The court considered the requirement that a proposed beneficiary must establish some positive act on the part of the person creating the trust for that person to be bound by the trust asserted. Megarry J said: ‘(1) If a transaction fails to make any effective disposition of any interest it does nothing. This is so at law and in equity, and has nothing to do with resulting trusts. (2) Normally the mere existence of some unexpressed intention in the breast of the owner of the property does nothing: there must at least be some expression of that intention before it can effect any result. To yearn is not to transfer. (3) Before any doctrine of resulting trust can come into play, there must at least be some effective transaction which transfers or creates some interest in property. (4) Where A effectually transfers to B (or creates in his favour) any interest in any property, whether legal or equitable, a resulting trust for A may arise in two distinct classes of case. For simplicity, I shall confine my statement to cases in which the transfer or creation is made without B providing any valuable consideration, and where no presumption of advancement can arise; and I shall state the position for transfers without specific mention of the creation of new interests. (a) The first class of case is where the transfer to B is not made on any trust. If, of course, it appears from the transfer that B is intended to hold on certain trusts, that will be decisive, and the case is not within this category; and similarly if it appears that B is intended to take beneficially. But in other cases there is a rebuttable presumption that B holds on a resulting trust for A. The question is not one of the automatic consequences of a dispositive failure by A, but one of presumption: the property has been carried to B, and from the absence of consideration and any presumption of advancement B is presumed not only to hold the entire interest on trust, but also to hold the beneficial interest for A absolutely. The presumption thus establishes both that B is to take on trust and also what that trust is. Such resulting trusts may be called ‘presumed resulting trusts. (b) The second class of case is where the transfer to B is made on trusts which leave some or all of the beneficial interest undisposed of. Here B automatically holds on a resulting trust for A to the extent that the beneficial interest has not been carried to him or others. The resulting trust here does not depend on any intentions or presumptions, but is the automatic consequence of A’s failure to dispose of what is vested in him. Since ex hypothesi the transfer is on trust, the resulting trust does not establish the trust but merely carries back to A the beneficial interest that has not been disposed of. Such resulting trusts may be called ‘automatic resulting trusts. (5) Where trustees hold property in trust for A, and it is they who, at A’s direction, make the transfer to B, similar principles apply, even though on the face of the transaction the transferor appears to be the trustees and not A. If the transfer to B is on trust, B will hold any beneficial interest that has not been effectually disposed of on an automatic resulting trust for the true transferor, A. If the transfer to B is not on trust, there will be a rebuttable presumption that B holds on a resulting trust for A.’
Megarry J
[1974] 1 Ch 269
England and Wales
Citing:
See Also – Vandervell v Inland Revenue Commissioners HL 24-Nov-1966
The taxpayer made a gift of shares to a trust set up to fund a medical professorship. The shares were in a private company, and an option was given for their repurchase once a certain level of dividends had been attributed to them. He was assessed . .
Cited by:
Cited – Allen and Another v Rochdale Borough Council CA 23-Mar-1999
Land was sold. It had been used as playing fields. The freehold and leasehold interests in the land were held by the respondent, and the claimants asserted it was held as bare trustees for them as charitable trustees for the school foundation. The . .
Appeal from – White and others v Vandervell Trustees Ltd. (No. 2), Re Vandervell’s Trusts (No 2) CA 3-Jul-1974
Lord Denning MR described the modern practice concerning pleadings: ‘It is sufficient for the pleader to state the material facts. He need not state the legal result. If, for convenience, he does so, he is not bound by, or limited to, what he has . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Trusts
Leading Case
Updated: 10 November 2021; Ref: scu.187406