department CA 1997 ([1997] Imm AR 251)
    . .
  • Cited – Adan v Secretary of State for the Home Department HL 6-Apr-1998 (Times 06-Apr-98, Gazette 07-May-98, , , [1999] 1 AC 293, [1998] 2 WLR 702, [1998] UKHL 15, [1998] 2 ALL ER 453)
    A fear of persecution which was justified only historically, was insufficient to justify an asylum claim. The applicant must show justification for contemporary fears. The applicant had been granted exceptional leave to remain in the UK, but wanted . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 07 September 2020; Ref: scu.146569

Jefferies and Others v Mayes and Others; National Grid Company Plc v Same; National Power Plc v Feldon and Others: CA 25 Feb 1999

Trustees of a pension scheme in actuarial surplus were not entitled to treat a clause requiring them to make arrangements for the surplus as allowing them to forgive their own liability to make contributions without the Trustees’ agreement or a variation.
References: Times 25-Feb-1999, Gazette 03-Mar-1999, [1999] EWCA Civ 761
Links: Bailii
Jurisdiction: England and Wales

Last Update: 07 September 2020; Ref: scu.82506

Wallington v Townsend: 1939

Where a vendor of land failed to complete for reasons other than a defect in title and the purchaser was unable to prove a loss of profits he was entitled by way of damages, in addition to the return of the deposit, to interest in respect of the loss of use of the deposit and to the costs of approving and executing the contract, investigating title, preparing the conveyance and of searches.
Morton J said: ‘The case is a good illustration of the fact that actions in which the subject-matter is comparatively trifling often give rise to the most difficult questions of fact and of law’.
References: [1939] Ch 588, [1939] 2 All ER 255
Judges: Morton J
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Omak Maritime Ltd v Mamola Challenger Shipping Co Ltd ComC ([2010] WLR (D) 230, [2010] EWHC 2026 (Comm), Bailii, WLRD)
    The court was asked as to the basis in law of the principle allowing a contracting party to claim, as damages for breach, expenditure which has been wasted as a result of a breach. The charterer had been in breach of the contract but the owner had . .
  • Cited – Hopgood v Brown CA ([1955] 1 WLR 213, [1955] 1 All ER 550, (1055) 99 Sol Jo 168, Bailii, [1955] EWCA Civ 7)
    Two adjoining plots were conveyed to the same purchaser. Buildings were constructed, and the adjusted boundary required an obtuse angle. The plots were sold on separately but with the original straight boundaries. The plans on the conveyances had no . .

These lists may be incomplete.
Last Update: 26 August 2020; Ref: scu.421539

Kelly v Solari: CexC 18 Nov 1841

Recovery was sought of money (andpound;200) paid an error of fact. There had been a life policy, but it had lapsed before the death of the life assured. The policy had been marked ‘lapsed’ but the marking had been overlooked.
Held: Where money is paid to another under the influence of a mistake in circumstances where if the true facts had been known the money would not have been paid, an action lies to recover the money and it is against the conscience of the recipient to retain it. Parke B said of Bilbie v Lumley that ‘All that that case decides is, that money paid with full knowledge of all the facts cannot be recovered back by reason of its having been paid in ignorance of the law’
A payment made in the knowledge that there was a ground to contest liability will be irrecoverable (Lord Abinger CB).
Lord Abinger CB accepted that Baron CB had put the matter too broadly at trial by using the expression ‘means of knowledge’. This was a very vague expression, and: ‘The safest rule however is, that if the party makes the payment with full knowledge of the facts, although under ignorance of the law, there being no fraud on the other side, he cannot recover it back again. There may also be cases in which, although he might by investigation learn the state of facts more accurately, he declines to do so, and chooses to pay the money notwithstanding; in that case there can be no doubt that he is equally bound. Then there is a third case, and the most difficult one, – where the party had once a full knowledge of the facts, but has since forgotten them. I certainly laid down the rule too widely to the jury, when I told them that if the directors once knew the facts they must be taken still to know them, and could not recover by saying that they had since forgotten them. I think the knowledge of the facts which disentitles the party from recovering, must mean a knowledge existing in the mind at the time of payment.’
Parke B agreed and said: ‘If, indeed, the money is intentionally paid, without reference to the truth or falsehood of the fact, the plaintiff meaning to waive all inquiry into it, and that the person receiving shall have the money at all events, whether the fact be true or false, the latter is certainly entitled to retain it; but if it is paid under the impression of the truth of a fact which is untrue, it may, generally speaking, be recovered back, however careless the party paying may have been, in omitting to use due diligence to inquire into the fact. In such a case the receiver was not entitled to it, nor intended to have it.’
Rolfe B mentioned two interpretations of the facts available to the jury: ‘first, that the jury may possibly find that the directors had not in truth forgotten the fact; and secondly, they may also come to the conclusion, that they had determined that they would not expose the office to unpopularity, and would therefore pay the money at all events.’
References: (1841) 9 M and W 54, [1841] EngR 1087, (1841) 152 ER 24
Links: Commonlii
Judges: Parke B, Lord Abinger CB, Gurney B, Rolfe B
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case cites:

