The A-G, using RSC Order 52, sought a finding that the defendant was in contempt when, as a juror she had conducted internet research about the case, revealing her results to other jury members.
Held: She was in contempt. She had deliberately disobeyed the judge’s instructions not to conduct internet research. It was a contempt of court in the context of jury misconduct within the jury room ‘for a juror deliberately to disobey the direction of the judge and [thereby] create a [real] risk of prejudice to the due administration of justice. What that removes is a specific intent in relation to the creation of the risk. The intent is directed at the deliberate disobedience.’
Lord Judge CJ set out four elements which would ordinarily establish the two elements of contempt in cases where there had been deliberate disobedience to a judge’s direction or order: i) The juror knew that the judge had directed that the jury should not do a certain act.
ii) The juror appreciated that that was an order.
iii) The juror deliberately disobeyed the order.
iv) By doing so the juror risked prejudicing the due administration of justice.
and . . ‘We have no doubt that the defendant knew perfectly well, first, that the judge had directed her, and the other members of the jury, in unequivocal terms, that they should not seek information about the case from the Internet; second, that the defendant appreciated that this was an order; and, third, that the defendant deliberately disobeyed the order. By doing so, before she made any disclosure to her fellow jurors, she did not merely risk prejudice to the due administration of justice, but she caused prejudice to it. This was because she had sought to arm and had armed herself with information of possible relevance to the trial which, although not adduced in evidence, might have played its part in her verdict. The moment when she disclosed any of that information to her fellow jurors she further prejudiced the administration of justice. In the result, the jury was rightly discharged from returning a verdict and a new trial was ordered. The unfortunate complainant had to give evidence of his ordeal on a second occasion. The time of the other members of the jury was wasted, and the public was put to additional unnecessary expense. The damage to the administration of justice is obvious.
This contempt is proved to the criminal standard.’
Judges:
Lord Judge CJ, Hallett LJ, Openshaw J
Citations:
[2012] EWHC 156 (Admin), [2012] 1 WLR 991
Links:
Cited by:
Cited – HM Attorney General v Davey Admn 29-Jul-2013
The Attorney general sought the committal of the defendants for contempt of court alleging their misbehaviour as jurors. One had posted to a facebook account about the trial and lied about it to the judge. The second, in a different trial, had . .
At Admn – Dallas v The United Kingdom ECHR 11-Nov-2013
The applicant challenged her conviction for contempt of court in that whilst a juror, she researched the case before her on the internet, discovering that the defendant had faced an earlier allegation broadly similar. She now said that the . .
At Admn – Dallas v The United Kingdom ECHR 11-Feb-2016
Test for contempt was accessible and foreseeable.
The applicant had been convicted of contempt of court in that whilst acting as a juror, and in defiance of an explicit direction from the judge had researched the defendant in the internet, and passed on her findings to other jurors.
Held: the . .
Cited – HM Solicitor General v Cox and Another QBD 27-May-2016
Applications for committal of the defendants for having taken photographs of court proceedings when their friend was being sentenced for murder and publishing them on Facebook. The SG urged that the offences had aggravating features taking the . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Contempt of Court, Criminal Practice
Updated: 05 October 2022; Ref: scu.452174