Where the Court of Session has, under the power conferred by section 2 of the Jury Trials Amendment (Scotland) Act 1910, after hearing parties on a rule in terms of section 6 of the Jury Trials (Scotland) Act 1815, on the ground that the verdict is contrary to evidence, set aside the verdict and in place of granting a new trial has entered judgment for the party unsuccessful at the trial, an appeal to the House of Lords, notwithstanding that no appeal is competent under section 6 of the 1815 Act, is competent.
‘To submit the language used on privileged occasions to a strict scrutiny and to hold all excess beyond the actual exigencies of the occasion to be evidence of express malice would greatly limit if not altogether defeat the protection which the law gives to statements so made ( Laughton v. Sodor and Man, L. R., 4 P.C. 495). The real question is whether, having regard to the circumstances, the statement is so violent as to afford evidence that it could not have been fairly and honestly made; for the very essence of a privileged occasion is that it protects statements that are defamatory and false, when apart from the protection the very character of the statement itself carries with it the implication of malice. If once the privilege be established, unless there be extrinsic evidence of malice, there must be something so extreme in the words used as to rebut the presumption of innocence and to afford evidence that there was a wrong and an indirect motive prompting the publication ( Spill v. Maule, L.R., 4 Ex. 232)’-per Lord Chancellor Buckmaster.
Judges:
Lord Chancellor (Buckmaster), Viscount Haldane, Lords Kinnear, Atkinson, and Parker
Citations:
[1916] UKHL 557, 53 SLR 557
Links:
Statutes:
Jury Trials Amendment (Scotland) Act 1910
Jurisdiction:
Scotland
Defamation, Litigation Practice
Updated: 11 July 2022; Ref: scu.630685