Appeals were made against orders under s42 of the 1981 Act restraining the appellants from commencing proceedings without consent of the court.
Held: The non-disclosure of a bench memorandum was the usual practice internationally, and not a breach of the litigant’s human rights. The right to present a case, did not include the right to unlimited time to present a case, and an order was appropriate in this case. It is not a necessary condition of a finding that a person is a vexatious litigant that he should sue the same people again and again. That may be the usual hallmark, but it is not essential. The right of access to the Courts has to be balanced against the need to divide court resources properly between competing requirements.
Judges:
Lord Woolf of Barnes CJ, May LJ, Jonathan Parker J
Citations:
Times 02-Mar-2001, [2001] EWCA Civ 254
Links:
Statutes:
Supreme Court Act 1981 42(1), European Convention on Human Rights 6
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Citing:
Appeal from – Attorney-General v Covey QBD 6-Oct-2000
In an application for a vexatious litigant order, the court asked whether the repetitious proceedings must be against the same defendant. Lord Justice Rose: ‘The question is whether it is a necessary prerequisite for the making of an order under . .
Cited – Attorney General v Barker Admn 16-Feb-2000
The AG sought a civil proceedings order against the respondent.
Held: Before the court can make an order under the section it must be satisfied that the statutory precondition of an order is fulfilled, namely that the person against whom the . .
Cited by:
Cited – Attorney General v Perotti Admn 10-May-2006
The respondent had been subject first to a Grepe v Loam order and then to an extended civil restraint order. The court had still faced many hopeless applications. An order was now sought that any future application for permission to appeal be heard . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Administrative, Human Rights
Updated: 18 May 2022; Ref: scu.77985