The claimant appealed against rejection of her objection to the defendant’s decision that it had discharged its housing duties toward her.
Held: The appeal succeeded. Etherton LJ said: ‘The accommodation offered by Camden to the applicant comprised two self-contained flats, on the same floor of the building, but a short distance apart, one of which was offered for occupation by the applicant and her sister and the other by her father. On any ordinary use of language, that was not the provision of accommodation which the applicant and her father were to occupy ‘together with’ one another. They would be living close by each other, but separate from one another. No one could reasonably describe them, in such circumstances, as living ‘together with’ one another. That ordinary meaning of the legislative language is reflected in the wording of section 176(a) which refers to a ‘person who normally resides with’ the applicant. It seems reasonable to suppose that concepts of occupation by the applicant ‘together with’ another, and residence of the applicant ‘with’ that other, were intended by Parliament to have a similar meaning. It cannot be said, on any ordinary use of language, that persons living in separate self-contained flats, however close, and not sharing any communal area, are residing together.’
Judges:
Jacob, Wilson, Etherton LJJ
Citations:
[2011] EWCA Civ 463, [2011] PTSR 1695
Links:
Statutes:
Jurisdiction:
England and Wales
Cited by:
Appeal from – Sharif v The London Borough of Camden SC 20-Feb-2013
The council appealed against a decision that having found Ms Sharif to be homeless, they had a duty also to house her sick father and sister as family members in one accomodation unit.
Held: The Council’s appeal succeeded (Lord Kerr . .
Lists of cited by and citing cases may be incomplete.
Housing
Updated: 08 September 2022; Ref: scu.434843