  • Cited – Bilbie v Lumley and Others ((1802) 2 East 469, Commonlii, [1802] EngR 245, (1802) 102 ER 448)
    An underwriter paid a claim under a policy which he was entitled in law to repudiate for non-disclosure. Although he knew the relevant facts, he was not aware of their legal significance. He claimed back the money he had paid.
    Held: A contract . .

This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council etc HL (Gazette 18-Nov-98, Gazette 10-Feb-99, Times 30-Oct-98, House of Lords, Bailii, [1998] UKHL 38, [1999] 2 AC 349, [1998] 4 All ER 513, [1998] 3 WLR 1095, [1998] Lloyds Rep Bank 387)
    Kleinwort Benson had made payments to a local authority under swap agreements which were thought to be legally enforceable when made. Subsequently, a decision of the House of Lords, (Hazell v. Hammersmith and Fulham) established that such swap . .
  • Cited – Fisher v Brooker and Another ChD (Bailii, [2006] EWHC 3239 (Ch), [2007] FSR 12, [2007] EMLR 9)
    The claimant said that he had contributed to the copyright in the song ‘A Whiter Shade of Pale’ but had been denied royalties. He had played the organ and particularly the organ solo which had contrbuted significantly to the fame of the record.

These lists may be incomplete.Leading Case
Last Update: 21 August 2020; Ref: scu.236536

Rex v Electricity Commissioners, ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co (1920) Ltd: 1924

An objection was made that an inquiry was ultra vires.
Held: Since the cost of the inquiry would have been wholly wasted if, thereafter, the Minister and Parliament had approved the scheme only to be told at that late stage that the scheme was ultra vires, the courts could examine the issue. Where some administrative order or regulation is required by statute to be approved by resolution of both Houses of Parliament, the court can in an appropriate case intervene by way of judicial review before the Houses have given their approval.
Younger LJ said: ‘the interference of the Court in such a case as this, and at this stage, so far from being even in the most diluted sense of the words a challenge to its supremacy, will be an assistance to Parliament.’
Lord Atkin observed at a very early stage in the development of public law that he knew of ‘no authority which compels me to hold that a proceeding cannot be a judicial proceeding subject to prohibition or certiorari because it is subject to confirmation or approval, even where the approval has to be that of the Houses of Parliament.’
References: [1924] 1 KB 171
Judges: Younger LJ, Lord Atkin
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 09 August 2020; Ref: scu.258760

Dawkins v Antrobus: CA 1881

Sir George Jessel MR said: ‘I think it is my duty to construe the rules fairly and in the same way as I should any other contract and I have no right to give the words other than their ordinary meaning, or to construe the rules otherwise than in their ordinary sense.’
References: (1881) 17 Ch D 615
Judges: Sir George Jessel MR
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Speechley and Others v Allott and Others CA (Bailii, [2014] EWCA Civ 230)
    The parties disputed the management of a social club. The club owned a bowling green, and bowling members sought to restrain its closure. The appellants now said that the court should not have found at first instance that a meeting had validly . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 03 August 2020; Ref: scu.551299