An admission of guilt by a prisoner is not a pre-requisite for granting him parole, but it is a question of the circumstances of each case. A prisoner denied his guilt of the offence of arson with intent to endanger life. The Parole Board declined to recommend him for parole, and he challenged the decision by way of judicial review. It was submitted on his behalf that it is unlawful to exclude a man altogether from consideration for parole on grounds only that he maintains his innocence of the offence of which he was convicted.
Held: ‘Where a prisoner either pleads guilty or after conviction later accepts his guilt, it is plain that he is in a position to address his offending in the sense that he can examine his underlying motivation, unreasonable reactions to stress or provocation and anger management and such like matters. But there may be a variety of reasons why a prisoner will not accept his guilt. He may genuinely have been wrongly convicted. Although inwardly he may know he is guilty, he may be unwilling to accept that he has lied in the past or confront loss of face in accepting what he has hitherto denied. Where, for example, the offence is one of specific intent, he may genuinely have persuaded himself that he did not have the necessary intent. Such a man may in all other respects be a model prisoner. He may have behaved impeccably in prison, occupied his time constructively and shown himself trustworthy and reliable with a settled background to which to return. Should he be denied parole solely because of his attitude to the offence? In the majority of cases I think plainly not. Each case will depend upon its own circumstances and this Court should avoid trying to lay down principles which may well not be universally applicable. While I have no doubt that paragraph 1.3(b) should be taken into account in all cases, the weight to be attached to it will vary greatly. At one end of the scale is the persistent offender, in particular the persistent sex offender, who refuses to accept his guilt in the face of clear evidence and is unable to accept that he has a propensity to such conduct which needs to be tackled if he is not to offend again.
In such a case it may well be a determinative consideration. At the other end of the scale is the first offender, where the motivation for the offence is clear and does not point to a likelihood of re-offending. In the majority of cases it is unlikely to be more than one of many factors to which undue weight should not be given.’
Judges:
Stuart-Smith LJ, Butterfield J
Citations:
Times 26-Jul-1995
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Regina v Secretary of State for Home Department ex parte Hepworth, Fenton-Palmer and Baldonzy and Regina v Parole Board ex parte Winfield Admn 25-Mar-1997
The applicants for judicial review had each been convicted and sentenced for sex offences. Each maintained his innocence, and now complained that that fact had prejudiced decisions as to early release on parole and as to their categorisation.
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Criminal Sentencing, Prisons
Updated: 28 April 2022; Ref: scu.87821