The defendant appealed against his conviction for reckless driving (absolute discharge and ten penalty points). He drove his car slowly on the pavement in front of a shopping precinct. He said that this had seemed to him to be the only way in which he could escape from a gang of 20-30 youths who had already banged on his car and threatened to kill him, and were now bent on doing him further violence: ‘The appellant realised that the only conceivable way he could somehow escape from this formidable gang of youths, who were obviously bent on doing further violence, was to mount the pavement on the right-hand side of [the road] and on the pavement to drive through a small gap into the front of the shopping precinct.’ It was ruled that a defence of necessity was not available to him on those facts.
Held: The conviction was unsafe. The judge had failed to ask the jury to record a formal verdict, the defendant having pleaded guilty only after the case had been opened to them. The court doubted whether the defence of necessity was in point, but the jury ought to have been left to decide whether ‘the appellant was wholly driven by force of circumstances into doing what he did, and did not drive the car otherwise than under that form of compulsion, i.e. under duress’.
Watkins LJ said: ‘Returning to how the appellant came to change his plea, one begins with the reasons advanced by the assistant recorder for declaring that the defence of necessity was not available to the appellant. He seems to have based himself upon the proposition, though saying that necessity was a defence known to English law, that it was not, albeit available to the appellant in respect of the journey through the gap into the car park in front of the shopping precinct, available to him upon the return journey because he was not at that stage being besieged by the gang of youths. We feel bound to say that it would have been for the jury to decide, if necessity could have been a defence at all in those circumstances, whether the whole incident should be regarded as one, or could properly be regarded as two separate incidents so as to enable them to say that the necessity applied in one instance but not the other. For that reason alone the course adopted by the Assistant Recorder was we think seriously at fault. Beyond that upon the issue of necessity we see no need to go for what we deem to have been appropriate in these circumstances to raise as a defence by the appellant was duress. The appellant in effect said: ‘I could do no other in the face of this hostility than to take the right turn as I did, to mount the pavement and to drive through the gap out of further harm’s way, harm to person and harm to my property.’ Thus the offence of duress, it seems to us, arose but was not pursued. What ought to have happened therefore was that the Assistant Recorder upon those facts should have directed that he would leave to the jury the question as to whether or not upon the outward or return journey, or both, the appellant was wholly driven by force of circumstances into doing what he did and did not drive the car otherwise than under that form of compulsion, i.e., under duress.’
Watkins LJ
(1986) 83 Cr App R 225
England and Wales
Cited by:
Cited – Regina v Conway 1989
The defendant said that he had driven recklessly because he was in fear for his life and that of his passenger.
Held: The court was bound by Willer to rule that a defence of duress was available. It was convenient to refer to this type of . .
Cited – In Re A (Minors) (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment); aka In re A (Children) (Conjoined Twins: Surgical Separation) CA 22-Sep-2000
Twins were conjoined (Siamese). Medically, both could not survive, and one was dependent upon the vital organs of the other. Doctors applied for permission to separate the twins which would be followed by the inevitable death of one of them. The . .
Cited – Regina v Pommell CACD 16-May-1995
The defendant appealed against his conviction for possessing a loaded shotgun. He had wished to advance a defence to the effect that on the previous evening he had taken it ‘off a geezer who was going to do some damage with it’ in order to stop him. . .
Cited – Regina v Rodger, Rose CACD 9-Jul-1997
The two defendants escaped from Parkhurst Prison. On capture they said that as murderers, they had received notices that though they had behaved without criticism in prison, their tarriffs had been increased. They said they felt unable to face . .
Cited – Regina v Denton CACD 1987
Necessity not a defence to reckless driving
The trial judge had refused to leave to the jury the defence of necessity, which the appellant sought to bring to a road traffic allegation.
Held: The appeal failed. Caulfield J referred to the authorities, and said: ‘In view of our ultimate . .
Cited – Regina v Conway CACD 28-Jul-1988
The defendant appealed against his conviction for reckless driving. He said the offence was committed out of necessity, since his passenger’s life was under threat.
Held: Necessity can only be a defence to a charge of reckless driving where . .
Cited – Regina v Conway CACD 28-Jul-1988
The defendant appealed against his conviction for reckless driving. He said the offence was committed out of necessity, since his passenger’s life was under threat.
Held: Necessity can only be a defence to a charge of reckless driving where . .
Cited – Regina v Martin (Colin) CACD 29-Nov-1988
Defence of Necessity has a Place in Criminal Law
The defendant appealed against his conviction for driving whilst disqualified. He said he had felt obliged to drive his stepson to work because his stepson had overslept. His wife (who had suicidal tendencies) had been threatening suicide unless he . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Road Traffic, Criminal Practice
Leading Case
Updated: 01 November 2021; Ref: scu.213666